GOVSI Podkast: Ustavimo dezinformacije

Ob začetku kampanje Ustavimo dezinformacije – preBERI, preMISLI, PREVERI to temo podrobneje osvetljujemo tudi v novi epizodi GOVSI podkasta. 

Naš gost je vodja skupine za politiko, strategijo in globalna prednostna vprašanja v oddelku za strateško komuniciranje Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje (ESZD) Siim Kumpas. Preden se je pridružil ESZD, je Kumpas oblikoval in izvajal pristop Estonije k izgradnji odpornosti proti manipulaciji z informacijami s strani tujih držav. Je tudi gostujoči predavatelj na Estonski akademiji za varnostne vede, kjer predava o strateškem komuniciranju in psihološki obrambi. 

Kaj so dezinformacije? 

Dezinformacije so zavajajoče ali nepravilne informacije, ki jih širijo posamezniki, organizacije in države z namenom zavajanja ali manipuliranja s posamezniki in javnim mnenjem. 

Največji učinek imajo v obdobju kriz, negotovosti in splošnega nezadovoljstva, ker delujejo na čustveni ravni in vplivajo na mnenje in odločitve ljudi. Njihov namen je ustvariti zmedo, vzbuditi jezo, strah, škodovati ugledu posameznikov, organizacij ali institucij in držav. Težava širjenja lažnih informacij je najizrazitejša v kriznih razmerah, kakršna je bila na primer pandemija novega koronavirusa. 

Vse evropske institucije nas opozarjajo, da lahko nov val dezinformacijskih kampanj pričakujemo tudi pred prihajajočimi evropskimi volitvami. Tudi zato želimo javnost čim bolj ozavestiti, da je kritično sprejemanje informacij in preverjanje zanesljivosti virov v današnjem času nujno. 

Pogovor vodi Zoran Potič. 

Vabljeni k ogledu in poslušanju.

[ENGLISH VERSION] 
GOVSI Podcast: let's STOP DISINFORMATION 

To mark the launch of the 'Stop Disinformation - READ, THINK, CHECK' campaign, we're taking a closer look at this topic in a new episode of the GOVSI Podcast. 

Our guest is Siim Kumpas, Head of the Policy, Strategy and Global Priorities Group in the Strategic Communication Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Prior to joining the EEAS, Kumpas designed and implemented Estonia's approach to building resilience against information manipulation by foreign states. He is also a guest lecturer at the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, where he lectures on strategic communication and psychological defence. 

What is disinformation? 

Disinformation is misleading or inaccurate information disseminated by individuals, organisations, and states with the intention of misleading or manipulating individuals and public opinion. 

They are most effective in times of crisis, uncertainty, and general dissatisfaction because they operate at an emotional level and influence people's opinions and decisions. They aim to create confusion, anger, fear, damage the reputation of individuals, organisations or institutions and countries. The problem of the spread of false information is most pronounced in crisis situations, such as the new coronavirus pandemic. 

All European institutions are warning us to expect a new wave of disinformation campaigns ahead of the upcoming European elections. All European institutions are warning us to expect a new wave of disinformation campaigns ahead of the upcoming European elections. This is one of the reasons why we want to make the public as aware as possible of the need to critically accept information and to check the reliability of sources nowadays. 

Moderated by Zoran Potič. 

You are invited to watch and listen. 

Transcript

Vladni podkast GOVSI. 

Voditelj Zoran Potič: Lep pozdrav v novem podkastu GOVSI. Pred vami je nov podkast in prinašamo vam dve novosti, namreč novo akcijo, novo platformo Ustavimo dezinformacije. Lahko jo tudi tu preberemo. Preberi, premisli, preveri, ustavimo dezinformacije. Tudi tokrat imamo gosta iz tujine. Prihaja iz Estonije oziroma Bruslja, kjer se ukvarja z dezinformacijami oziroma fenomenom, ki je v zadnjem obdobju zelo prisoten. Torej, pogovarjamo se s Siimom Kumpasom, strokovnjakom za boj proti dezinformacijam. 

Gost Siim Kumpas: Hvala, lepo je biti tukaj, hvala za povabilo. Sem Siim Kumpas, trenutno delam na Evropski službi za zunanje delovanje (ESZD), ki je, na kratko, v bistvu ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve EU, z nekaj razlikami od narodnih ministrstev za zunanje zadeve. Ker sem to že počel v Estoniji, je moja vloga ta, da podpiram ekipo, ki se ukvarja s t. i. tujo informacijsko manipulacijo in vmešavanjem. Gre za to, da skušamo ugotoviti, kako najbolje varovati sosesko Evropske unije pred zlonamernimi dejavnostmi, zlasti v informacijskem okolju, naj gre za dezinformacije, napačne ali zlonamerne informacije. Vladam, kot sta ruska ali kitajska, skušamo preprečiti vmešavanje v informacijsko okolje ob Evropski uniji. 

Voditelj: To pomeni, da se osredotočate na zunanje zadeve, torej ne na države članice Evropske unije, temveč na tretje države, kot sta Rusija in Kitajska. So še kakšne druge države, ki so "nevarne" na tem področju? 

Kumpas: Prav imate, ne osredotočamo se na države članice Evropske unije, saj to ni naloga, ki so nam jo države članice naložile. Dale so nam nalogo, da gledamo zunaj EU. Tam pa glavne grožnje izvirajo iz Rusije, v manjši in drugačni, a vseeno veliki meri, pa tudi iz Kitajske. So tudi druge vlade, ki se aktivno skušajo vmešavati v zadeve Evropske unije, toda naša ekipa na ESZD se ukvarja s tema vladama, z Rusijo in Kitajsko, saj sta se izkazali kot največji grožnji Evropski uniji. 

Voditelj: Morda veste o tem veliko več, toda Slovenija je pred nekaj tedni izgnala ruskega diplomata zaradi obsežne propagande, ki jo je uporabljal proti slovenskim nacionalnim interesom. Taka je bila razlaga. Kako obsežna je ruska propaganda z vašega vidika? Kaj se dogaja na področju informacijske vojne? 

Kumpas: Ogromna je. Na različne načine lahko razložimo ali ponazorimo, kako velik je ta problem. Lahko začnemo s številkami. Če pogledamo, koliko Rusija vlaga samo v svoje državne medijske hiše, kot so Sputnik, RT in več drugih, je lani to znašalo okrog 1,5 milijarde evrov. 

Voditelj: Ali to pomeni, da je ruska vlada vložila toliko denarja v propagando skozi svoje medije? 

Kumpas: Točno, in to je le del, za katerega vemo, ker so to javno povedali. Poleg tistih »medijskih hiš«, in narekovaje uporabljam, ker se ne vedejo kot novinarji ali mediji, dobro vemo, kako uporabljajo svoje obveščevalne službe in druge vladne organe za vmešavanje v naše zadeve. Vemo, da je resnična številka veliko višja. Za kontekst, proračun ESZD za delo s strateško komunikacijo in boj proti informacijski manipulaciji je približno stokrat manjši od zneska, ki sem ga navedel. To kaže, kako nesomerna je naša naloga. In trenutno govoriva samo o Rusiji. K temu je treba dodati še Kitajsko, ki namenja še več sredstev, da dela, karkoli se ji zahoče. Tak je problem, s katerim se soočamo. Gre za zelo nesomerno grožnjo v smislu financiranja, pa tudi v smislu pravil igre. S tem mislim, da ko skušamo preprečiti ruske dezinformacije in informacijsko manipulacijo, moramo pri tem upoštevati določene etične in moralne standarde, iz očitnih razlogov. 

Voditelj: Kakšni pa so? Svoboda govora? 

Kumpas: O tem govorimo največ, svoboda govora, svoboda tiska, svoboda izražanja mnenja, pravica do zbiranja ... A ko pogledamo, kako deluje Kremelj, njim sploh ni mar za to. Ravno nasprotno, našo odprtost uporabljajo proti nam. Našo odprtost skušajo spremeniti v šibkost. Mislim, da nam ni treba pretirano skrbeti glede tega, kar počnejo. Svojo odprtost moramo sprejeti, saj ni šibkost, temveč prednost. Kaže, da lahko delujemo kot demokratična, odprta družba. 

Voditelj: Zadnji primer je bil Voice of Europe. 

Kumpas: Precej ciničen, glede na ime, seveda. 

Voditelj: Ja, Glas Evrope. 

Kumpas: Tako je. 

Voditelj: Zanimivo. Ali obstajajo tudi drugi portali ali mediji, kot je Voice of Europe? Ali lahko v prihodnosti pričakujemo nove tovrstne primere? Kaj lahko rečete o tem? 

Kumpas: Nimam kristalne krogle, a če v prihodnosti ne bomo videli novega medija, kot je Voice of Europe, bom izjemno presenečen, saj že leta opazujemo, kako Rusija deluje. Na ravni EU to delamo že od leta 2015, skoraj 10 let, nekatere države članice pa še veliko dlje, zlasti baltske in nordijske države, Poljska in nekaj drugih. Te že desetletja opazujejo Rusijo. Iz čistih izkušenj vemo, da tako delujejo. s tem mislim Kremelj, rusko vlado oziroma režim. Z informacijami je tam drugače kot tu, v zahodnih demokratičnih državah. Zanje so informacije orodje ali celo orožje, še posebej, če na primer pogledamo, kako so uporabili informacijske operacije skupaj z vojaškimi napadi na Ukrajino. To kaže, kako so te informacijske operacije integrirane z njihovimi vojaškimi operacijami, diplomatskimi dejavnostmi in vsem ostalim. To je bistven del njihovega načina razmišljanja in delovanja. 

Voditelj: Kakšno metodologijo in orodje uporabljajo? Kako poteka širjenje dezinformacij? Kakšen je vzorec? Kako lahko to prepoznamo? Kaj bi priporočili državam članicam, vladam? EU namreč na tem področju nima politike, kajne? 

Kumpas: Pravzaprav ima politike na tem področju, če se ne motim, saj se EU s tem problemom ukvarja že skoraj deset let. Zares smo postali dejavni, ko je Rusija prvič napadla Ukrajino, leta 2014. Potem je bilo več različnih političnih pobud, dokumentov, a ne bom šel v podrobnosti, ker lahko postane dolgočasno in birokratično. Bom pa rekel, da imamo vzpostavljene ekipe, ki se ukvarjajo s tem, kot je naša na ESZD, imamo tudi ekipe v Evropski komisiji in parlamentu, ki spremljajo vpletanje v volitve. Spremljajo, kako Rusija skuša vplivati na evropske volitve. Imamo nove zakone, ki jih pred nekaj leti še ni bilo. Imamo zakone, ki spletne platforme, kot so Facebook, Google, Youtube, Twitter oz. X, obvezujejo k večji transparentnosti, deljenju podatkov s strokovnjaki, nudenju možnosti uporabnikom, da se lahko bolje zaščitijo itn. EU je naredila veliko, ampak težave ne moremo rešiti iz Bruslja, ker Rusija redko napade Bruselj. Pogosteje napadajo posamezne članice po načelu deli in vladaj. Žrtev razdeliš na več kosov in potem napadeš te. To je nekaj, na kar morajo biti pripravljene vse države in delati na tem. Vlagati morajo denar, čas in trud, da ugotovijo, kako Rusija vpliva na njihovo informacijsko okolje, in nato ukrepajo. 

Voditelj: Katere države so po mnenju Bruslja najšibkejši člen te verige pri boju z dezinformacijami? Madžarska, Slovaška, Slovenija? 

Kumpas: Sem diplomat, zato ne bom imenoval nobene države, ampak mislim, da države, ki so najšibkejše, niso nujno države v neposredni bližini Rusije, če pogledamo na zemljevid. Države poleg Rusije so po eni strani najbolj na udaru te grožnje, po drugi strani pa se zavedajo, da je to resna grožnja, in so sprejele ukrepe. Dlje kot je neka država od Rusije, manj so zaščiteni pred njo. To lahko rečem. 

Voditelj: Torej pravite, da bi morale vse države zagotoviti programsko opremo za boj proti dezinformacijam? Kakšna orodja bi morali zagotoviti? 

Kumpas: Ne gre samo za programsko opremo. 

Voditelj: Programska oprema v narekovajih. 

Kumpas: Vem, kaj mislite. V Bruslju mislimo, da potrebujemo nekaj ključnih stvari. Najprej moramo razumeti, kakšna je grožnja. Moramo se zavedati situacije. Gre samo za to, da razumemo, kdo je grožnja, kdo nas hoče napasti, kako nas skušajo napasti, kakšne načine uporabljajo, kakšna omrežja skušajo zgraditi in kaj pravijo. Kakšna je zgodba, kakšno je sporočilo, kaj nam hočejo prodati, če hočete. To je prvi korak. Če se hočemo resno in sistemsko lotiti težave, moramo najprej razumeti grožnjo. Tudi ljudi moramo vprašati, kaj mislijo, in izvajati ankete, ker tudi če vemo, kaj Rusija počne, moramo vedeti, ali ljudje dejansko verjamejo zgodbam, ki nam jih Rusija skuša prodati. Ko to vemo, lahko začnemo iskati rešitve. Ko govorimo o rešitvah, lahko naredimo marsikaj in veliko tudi že delamo. Ena najpomembnejših stvari, ki jo vedno omenim, je ozaveščanje v najožjem pomenu besede. Ljudje morajo razumeti, da obstaja grožnja. Če vlade in odločevalci ne razumejo grožnje, ne bodo vlagali denarja v politične rešitve. Če posamezniki ne razumejo grožnje v informacijah, ki jih dobivajo, ne bodo poslušali nasvetov in vlade, ki jim pravi, naj bodo pozorni. Razumeti morajo, da obstaja grožnja, hkrati pa nočemo panike. Nočemo napihovati grožnje. Tu prihaja do ironičnega preobrata. Rusija se skuša predstavljati kot večja grožnja, kot v resnici je. Obstajajo primeri, ko trdijo, da odločajo o tem, kdo bo naslednji ameriški predsednik, kar je absurdno. Vemo, da so se večkrat vpletali v ameriške volitve, to je dejstvo, dejstvo pa je tudi, da je bil dejanski vpliv zelo omejen. Mogoče nekaj odstotnih točk če sploh toliko, ampak trdijo, da so izbrali predsednika, da bi nas prestrašili in prepričali, da se ne moremo zaščititi. Iščemo srednjo pot, nočemo ne premalo ozaveščenosti ne panike. Naredimo lahko še marsikaj. Vlagamo v medijsko pismenost, učimo ljudi biti bolj kritični in razmišljati o tem, kar preberejo, zlasti na družbenih omrežjih, ki sicer niso več novi mediji, ampak jih nismo vajeni toliko kot televizije, radia ali časopisov. Tu je še veliko prostora za izobraževanje in še marsikaj. 

Voditelj: Govorite o celostnem pristopu. 

Kumpas: Točno. 

Voditelj: Ne vem, kaj mislite, ampak kako se lahko vlade borijo proti dezinformacijam? Če so preveč aktivne, jih lahko obtožijo cenzure. To je dvorezen meč in lahko predstavlja težavo. 

Kumpas: Res je. Pretiran odziv je lahko večja težava od težave same, zato verjamemo, pa ne le verjamemo, ampak tudi ukrepamo celostno. To je težava, ki vpliva na vse vidike družbe, in edini način, da jo - ne bom rekel rešimo, ker vlade, kot je kremeljska, ne bodo nehale uporabljati informacij kot orožje - lahko pa jim to otežimo. Lahko postane dražje, bolj zamudno, zahtevnejše. To lahko naredimo, edini način pa je, da sodeluje vsa družba. Pomembno vlogo imajo mediji, podjetja in družbena omrežja. Nekatera podjetja imajo odlična orodja za spremljanje, ki jih raziskovalci, vlade in novinarji potrebujejo za lažje odkrivanje dezinformacij. Pomembno vlogo imajo tudi šole. Edina dolgoročna rešitev je povezovanje vseh dejavnikov, gonilna sila pa mora biti vlada, ker je to edini del družbe, ki lahko združi vse ostale. Vlade imajo ključno vlogo, ne morejo pa se s tem ukvarjati samo one. Pristop ne sme biti pregrob. 

Voditelj: V Evropi imamo volitve čez dva meseca. 

Kumpas: Imamo. 

Voditelj: Kakšne aktivnosti od zunaj ste zaznali? Kakšne vzorce lahko vidimo? Kaj se dogaja na tem področju? 

Kumpas: Na podlagi našega spremljanja in analiz lahko vidimo, da se zadnje mesece ni veliko dogajalo, kar se tiče ruskega vpletanja v naše volitve. Seveda ujamemo kakšnega ruskega vohuna ali pa se njihovi ljudje … Nekateri se infiltrirajo v politične položaje v EU ali Bruslju. Kar se tiče določenih govorov, sporočil ali vsebine o volitvah, tega ni bilo veliko. Zdaj pa vidimo, da to narašča. To se ujema s teorijo. Teorija pa je, da je največ poskusov vmešavanja 48 do 72 ur pred volitvami. Zato se na to zares pripravljamo dva do tri dni pred volitvami. Spremljamo in delimo podatke z državami članicami EU, vključno s Slovenijo in drugimi. Tega ne vodi Evropski parlament, saj oni nadzirajo volitve. Vidimo, da je Rusija vse bolj dejavna. Če govorimo o tem, kakšna sporočila poskušajo uporabiti proti državam članicam EU pred volitvami, je to nekaj stvari. Predvsem še vedno zelo pritiskajo na Ukrajino. Poskušajo podpreti glasove, ljudi in stranke, ki so bolj kritični glede podpore Ukrajini. Zelo se trudijo, da bi EU zmanjšala podporo Ukrajini. To je ena velika skupina tem. Druga velika skupina je, ko se trudijo, da bi ljudje izgubili zaupanje v volitve na splošno. En razlog za to je odziv ljudi, ki ne zaupajo volitvam. Kako se odzovejo? Ne gredo volit. Manj ljudi gre volit, manj legitimne so, morda voli manj ljudi, ki bi sicer volili razumne sredinske stranke, voli pa več ljudi, ki izbirajo skrajne ali obrobne stranke. Temu smo bili priča doslej. Zmanjševanje podpore Ukrajini in splošnega zaupanja v volitve, v volilni sistem in tako dalje. 

Voditelj: Kakšen pristop uporabljajo pri tem ... Kako poskušajo doseči cilje? Kakšne metode uporabljajo? 

Kumpas: To je odlično vprašanje, kajti pri svojem delu poskušamo vse bolj razumeti in zaznati manipulativno vedenje. Preprosto povedano, vsebina ali sporočilo je le del sestavljanke. To lahko primerjamo z zavajajočim sporočilom glede podpore Ukrajini. Ampak to je samo viden del ledene gore. Veliko večji del operacije se odvija spodaj, kjer ga ne vidimo. Pogosto uporabim primerjavo s kroglo in pištolo. Sporočilo, ki meri na podporo Ukrajini, bi bila krogla, ki zadene občinstvo. V najslabšem primeru povzroči škodo ali spremeni mišljenje žrtve. Poleg krogle pa imaš tudi pištolo, nekdo pritisne na petelina, nekdo ustreli. Enako velja za dezinformacije. Sporočilo doseže občinstvo, da ljudje razmišljajo ali se vedejo drugače, ampak nekdo je moral ustvariti to sporočilo, ga nekje objaviti in nato širiti, promovirati. Zunaj je veliko podatkov in lahko objaviš, kar hočeš, a to mora priti do ljudi. Tukaj se vprašamo, kaj počnejo in kako dostavljajo ta sporočila. Pri tem so precej zviti. 

Voditelj: Lahko lociramo te ljudi ali organizacije? 

Kumpas: Te mreže. 

Voditelj: Ja, mreže. Je to možno? 

Kumpas: Pri tem smo čedalje boljši. V Bruslju, pa tudi v EU kot celoti. Več držav članic je ustvarilo nove enote, agencije in premikajo poudarek z gole vsebine na širše manipulativno vedenje. Zato pravim, da smo čedalje boljši pri odkrivanju teh mrež povezanih računov. Morda so lažni, morda pa so pristni. V zadnjem letu smo videli, da Rusija pogosto uporablja ne zmanipulirane, pač pa ponarejene medije. Ustvarijo nekaj, kar je videti kot najpomembnejši časopis v Sloveniji, ko odpreš spletno stran, vidiš, da je ena črka v naslovu drugačna. 95-odstotno pa je videti enako kot dejanski časopis. In denimo devet zgodb na spletni strani je enakih kot v dejanskem časopisu. Ena zgodba pa je podtaknjena. To smo v zadnjem letu videli že neštetokrat. Ponaredijo slavne spletne izdaje Le Monda, Le Figara, Deutsche Welle in številnih drugih. Vsi ne bodo nasedli. Mnogi vidijo, da je to lažna stran. Veliko ljudi pa tudi ne pogleda vrstice z naslovom in ne preverijo vseh črk, ali je vse enako. Ja, na več načinov nas skušajo pretentati. 

Voditelj: Nam lahko pojasnite razliko med napačno informacijo, dezinformacijo in lažno novico? 

Kumpas: Ja. 

Voditelj: Običajne ljudi to precej zmede. 

Kumpas: Seveda. 

Voditelj: Izvolite. 

Kumpas: Ne bi se osredotočal na ali ustavljal pri lažni novici. Ta izraz smo res uporabljali, zlasti okoli leta 2016, 2017, ko so bile v ZDA predsedniške volitve. 

Voditelj: Se lahko za hip ustaviva? Govorilo se je, da je lažna novica samo alternativno dejstvo. Da lažnih novic ni, samo alternativna dejstva. Kaj je to? Takrat smo si zastavljali to vprašanje. 

Kumpas: Tako je. Pri tej zamisli o lažni novici sta dve večji težavi. Prva je ... Vsebina in vedenje, ki nas skušata zavesti. To pogosto ni novica. Lažna novica je napačna oznaka. Še pomembneje pa je, da je ta izraz spolitiziran, še posebej v ZDA, pa tudi v nekaterih evropskih državah. Včasih politiki označijo kot lažno novico vse, kar jim ni všeč. Ko neki časopis kritizira populističnega politika, ta reče, da je to lažna novica in da ne ve ničesar o tem. Zato lažna novica ni dober izraz in odsvetujem uporabo. Če pa skočimo na napačno novico in dezinformacije ... Rad bi poenostavil, zato pravim, da za običajne ljudi, povprečne prejemnike podatkov to ni pomembno. Oboje je enako v smislu ... Rad povem primerjavo ali primer. Tukaj bi to primerjal s tem, da vas zadane avto. Če ste žrtev, ni pomembno, ali vas je voznik povozil namenoma ali po nesreči. Mogoče ga je zaslepilo sonce in za hip ni videl. Ali mu je postalo slabo in se je zato zaletel v vas. Škoda je v vsakem primeru enaka. S profesionalnega vidika pa obstaja razlika. Napačni podatki niso namerni. To so napačne ali zavajajoče informacije, ki pa jih niso ustvarili ali širili namerno. Tudi dezinformacije so napačne in zavajajoče, vendar zavestno. V tem primeru gre za nekoga, ki nas skuša namerno zavajati zaradi politične koristi ali gospodarske koristi. Včasih pa tudi iz osebnih razlogov. 

Voditelj: Obstaja še en izraz. FIMI. 

Kumpas: Ja, FIMI, ki ga mi obožujemo. Ne le zato, ker smo mi skovali ta izraz, pač pa menimo, da bolje zajema to težavo oziroma grožnjo. To je kratica za tujo informacijsko manipulacijo in vmešavanje. Kot sem že omenil, pri tem gledamo širšo sliko oziroma manipulativno vedenje. Naj omenim nekaj praktičnih primerov, da ne bomo preveč teoretični. Recimo, da imam deset lažnih računov. Je to dezinformacija? Ne. Ali lahko uporabim te račune, če hočem širiti  dezinformacije? Ja. To skušam povedati. Obstaja manipulativno obnašanje, ki ne spada vedno pod dezinformacije, a je omrežje, ki ga potrebujejo ... Morda je še boljša beseda infrastruktura, ki jo potrebujejo, da lahko dezinformacije posredujejo različnemu občinstvu. Zato delamo s konceptom FIMI. Še en pomemben del tega, ki prav tako ne spada pod dezinformacije, a je enako težaven, je to, kar počne predvsem Kitajska. Govorimo lahko o cenzuri, o zatiranju neodvisnih glasov znotraj Kitajske in vse več tudi znotraj Rusije. Rusija to počne vse pogosteje. Če se ozremo pet let nazaj, je bila Kitajska pri domači cenzuri daleč pred Rusijo, sploh na spletu, od ruske invazije na Ukrajino pred dvema letoma pa Rusija strogo nadzoruje neodvisni govor na spletu in v življenju. Ruski neodvisni mediji sploh več ne obstajajo. Če že, so v izgnanstvu, izven Rusije. To je velik del sestavljanke. Ne gre samo za to, kaj nam skušajo avtokratske države, kakršni sta Rusija in Kitajska, vsiliti, gre tudi za to, kaj skušajo vzeti iz informacijskega okolja. Utišati skušajo neodvisne glasove, ki kritizirajo režim. 

Voditelj: So med strategijo Rusije in Kitajske kakšne razlike? Nekaj ste jih že omenili. V čem je razlika med tema velikima in pomembnima državama? Na globalni ravni. 

Kumpas: O Rusiji vemo veliko več. Kot večina analitikov in raziskovalcev. A o Kitajski vsak dan izvemo več. Kar se tiče razlik in podobnosti, bi rekel, da je še vedno veliko razlik. Morda niso več tako velike, kot so bile pred štirimi ali petimi leti, sploh pred pandemijo covida-19. A še vedno so razlike. Vidimo, da je Rusija veliko agresivnejša. V glavnem skušajo vse ostale prikazati v slabi luči, namesto da bi promovirali sebe. Kitajska pa še vedno uporablja bolj tradicionalno, staromodno propagando. Tudi oni postajajo agresivnejši, sploh od pandemije covida-19, a še vedno skušajo v glavnem promovirati sebe, podobo svoje države in vlade. Pokazati skušajo, da je njihov način vladanja najboljši, veliko boljši od tradicionalnih demokracij. Ne tradicionalnih, samo demokracij, Kitajska ni demokracija. Kaj še? Omenil sem samo zatiranje informacij oziroma cenzuro. Kitajska je pri tem še vedno veliko naprednejša, sploh na spletu. Praktično nobenega prostora ni za neodvisno dejavnost, ki je država ne bi opazila. Na kateremkoli družbenem omrežju, ki je na voljo Kitajcem. Skoraj vsa zahodna družbena omrežja in druge spletne strani so za Kitajce nedostopni. Tudi v Rusiji je to vse pogostejše, čeprav je še vedno nekaj odprtih kanalov, prek katerih lahko Rusi komunicirajo s tujino in obratno. 

Voditelj: Fenomen dezinformacij ni nov. Vemo, da so te strategije uporabljali tudi v zgodovini, sploh med vojnami. A zdaj je drugače zaradi tehnologije. Tudi zaradi umetne inteligence. Kakšna je povezava med fenomenoma dezinformacij in tehnologije, s katerima se soočamo danes? Kakšna je prihodnost te povezave? Kaj se bo zgodilo? Ker zelo hitro napreduje. 

Kumpas: Dobro vprašanje. Ko bi vsaj imel kristalno kroglo, a komentiram lahko to, kar smo videli doslej. Doslej smo videli, da trenutno še ni prišlo do revolucije, kar se tiče groženj, ki jih tehnologija predstavlja za naše informacijsko okolje, za dezinformacije in manipulacijo z informacijami. Prišlo je do evolucije. Do počasne, a stalne rasti obsega, hitrosti in prilagodljivosti. To so tri velike stvari, ki jih tehnologija ves čas spreminja. Najprej družbena omrežja, zdaj pa umetna inteligenca. Kot ste rekli, ljudje druge ljudi zavajamo že od nastanka naše vrste. To je žal del naše psihologije, tako delujemo kot človeška bitja. Nekateri bolj kot drugi, a vedno so nas obdajali ljudje, ki zavestno lažejo in zavajajo. Sploh, kot ste že povzeli, med kriznimi obdobji. Vojna je najhujša kriza, kar si jih lahko predstavljamo. Pri umetni inteligenci vidimo tri stvari. Ljudi lahko zavajamo hitreje, lažje in ceneje. Četudi ne vemo, kaj nam bo prinesla prihodnost, to konceptualno deluje v nasprotju s tem, kar skušamo doseči. Kot sem že rekel, je naš cilj državam, kot sta Rusija in Kitajska, otežiti izkoriščanje informacij kot orožje proti nam. Umetna inteligenca pa to olajšuje. To je osnovna enačba. Podrobnosti pa bomo seveda videli šele v naslednjih letih. A ne verjamem, da nam bo umetna inteligenca olajšala življenja. 

Voditelj: Ali vaše delo. 

Kumpas: Tako je. 

Voditelj: Lahko za konec našim poslušalcem svetujete, kako naj prepoznajo dezinformacije, napačne informacije, kakšnega vzorca se morajo zavedati? 

Kumpas: Obstaja veliko različnih nasvetov, a najbolj sta mi všeč dva. Prvi in vsaj meni se zdi morda najpomembnejši, tudi sam se ga skušam držati, ker vsak dan spremljam informacije, je, naj pogledajo vir. Kdo stoji za to informacijo? Je to vaš znanec, dejanski novinarski portal ali anonimen profil na družbenem omrežju? Spremljamo lahko informacije vseh teh virov, a zavedati se moramo, da imajo novinarski portali zelo jasne standarde. Poročati morajo o resnici, uravnoteženo, iskreno in tako naprej. Za na primer vplivneže ta pravila ne veljajo. To je prvi nasvet. Zavedajte se, od kod informacije prihajajo, in bodite temu primerno bolj ali manj kritični. Drugi nasvet. Če informacija, na katero ste naleteli na družbenih omrežjih, na televiziji ali radiu, kjerkoli, v vas prebudi čustva. Morda postanete malo preveč veseli ali malo preveč jezni. Potem se ustavite in trikrat ali štirikrat globoko vdihnite in izdihnite. Ustavite se, razmislite in se šele potem odzovite ali ne. To je zelo pogosta tehnika zavajanja. Dezinformacije zapakirajo v zelo sočen in čustven paket. Če vidimo nekaj, zaradi česar se nam takoj začnejo tresti roke, hočemo to takoj deliti, všečkati ali komentirati. A če nekaj v nas prebudi takšna čustva, je zelo mogoče ... Četudi ne gre za dezinformacijo, si je še vedno dobro vzeti tri sekunde, si morda skuhati skodelico kave ali čaja ali spiti kozarec vode, se vrniti k računalniku, televiziji ali radiu in še enkrat premisliti, ali se res hočete odzvati, kot ste se hoteli sprva. 

Voditelj: Kot piše na našem letaku. 

Kumpas: Tako je. 

Voditelj: Premisli in potem preveri. 

Kumpas: Tako je. 

Voditelj: Prišla sva do konca podkasta, čas se je iztekel. Predlagam, da s tem končava. Z umetno inteligenco in svetlo prihodnostjo, ki je pred nami. Hvala za pogovor, za vaš čas. Nasvidenje. 

Kumpas: Hvala za povabilo in vso srečo. Nasvidenje.


[ENGLISH VERSION]
Gov.si, the Government Podcast

Host Zoran Potič: Welcome to the GOVSI Podcast. This episode unveils new features. A new campaign, a platform called Stop Disinformation. You can also read it here – read, think, check, stop disinformation. This time we've got a guest from Estonia and Brussels, where he's working on disinformation, a phenomenon that has been quite present lately. We are now talking to Siima Kumpas, who is an expert on fighting and tackling disinformation. 

Siim Kumpas: Thank you and it's a pleasure being here, thanks for having me. As I said, my name is Siim Kumpas. I currently work at the European External Action Service, which is, in short, the EU's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which differs from national and foreign ministries. But in essence, my role there, coming from Estonia and having worked on this before, is supporting the team that works with what we would call foreign information manipulation and interference. The idea is that we are trying to figure out how to best protect EU's neighborhoods against malign activities, especially in the information environment, be it disinformation, misinformation, malinformation. We're trying to stop governments like the Russian one and the Chinese one from interfering in the information environment next to the EU. 

Host: That means that you're focused on external affairs. That doesn't mean the member states of the European Union, but you're focused on third states. That means Russia and China. Are there any other states which are dangerous in that field? 

Kumpas: You're correct, exactly. We do not work nor focus on European member states because that is not the task that we have been given by member states. They gave us a task to look outside of the EU. Threats mainly do come from Russia, but to a lesser and different extent from China. If you ask whether other governments are also actively trying to interfere in EU matters... There are others as well, but when we talk about what are the governments that we're looking at in our team at the EEAS, there are two countries. Russia and China, because they are the ones who have proven to be the biggest threats to the EU. 

Host: Okay. Maybe you know much more about that, but Slovenia, if you're familiar with that, a few weeks ago, Slovenia expelled a Russian diplomat due to extensive propaganda they spread against Slovenian national interests. That was the reason. How big is Russian propaganda from your perspective? What is going on in that field? 

Kumpas: Informational war? I mean, it is huge. There are different ways to explain or exemplify the size of the problem. We can start with the numbers. Let's look at how much Russia is investing in their state-controlled outlets, such as Sputnik, RT and several others. Last year the number was around 1.5 billion euros. 

Host: That means the Russian government invested that much money into propaganda, spread through their media. 

Kumpas: Exactly and that's only what we know of because they publicly said it in addition to the media outlets. I used air quotes as they don't act like journalists or media. We are aware of their use of intelligent services and other branches of the government to interfere in our matters. The actual number is much bigger. And just to give you context, EEAS' budget to work on strategic communications, countering information manipulation is roughly about 100 times smaller than the amount I just gave you. This shows how asymmetrical the task on our hands is. We're currently talking only about Russia. You must apply this to China with an even bigger budget to work on whatever they want. This is the nature of the problem that we're facing. It's a very asymmetrical threat in terms of funding, but also in terms of the rules of the game. What I mean by that is, when we try to counter Russia's disinformation and information manipulation, we must follow certain ethical and moral standards because of obvious reasons, you know. 

Host: Which is freedom of speech and... 

Kumpas: This is the one that we talk about the most. Freedom of speech, of media, of opinion, of association, etc. But when you look at how the Kremlin operates, they couldn't care less. On the contrary, they use our openness against us. So, they're trying to kind of take our open nature and use our vulnerability. We shouldn't get carried away by what they're doing. We must face our openness and not worry too much. It's not a weakness but a strength. It shows that we can cope as democratic, open societies. 

Host: The last example was the Voice of Europe? An especially cynical one, given the name. Yes, the Voice of Europe. 

Kumpas: Yeah, exactly. It's interesting. 

Host: Are there other, I don't know, portals and media like the Voice of Europe? Can we expect some new cases... In the future? What can you say about that? 

Kumpas: I don't have a crystal ball, but if we don't see any new outlets, such as the Voice of Europe, I will, as the saying goes, eat my hat, because we have been looking at how Russia operates for years. On the EU level, we've been doing it since 2015. Almost ten years. Some of our member states have been doing it for longer, especially Baltic, and Nordic states, Poland and others. They've been watching Russia for decades. And we know from experience that this is how they operate. And by them, I mean the Kremlin, Russia's government regime. Information there is different than in western democratic countries. For them, information is a tool, not to say a weapon. For example, look at how they used information operations hand in hand with military attacks against Ukraine. It shows how integrated these information operations are with military operations, diplomatic efforts and more. It is a core part of their thinking and the way they operate. 

Host: What kind of methodology or tools do they use? How does disinformation spread? What is the pattern? How do we recognize it? What would you suggest to member states' governments? Because there is no European policy on that, right. 

Kumpas: Well, there are policies on that if I'm correct. Because the EU has been working on the problem for almost ten years. We really started moving in 2014, after Russia first invaded Ukraine. Since then, there have been many various policy initiatives, papers. But I'm not going into details because it's boring, bureaucratic. What I'll say instead is that we have teams in place to look at it, such as ours at the EEAS. We also have teams in the European Commission, the European Parliament, who are now looking at election interference. They look at how Russia's trying to interfere in European elections. We have new laws that we didn't have before. We have laws that force social media platforms, such as Facebook, Google, YouTube, Twitter, or X, to be more open about what's going on on their platforms, share data with researchers, provide more tools and options for users to protect themselves better, etc. So, the EU is doing quite a bit, but this is not a problem that the EU can solve from Brussels because Russia rarely attacks them. They prefer attacking single member states because of the old divide and conquer tactic. You break your victim into smaller pieces, which you then attack. This is why EU member states must be ready and invest money, time and effort into understanding how Russia interferes in their information environment then take steps as needed. 

Host: From Brussels' perspective, which member states are the weakest? The weakest part of the chain that is tackling disinformation. Which countries? Hungary? Slovakia? I don't know, Slovenia? 

Kumpas: Being from the diplomatic service, I will not name anyone. What I can say is that I think the weakest countries are not necessarily the countries immediately facing Russia on the map because even though Russia's neighboring countries might be most open to the threat on one hand, but on the other hand, they understand that it poses a serious threat to them, meaning they have taken steps. The further somebody is from Russia, less steps they have taken to protect themselves from them. That's what I can say. 

Host: Your suggestion would be that every member state provide software for tackling disinformation. What should that software include? What kind of tools? 

Kumpas: It's not just about software. 

Host: But you know, ''software''. 

Kumpas: No, I get what you mean. The way we see it in Brussels... You need a couple of big things. Firstly, you need to know what the threat is. So, you need situational awareness. But it's nothing more or less than understanding who are the threat actors trying to attack us? How are they trying to attack us? What methods or behaviors are they using? What networks are they trying to build, etc.? And what are they saying? What are the narratives or messages? What content are they trying to sell us? That's the first step. Those who want to do something about the problem on a serious, systematic level, firstly need to understand what the threats are. This includes asking people what they think, conducting polls. Because even if we know what Russia's putting on the table, we need to know who believes that. Are people buying the narratives that Russia is trying to sell us? Once we know that, we can start finding solutions. When we talk about solutions, many things can be done and are already being done. One of the first and most important ones for me is awareness in the shortest sense of the word. We need people to understand and feel that there is a threat. Because if governments or decision makers don't understand, they aren't motivated to invest money to create teams, to support the issue politically. If people don't understand that there's a threat in the information they consume, they won't pick up any media literacy advice or campaigns by the government telling them to stop and think. They need to know there's a threat. But at the same time, we don't want people to panic. We don't want them to imagine the threat being bigger than it is. And there's an interesting and ironic twist. We've seen Russia's attempts to make themselves seem bigger than they are. There are examples when they claim that they decide who will be the next US president, which is absurd. We know Russia's interfered in US presidential elections several times, that's been proven. But at the same time, it's also been proven that their effect to the outcome of the elections was limited. So maybe a few percentages here and there, if even at all. But they claim they chose the US president just to intimidate us, to make us believe that we can't protect ourselves. So, we're aiming for that sweet spot in the middle. Not too little awareness, not panic, something in between. There are many things we can do, invest in media literacy initiatives meaning we can educate people on how to be more critical and sensible information consumers, mainly on social media because even though it's not a new medium anymore, accustomed to it as much as we are accustomed to the radio, the TV, or newspapers. 

Host: So, there's still room for education and training and other things. You are describing a whole-society approach.

Kumpas: Exactly. 

Host: What do you think, how can the government fight or tackle disinformation if they are too active in that field? Some could say that they are forcing some kind of censorship. 

Kumpas: It's the other side of the same coin. That could be a problem. You're correct that overreacting to a problem can become a bigger problem than the original one itself. And this is why we believe and act according to what you just said, a whole-society approach. This is a problem that concerns society's each and every layer. So, the only way to... I can't say solve it because I believe that we can never make governments such as the Kremlin stop using information as a weapon. But we can make it more difficult and costly for them. We can make it more time and energy consuming, that we can do. The only way to do that is to bring together all of society's layers. Media plays a big role, private companies, social media platforms. There's also private companies which build excellent monitoring tools that researchers, governments, journalists need to better detect and understand disinformation. Schools have a very clear role to play and so on and so forth. So, the only long-term solution lies in connecting the dots. But I believe that the convening power must be the government because it is the only part of the society that can bring together different layers of the society. The government has a clear role to play but I fully agree that there can't be a government-only approach and it can't be too heavy fisted. 

Host: We have elections in two months …  

Kumpas: We do …

Host: We all have elections. What kind of narrative or activities do you detect? From outside threats? What kind of patterns can we see? What's going on in that field? 

Kumpas: From our monitoring and our analysis, we can see the past couple of months have been slow regarding Russians trying to interfere in our elections. There are cases of Russian spies being caught here and there or cases of people infiltrating some political offices across the EU or Brussels. But regarding specific narratives, messages or content on elections, there isn't much. But now we're seeing it is starting to grow, which corresponds with the theory that the interference attempts become most active in the 48 to 72 hours before the election. This is why we prepare two or three days ahead of the elections. We monitor, share information with the EU member states, including Slovenia, and everyone else. This is run by the European Parliament that oversees the elections. But Russia is getting more and more active. If we talk about what are the messages they are trying to use against EU member states before the elections. First and foremost, they are still pushing a lot on Ukraine. They are supporting voices, people, parties, more critical of supporting Ukraine. They're really trying to have the EU lower its support to Ukraine. That is one big cluster or set of topics. The other big set of topics is trying to have people lose trust in the elections as such. 

Host: One of the reasons for that is if people don't trust the elections, what is the logical reaction? 

Kumpas: They don't vote, which means less legitimacy. Maybe less people voting who would otherwise vote for sensible middle ground parties and more people who will vote for more extreme or fringe parties. This is what we've seen so far. Attacking support for Ukraine and trying to diminish the overall trust in elections, in the election system, etc. 

Host: What approach do they use in the way they're trying to achieve the goals? What methods do they use? 

Kumpas: It's a good question because, in our work, we are trying to understand and detect manipulative behaviors. To put it simply, the content or the message itself is only one part of the puzzle. Let's say there is a misleading message or narrative on EU's support for Ukraine. That is only the visible part of the iceberg, a bigger part of the information operation happens underground where we can't see it. I compare it to a bullet and a gun. A message targeting our support for Ukraine is a bullet that hits an audience that causes harm or makes the victim think differently. There's also a gun, somebody who pulled the trigger, somebody who shot the gun, etc. The same applies to disinformation. Yes, there is a message that reaches an audience and makes people think or behave differently. But somebody had to create that message. Somebody had to publish, disseminate, and promote it. There's a lot of information. You can publish anything. But you must reach people. You asked what are they doing and how are they delivering these messages. They are quite cunning. 

Host: Can we locate these people, these organizations? Networks? 

Kumpas: Yes. 

Host: Can we do that? 

Kumpas: We are getting better at that. We as in we in Brussels, but also, we as in the EU as a whole. Several EU member states have recently created new units, agencies, and are also shifting focus from not only content but also to manipulative behavior. That is why we are better and better at detecting these networks of connected accounts, which can be fake or genuine. Last year, we have often seen Russia using not manipulated but faked media. They design something that looks like the biggest Slovene newspaper. But there is one letter difference in the website address. It looks 95% the same as the actual newspaper. Maybe 9 stories in the newspaper, on the website are the same as those in the actual newspaper. There is one story planted there, we've seen this many times in the past year. They fake famous websites like Le Monde, Figaro, Deutsche Welle, etc. Not everyone will fall for that. Many will recognize the fake website. Some people, many people will not look at the address line letter by letter. Is it the same? There are different ways to deceive us. What is the difference between misinformation, disinformation, fake news? Yeah. 

Host: It is confusing for regular people. 

Kumpas: Sure. 

Host: I would not even focus on fake news at all. It is a term that was used especially around 2016, 2017, around presidential elections in the US. 

Kumpas: Can I stop you for a moment? Because there was a time when fake news were just alternative facts. There is no fake news, just alternative facts. 

Host: What is that? This was the question at the time.

Kumpas: Exactly. There are two big problems with that idea of fake news. First is content trying to mislead us, behavior trying to mislead us is often not news. Fake news is just a wrong label. More importantly, the term fake news is very much politicized, especially in the US, but also in Europe. Some politicians brand everything they don't like fake news. There is a newspaper criticizing populist politicians. They will call it fake news and say they know nothing. Fake news is not really a good term. I would advise against using it. Moving on to misinformation and disinformation, I want to argue that it doesn't matter for average information consumers. It's all the same in the sense... I like drawing parallels. I will draw the parallel of being hit by a car. The intention of the driver does not matter to the victim. Maybe the sun shone in their eyes. They didn't see for a moment. Maybe they felt sick, and they hit you because of that. You are hurt just the same. But from the point of view of a policymaker there is a difference that misinformation is not intentional. The information is false or misleading, but not intentionally created or disseminated. Whereas disinformation is disseminated knowingly. Disinformation is deliberately deceiving for political gains, for economic gains or for personal reasons. 

Host: There is another term. FIMI? 

Kumpas: We are big fans of FIMI, because we came up with the term. We believe it captures the problem, the threat better. FIMI stands for foreign information manipulation and interference. As I already mentioned, it is looking at the broader picture and at manipulative behavior. I will give a practical example for this not to be too theoretical, Let's say I own ten fake accounts. Is this disinformation? No. Can I use them if I want to push disinformation? Yes. This is what I'm trying to say. You have manipulative behavior that doesn't always fall under disinformation. It's like a network that is needed. Or an infrastructure that is needed to start pushing disinformation to different audiences. This is why we have the concept of FIMI. An important part of FIMI that doesn't count as disinformation and is as problematic as its other parts is if we look at what China is doing, we can discuss censorship, suppressing independent voices within China and now more and more within Russia. Russia has been picking up speed. Five years ago, China was miles ahead of Russia in domestic censorship, especially online. Since Russia's invasion more than two years ago, they have really cracked down on independent speech. Online, offline. There is no independent media in Russia anymore. If anything, it happens in exile outside of Russia. I would say that this is a big part of the puzzle. It's not just about what are autocratic governments like Russia's and China's trying to push towards us, what do they want to take from the information environment? They want to silence independent voices critical of the regime. 

Host: Are there any differences between Russia and China? There are strategies. You mentioned some of them. What is the difference between those two important states on a global stage? 

Kumpas: We know much more about Russia. Most analysts and researchers do. But we learn every day about China's operations. Regarding differences and similarities there's many differences. They are not as big as they were 5 years ago, before the COVID-19 pandemic. There are still differences. Russia is much more aggressive. They try to show everybody else in a bad light, instead of promoting themselves. Whereas China still uses more traditional or old-school type of propaganda. They are also getting more aggressive, especially since the pandemic. But they still mostly try to boost themselves, their image as a country and government. They want to show that their way of governing China is the best and better than traditional democracies or democracies as such, because China is not democratic by any standard definition. 

Host: What else?

Kumpas: I mentioned information suppression or censorship. China is more advanced, especially online. There is no room for independent activity without the state noticing on a social media platform, available to Chinese people, because almost all Western social media platforms and other platforms online are unavailable in China. This is becoming the case with Russia as well. Even though there are still some open channels that can be used by Russians to reach out and to reach Russians. This disinformation phenomenon is not new. Those strategies were used in history and mostly during wars. But there is a new moment. It's technology. 

Host: And there is also artificial intelligence. Where is the connection between the actual phenomena, disinformation, and technology, that we are facing now? What is the future of that connection? What will happen? Because it's accelerating. It's going fast. 

Kumpas: Good question. If I only had a crystal ball. I can say what we see so far. So far, we see that there has still not been a revolution, when it comes to threats posed by technology to our information environment, to disinformation, information manipulation. There was an evolution, so a slow but steady incline of the scale, speed and tailorability. These are three things constantly changed by technology. First social media and now AI. As you said, people have deceived other people since we were born as a species. This is in our psychology. This is how we operate, some more than others. There have always been people who knowingly lie and deceive, especially during times of crisis. And war is just the biggest form of crisis you can imagine. With AI we see three things. It makes it faster, easier, cheaper to deceive people. Even without knowing what the future will bring us, it is conceptually working against our goal. Our whole aim is to make it as hard for governments like Russia and China to use information as a weapon. AI is making it easier. On a basic level, this is the equation. But when you get to the details, this will unroll throughout the next years. I cannot see AI making our lives easier, let's put it that way. And your job probably. 

Host: Exactly, exactly. And before the end. Siim, can you advise our listeners on how to recognize disinformation, misinformation? What is the pattern they should be aware of? 

Kumpas: There are different options, but I would give people two ideas that I like the most. First and the most important one for me. I do this as an individual because I also consume information daily. I look at the source of a piece of information. Is it just somebody you know, an actual journalistic outlet, is it an anonymous social media page? You can get information from all of these sources but be aware that journalistic outlets have clear standards about what they do, how they have to be truthful, balanced and honest and so on. Whereas these rules don't apply to influencers for example. This is the one piece of advice. Have in mind where is the information from. Then be critical. Secondly, if a piece of information you see on social media, on TV, radio, makes you emotional, either a bit too happy or a bit too angry, then take a moment. Breathe in 3, 4 times. Breathe out. Think and pause for a moment and then either react to it or not. Because this is a very common technique of people wanting to deceive us. They package disinformation in a very juicy emotional package. So, if we see something, we immediately ... Our hands start to tremble, and we want to share, like or comment. If something makes us feel like this, it is possible that even if isn't disinformation it's still good to wait, drink a coffee, have a cup of tea, come back to it and then think again if you still want to react the same way. 

Host: As our leaflet states ... 

Kumpas: Exactly. Read it, think about it, and then check it out. 

Host: We are at the end of the podcast. Our time is up. So, I suggest we end on that note. AI and the bright future that awaits us. Thank you for this conversation and your time. Goodbye. 

Kumpas: Thanks for having me. Best of luck. Bye, bye.