GOVSI Podkast: »Demokracija je napadena«

V novi epizodi se je voditelj Zoran Potič pogovarjal z uglednim ameriškim profesorjem na področju komuniciranja in javne diplomacije Nicholasom J. Cullom. Govorila sta o zgodovini dezinformacij, značilnosti dezinformacij dandanes ter izzivih, ki jih za demokracijo prinašajo sodobne tehnologije in vse večje količine (dez)informacij.

»Sovražnik pravzaprav ni več ideologija, temveč resnica sama. Demokracija je napadena, zato moramo zgraditi informirano družbo, ki se bo zavedala nevarnosti dezinformacij in umetne inteligence,« je med drugim povedal gost, ki je eden vodilnih učenjakov na področju mednarodnih odnosov in tako imenovane mehke moči.

Nicholas J. Cull je zgodovinar, katerega raziskave se osredotočajo na vpliv javne diplomacije ter na to, kako države uporabljajo kulturo in medijske strategije, da oblikujejo svojo globalno podobo. Je avtor številnih vplivnih knjig, med drugim Javna diplomacija: Nauki iz preteklosti (angleško: Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past) ter Javna diplomacija: Temelji za globalno udejstvovanje v digitalni dobi (angleško: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age). Je ustanovni direktor programa javne diplomacije na Univerzi Južne Kalifornije, kjer poučuje še danes.

Vabljeni k poslušanju in ogledu podkasta.

[ENGLISH VERSION]
GOVSI Podcast: »Democracy is under attack«

In the latest episode, Zoran Potič hosted distinguished American professor in the field of communication and public diplomacy, Nicholas J. Cull. They discussed the history of disinformation, the characteristics of disinformation today, and the challenges modern technologies and the increasing amounts of (dis)information pose to democracy. 

»The enemy is no longer really an ideology, but the truth itself. Democracy is under attack, so we must build an informed society that is aware of the dangers of disinformation and artificial intelligence,« said the guest, who is one of the leading scholars in the field of international relations and so-called soft power.

Nicholas J. Cull is a historian whose research focuses on the impact of public diplomacy and how countries use culture and media strategies to shape their global image. He is the author of several influential books, including Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past and Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age. He is the founding director of the public diplomacy program at the University of Southern California, where he still teaches today.

You are invited to watch and listen.

Transcript

Vladni podkast GOVSI.

Voditelj Zoran Potič: Lep pozdrav v novem podkastu GOVSI, v katerem se bomo vrnili znani temi, dezinformacijam. Ob začetku kampanje "preBERI, preMISLI, preVERI" spomladi letos smo govorili s Siimom Kumpasom iz Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje. Jeseni, zdaj, nadaljujemo pogovore na to temo, zato me izjemno veseli, da lahko slovenski javnosti predstavimo uglednega profesorja iz Kalifornije, Nicholasa Culla. Dobrodošli, gospod Cull.

Gost Nicholas Cull: Hvala.

Voditelj: Naj povem nekaj besed o vas, potem pa vas bom povabil, da se predstavite slovenski javnosti. Nicholasa Culla njegova univerza predstavlja kot pionirskega učenjaka in izobraževalca na področju javne diplomacije.

Cull: Tako je. 

Voditelj: Kot zgodovinar proučuje vlogo množične komunikacije v zunanji politiki. Nicholas Cull je pravzaprav Britanec, nekdanji Evropejec, toda po Brexitu ... 

Cull: Ja, po Brexitu.

Voditelj: Zdaj ste le Američan. 

Cull: Tako je, zdaj sem le Američan.

Voditelj: Kar nadaljujte.

Cull: Rekel bi, da je med vsemi temi stvarmi pomembno, da sem v osnovi zgodovinar, saj se mi pri dezinformacijah zdi najpomembnejše razumeti, da to ni nekaj, kar je bilo izumljeno v zadnjih petih letih. To obstaja že od nekdaj. Obstajajo celo primeri dezinformacij iz antike. V moji knjigi so primeri iz antične Grčije. Bistvo je v tem, da se to morda zdaj zdi neznansko, a če pregledamo dolgoletno znanje o tem, kako se s to težavo spoprijeti, imamo na voljo veliko več znanja in izkušenj, kot se nam morda sprva zdi. Kot v knjigi o dojenčkih, ki se začne z: "Ne paničarite, že veste več, kot se vam zdi." To bi moralo pisati tudi v knjigi o dezinformacijah. Ne paničarite, znamo se spoprijeti s tem, če stvar vzamemo resno in jo temeljito premislimo.

Voditelj: Če koga zanimajo vaša predavanja, gre lahko v Kalifornijo. Kje je vaša fakulteta?

Cull: V Los Angelesu, Univerza Južne Kalifornije.

Voditelj: V redu. Omenili ste, da dezinformacije niso nov pojav. Kaj so dezinformacije dandanes in kako se razlikujejo od propagande?

Cull: Moja definicija propagande je, da je to množična komunikacija, ki se jo izvaja iz političnih razlogov. Politična množična komunikacija. Mislim, da propaganda ni nujno nepoštena ali škodljiva. Včasih hočejo ljudje prepričati javnost, naj nekaj naredi. Vendar živimo v svetu, v katerem beseda "propaganda" velja za grdo besedo iz zgodovinskih razlogov. Bila je povezana z akterji, ki so po presoji zgodovine veljali za slabe. Izraz izvira iz povezave z Vatikanom, saj so veliko zgodovine pisali ljudje, ki Vatikana niso marali. Njihova najljubša beseda za opisovanje širjenja vere od leta 1540 dalje je postala negativna beseda, vendar na začetku ni bilo tako. Dezinformacije pa so veliko bolj specifične. Lahko rečemo, da obstaja nevtralna oblika propagande, nevtralne oblike dezinformacij pa ni. Dezinformacije so komuniciranje nečesa, kar veš, da ni resnično, za namene oviranja. Edini razlog za širjenje dezinformacij je, da nasprotniku otežiš življenje. Na to gledam kot določeno taktiko propagande in kot eno najbolj nemoralnih taktik med orodji propagande.

Voditelj: Dezinformacije niso nov pojav, kot ste omenili. Kakšna je razlika med dezinformacijami med dobo hladne vojne in zdaj?

Cull: Kot zgodovinar sem proučeval, kako so se ZDA spoprijele s sovjetskimi dezinformacijami med hladno vojno. Govoril sem s strokovnjaki, ki so se borili proti tistim dezinformacijam. Nekateri jih primerjajo s tem, kar se dogaja dandanes. Odmevna, uničujoča zgodba, ki jo je Sovjetska zveza uporabljala med hladno vojno, je bila zamisel, da je bil virus HIV ameriško biološko orožje, ki je ušlo. A če pogledamo, kako so to zgodbo pripravili in predstavili, je trajalo leta, da so jo oblikovali in predstavili na prepričljiv način. Delno so to storili tako, da so objavili lažne znanstvene članke. Nato so o tem poročali časopisi v Afriki, ki ga je nato citiral časopis v Egiptu, revija v Indiji ... Dokler se ni po več mesecih zdelo, da je več raziskovalcev iz številnih držav po svetu prišlo do zaključka, da je virus aidsa biološko orožje, ki se je izjalovilo. To je bila uspešna in zelo škodljiva dezinformacijska zgodba. Dandanes pa dezinformacijskih zgodb ne ustvarjajo več tako skrbno. Kot bi primerjali roman s šalo ali nečim, kar si je nekdo izmislil v pol ure. Toda zaradi moči spleta so lahko dezinformacijske zgodbe ... Britansko zunanje ministrstvo je odkrilo 32 različnih dezinformacijskih zgodb o enem samem dogodku v Britaniji, poskusu zastrupitve nekdanjega ruskega agenta Sergeja Skripala leta 2017. Mislim, da Kremelj, ki je preko spletne strani veleposlaništva objavil 32 različnih razlag tistega incidenta, ni skušal kogarkoli prepričati, temveč je skušal le maksimirati dvome. Značilnost dezinformacij dandanes je, da poskusiš izdati več razlag o enem incidentu in da ti ni mar, če večino ignorirajo. Sovražnik pravzaprav ni več ideologija, temveč resnica sama. Gre za napad na zamisel, da je svet mogoče razložiti. Če sveta ni mogoče razložiti in ni nič resnično, potem samo zaupaš najmočnejšemu, kar pa je, z vidika Kremlja, g. Putin. Zakaj bi jim bilo mar za resnico?

Voditelj: Strategija se je spremenila, pred 40 leti je bila pomembna kakovost, zdaj pa količina.

Cull: Točno tako, količina.

Voditelj: To omogoča tehnologija. 

Cull: Ja, količina, količina, količina. Mislim, da gre za preplavljanje trga z nasprotujočimi si zgodbami, da ljudje ne bi vedeli, kaj je res, in da bi dvomili v vse. Dezinformacije so postale tako pereč pojav, da forumi, kot sta G7 in G20, razpravljajo o tej temi. Kar nenavadno je, da se o tem pojavu razpravlja na tej ravni. Zdi se mi pomembno, da se. Menim, da moramo ponovno proučiti naravo varnosti države. Del tega, kako država postane varna, je, da poskrbi, da je njen ugled varen. Glede na to, kar naši nasprotniki počnejo, vidimo, da skušajo napadati ugled držav, da bi ljudje dvomili v integriteto države, da bi državljani dvomili v integriteto svoje države in da bi sosednje države dvomile vanjo. Izziv je torej kako razviti uglednostno varnost. To presega način, kako je ugled deloval v povojni dobi, ko so majhne države komu naročile, naj si izmisli kakšen slogan in oglašuje narod, da bi ustvarile mehko moč. Mislim, da se tega ne počne več. Ne skuša se privabljati turistov ali povečati izvozov. Če zdaj lahko skomuniciraš ugled, ki ga ljudje občudujejo, lahko preživiš, ko gre kaj narobe. Naj to razložim. Primerjajmo težavo Ukrajine leta 2014, ko te države ni nihče poznal in njena zgodba ni bila znana po Evropi, ter Ukrajino leta 2022. Leta 2014 Ukrajina ni bila uglednostno varna, nihče ni poznal njene zgodbe. Do leta 2022 ji je uspelo ustvariti ugled, razložiti, kakšna država je in kakšna nevarnost ji preti. Ko je bila Ukrajina leta 2022 ogrožena, se je Evropa odzvala, ji stopila v bran in se zavzemala za podporo Ukrajini. Del razloga za to je bilo razumevanje nevarnosti dezinformacij, del pa je bil tudi, da je Ukrajina delala za to, da ni ustrezala stereotipu, ki se je je držal leta 2014, temveč je razvijala svojo demokracijo, da je postala bolj občudovanja vredna država. Mislim, da pri celostni strategiji pridobivanja ugleda ne gre samo za boj proti dezinformacijam, katerih tarča si, ampak tudi za reforme in reševanje težav, ki jih imaš ti in tvoji zavezniki, da so dezinformacije manjša težava in imajo manjšo veljavo. To velja tudi za ZDA. Ko so Rusi med hladno vojno govorili, da so ZDA rasistična država, so voditelji razumeli, da morajo ne samo pokazati, da to ne drži, ampak tudi poskrbeti, da res ne bo držalo. To je zapletena strategija pridobivanja ugleda.

Voditelj: Ja. Živimo v zahtevnih časih, ker so informacije ključne za svet in demokracijo.

Cull: Ja.

Voditelj: Ko ste opazovali širjenje dezinformacij, ste videli nered in grožnjo demokraciji. Kako se demokracija lahko brani?

Cull: Najprej se moramo zavedati, da je demokracija napadena. Dezinformacije so izziv za vse, zato moramo biti vsi vključeni v pogovore, da bi se lahko ubranili pred njimi. Razumeti moramo, kakšne so dezinformacije. Odgovor se začne s poslušanjem. Izslediti moramo dezinformacije in ugotoviti, kje se širijo določene zgodbe. V hladni vojni so vzeli zgodbo, ki jo je Sovjetska zveza, takratni največji sovražnik, širila v določeni državi, in jo predstavili nekje drugje. To kaže na pomanjkanje kredibilnosti države, ki širi dezinformacije. Velika Britanija je zelo dobro pokazala, kako je Rusija širila nasprotujoče si novice v zvezi z napadom na Skripala. To je zmanjšalo kredibilnost ruskega zunanjega ministrstva kot vira novic. Poslušati moraš, da se lahko odzoveš. Zunanje ministrstvo je vsak dan trdilo nekaj drugega, ker so mislili, da bodo ljudje poslušali samo en dan, ne pa vsak dan in bodo vse objavili. Razkrivanje dezinformacij je začetek tega.

Voditelj: V informacijski dobi imajo veliko vlogo mediji in novinarji.

Cull: Ja. 

Voditelj: Vsi imajo zelo pomembno vlogo. Novinarstvo se spreminja. Navadni ljudje ustanavljajo medije, množični mediji, zlasti tiskani, pa izgubljajo veljavo. Preverjanje dejstev je vedno bolj površno.

Cull: Ja. 

Voditelj: To je odlično okolje za širjenje dezinformacij.

Cull: Vsekakor. 

Voditelj: Kako mediji lahko ohranijo kredibilnost in zaupanje v odzivu na vedno več dezinformacij?

Cull: To je velika težava. Še slabše je, če so mediji odvisni od trga in delajo vse, da bi čim več zaslužili. Prvi hočejo razkriti neko zgodbo in so raje prvi in dobijo pozornost, kot da bi preverili dejstva. Tudi pri manjših zgodbah, kot je zgodba o avstralski plesalki break dancea, se začnejo širiti govorice, kot je ta, da se je po zaslugi svojega moža uvrstila na olimpijado. O tem so poročali resni mediji. To ni bila ruska zarota, da bi očrnili avstralski šport, ampak je zgodba povzročila škodo in kaže, kako ljudje ponavljajo nekaj, kar se sliši verjetno, da bi dobili pozornost svojih prijateljev. S tem bi se morali spopasti tako, da bi še bolj razvili preverjanje dejstev. Najbolj se ukvarjam z Ukrajino, kjer so vzpostavili spletno stran za preverjanje dejstev StopFake. Ostale evropske države so jim pomagale stran prevesti v različne jezike. Tam lahko preverite zgodbo in vidite, ali je resnična. Vidite, kje je bila že objavljena. Avtorji dezinformacij so velikokrat leni in ponavljajo stare zgodbe, kot je tista, da imajo Američani v Ukrajini laboratorij za biološko orožje. Ta velika novica je že stara. Ne izvira le iz hladne, ampak tudi korejske vojne.

Voditelj: Res? 

Cull: Ja. Glavna obtožba vzhodnega bloka proti Ameriki v korejski vojni je bila, da proti Severni Koreji uporabljajo biološko orožje. Zgodba je zelo neizvirna in se ves čas ponavlja. Lahko celo napovemo, kakšne bodo nekatere zgodbe in to je največji napredek, da lahko rečemo: Ko se bodo stvari spremenile ali bo Putin napadel, bo rekel to in to. Ko napade in res reče točno to, izgubi kredibilnost kot nekdo, ki mu ni mogoče zaupati. Temu se reče napovedovanje čenč in je zelo učinkovito.

Voditelj: Ja, ampak živimo v dobi umetne inteligence, ki ustvarja globoke ponaredke, ki jih težko prepoznamo.

Cull: Ja, zato moramo govoriti o tem. Super je, da se pogovarjava o tem. Nekateri mediji so opravili odlično delo in pojasnili ljudem, da lahko pričakujejo ponaredke. Moja mama ima več kot 90 let in mi je zadnjič rekla, naj bom pozoren na fotografije in naj preštejem prste na njih, ker umetna inteligenca še ne zna narediti rok, ki so zato čudne. Ko gledaš fotografijo na spletu, preveri število prstov. Sporočilo, da moramo biti kritični, je prišlo tudi do 91-letnih žensk iz Anglije, kar je dober znak. Dobro je, da se ljudje zavedajo nevarnosti globokih ponaredkov, ampak je pred nami ogromen izziv. Globokih ponaredkov ne uporabljajo le politiki. Ravno zdaj se govori o južnokorejskih najstnikih, ki ustvarjajo pornografske slike sošolcev s pomočjo orodij na telefonih. To je družben problem. Zgraditi moramo informirano družbo, ki se bo zavedala nevarnosti dezinformacij in umetne inteligence. Prej ko to naredimo, bolje bo. To bi morala biti naša prioriteta. Že v vrtcu bi morali z otroki govoriti o umetni inteligenci in globokih ponaredkih.

Voditelj: Bosta pogovor in ozaveščanje dovolj? Če hočemo regulirati družbena omrežja in tako naprej, je to omejevanje svobode govora. 

Cull: Seveda. 

Voditelj: Veliko se govori o tem.

Cull: Seveda, ker je nekaterim v interesu, da lahko počnejo, kar hočejo, in dobro služijo. Kot Britanec nisem več državljan EU-ja in pogrešam njihovo zakonodajo, ki ljudi ščiti pred največjimi skrajnostmi interneta. Pravila in nadzorni organi so pomembni, ker so varovalo. Svojim študentom vedno rečem, da od tehnološkega milijonarja ne moreš pričakovati, da bo za lastne omejitve. Vedno bo trdil, da mora imeti svobodo, da lahko reče, kar hoče, ampak je ta nagon treba brzdati in narediti, kar je najbolje za družbo, ne enega milijarderja.

Voditelj: Kako so dezinformacije spodkopale zaupanje v novinarstvo in medije? Kje smo zdaj? 

Cull: Težava je, da je ne glede na vsebino medijsko okolje spodkopalo tradicionalne medije. V preteklosti so imeli mediji urednike. Imeli so organizacijo. 

Voditelj: Nadzornika.

Cull: Nadzornika ali nekoga, ki je rekel, kaj gre v časopis in kaj ne, in je bil čuvar. Zdaj smo sami svoji čuvarji in se odločimo, ali bomo delili neko novico glede na to, od koga je. Zaupam človeku, ki mi je poslal novico? Je tak kot jaz? Iščemo velike podobnosti. Je z iste ulice? Ni mi samo malo podoben. Ali govori slovensko? Je enako star? Posluša Taylor Swift? Ali vsi ... Izjemne ravni podobnosti. Drugi del izbire, ali boš prenesel sporočilo, je, ali bom po tem sporočilu videti bolje na svojem družbenem omrežju.

Voditelj: Pravite, da bi moral biti vsak državljan nekakšen urednik.

Cull: Težava je v tem, da je vsak državljan nekakšen urednik, ampak tega ne vedo vsi. Zbuditi državljane, da se zavejo odgovornosti urejanja svojega omrežja, je delno naše delo. Reči moramo ... Med pandemijo je bilo to možno. Ljudi smo poučili o omejevanju socialnih stikov. Zdaj moramo razumeti, da ne stopiš preblizu nekoga, če si prehlajen, ko pa imaš kakšne podatke, moraš razmisliti, morda večkrat, preden jih preneseš naprej. Kot ne želiš na drugega prenesti virusa, nočeš prenesti niti dezinformacij. Vloga dobrega državljana v povezavi s podatki je, da razmisliš, preden zgodbo pošlješ naprej, hkrati pa morda odbiješ prijatelja, ki ti pošlje nekaj, kar ti ne ustreza, kar je pristransko in spominja na dezinformacijo. Poveš, da tega ne potrebujemo. Ko sem bil otrok v ZK, so bile vse šale etnične šale. V glavnem smo se šalili iz razlik med etničnimi skupinami. Nato pa se je to nehalo, ker so ljudje rekli: "Veš, kaj? Nočem slišati šale o Škotu in Ircu, ki gresta v bar. Pogovarjajmo se o čem drugem." Tak odnos moramo imeti do dezinformacij. Začutiti moramo, da tega nočemo deliti, hkrati pa tega nočemo niti slišati. Če ljudje začutijo družbeno oviro pri širjenju dezinformacij ali nečem, kar bi lahko bila dezinformacija, bo pogon širjenja dezinformacij, ki je videti kul na omrežju, prekinjen. To se je že zgodilo. Med 2. svetovno vojno so se pojavili plakati, kjer je pisalo: "Pazi, kaj govoriš. Nikoli ne veš, kdo posluša. Ne širi govoric." Celo risanke demonizirajo ljudi, ki radi širijo zgodbe. Prikazani so bili absurdno. Ustvarjanje negativne podobe ljudi, ki širijo govorice, spodkoplje glavni razlog, da to počnejo. Ljudje, ki širijo te podatke, se imajo za inteligentnejše, ker poskušajo najti pravo resnico, kaj se dogaja v neki situaciji. V resnici so inteligentnejši. Statistično so inteligentnejši, ampak ker jih skrbi, da bi jih videli kot manj inteligentne, lahko destimulirate širjenje dezinformacij. Praktičen nasvet.

Voditelj: Kakšne proaktivne ukrepe lahko uvedejo organizacije, da bi minimalizirale širjenje dezinformacij na svojih platformah?

Cull: Moderiranje vsebin. Pomembno je, da ste pozorni na to, kaj se govori na vaši platformi, in da imate dobre smernice za skupnost. Ljudi, ki obiščejo stran, pa lahko opozorijo, naj pazijo, kaj objavijo. Obstaja tudi zbirka lažnih uporabnikov, robotov, lažnih spletnih strani, ki tvitajo in objavljajo tvite. Opogumljajte ljudi, naj bodo pozorni na lažne uporabnike, na umetne prisotnosti na spletu. Včasih se ljudje tega zavedajo v okviru družabnih interakcij. Najbrž ne obstaja bogato dekle s Kitajske, ki bi bila njihova spletna prijateljica. Najbrž je robot. Do nekoga, ki širi zgodbo o pokvarjenem politiku, pa so morda manj kritični in ne prepoznajo političnega robota, kot bi ga na družbeni ravni. To je družbeni pristop, kako ustvariti odpor in okolje proti dezinformacijam.

Voditelj: Kakšno vlogo pa ima denimo vlada? Kaj lahko naredijo vlade, da bi omejile širjenje dezinformacij in kako daleč lahko gredo, da bi zagotovile, da ne zapademo v popoln nadzor in cenzuro? Kaj lahko naredijo vlade? Kakšne ukrepe lahko sprejmejo?

Cull: Medijsko izobraževanje je pomembno. Gojenje svobodne in transparentne medijske kulture je pomembno. Ljudje verjamejo dezinformacijam, ko nimajo drugih virov o neki zgodbi. Nikogar ne zanimajo dezinformacije o zgodbi, o kateri so popolnoma obveščeni. Dezinformacije zapolnijo praznino, ko imamo slepo pego. Bolj se lahko vlada izogne slepim pegam, manj verjetno bodo prebivalci iskali dezinformacije za pojasnilo. Transparentnost, vlaganje v svobodne medije, toleranca do medijev, ki so sovražno nastrojeni ali kritični do vlade. Neko mero kritike lahko spodbujate. Tako država gradi demokratično občutljivost, ki je odporna na dezinformacije. To je ... Zdaj je demokracija res ogrožena. Dezinformacije pa izkoriščajo to težavo, gospodarsko krizo in težavno obdobje po pandemiji. S tem izzivom se moramo spopasti ter ponovno odkriti in potrditi demokratične vrednote. V takem okolju bodo dezinformacije težko uspevale.

Voditelj: Lahko za konec kaj svetujete povprečnemu uporabniku novic, kako preživeti v digitalni dobi, kjer je veliko ...

Cull: Moj najljubši nasvet prihaja od Boga. Morda bo zvenelo precej presenetljivo. Se spomnite, kako sta v bibliji Adam in Eva jedla z drevesa znanja in se nenadoma zavedla svoje golote? Ko ju obišče Bog, se skrijeta. Rečeta, da se skrivata, ker sta gola. Se spomnite, kaj reče Bog? 

Voditelj: Ne.

Cull: Kdo vama je rekel, da sta gola? Kdo vama je rekel, da sta gola? To je zelo pomembno vprašanje. Vsakič ko gledamo medije, bi se morali vprašati, od kod izhaja ta medij, to sporočilo. Še posebej, ko sporočilo spodkopava našo družbo. Kadar so naša družba in vrednote ogrožene, bi morali reči: "Kdo nam je rekel, da smo goli? Kdo je rekel Evropi, da demokracija propada? Kdo nam je rekel, da naše povezave niso resnične? Kdo nam je rekel, da so naše strukture brez pomena? Da ni razlike med svetom oligarhov in svetom zanesljivih institucij?" Morali bi izslediti, kdo nam je to povedal. Mislim, da bi zgradili odpornost do tega, da bi verjeli take stvari. Sprašujte se, kdo to pravi. Kdo stoji za sporočilom? Bodite osveščeni potrošniki Še pomembneje pa je, da ste osveščeni širitelji informacij. To je ključ, da porazimo to nevarnost.

Voditelj: Ste optimist ali pesimist? 

Cull: Optimističen sem glede zmožnosti ljudi, ko dobro razmislijo in se stabilizirajo, da se znajo pravilno odločiti. Če verjamemo v demokracijo, moramo verjeti v ljudi, ki pa morajo pridobiti najboljše iz demokracije, kar ni le to, da izrazimo svoja stališča, temveč da se poslušamo in se razumemo kot pripadniki neke skupnosti. Verjamem v ta postopek, vendar traja, ko se pojavi nov medij, da javnost razume, kakšno škodo lahko naredi tak medij. Kot se mora telo navaditi na nov virus. Razviti moramo protitelesa, da nam pomagajo pri stabilizaciji. Razviti moramo tudi medijsko pismenost, specifično za nov mehanizem komunikacije. Mislim, da nam to uspeva pri družbenih medijih. Svet se je sprijaznil z njimi in stabiliziral. Težava je, da smo vmes dobili umetno inteligenco. Ko zaključimo en postopek, začnemo drugega. Verjetno se bo po umetni inteligenci pojavilo še kaj, nato še kaj. Zaradi obsega tehnologije ne smemo zaspati. Moramo razmišljati o integriteti našega medijskega okolja. Zato se mora to odvijati od vrtca naprej. Del vzgoje mora biti, da se vprašamo, od kod prihaja to sporočilo. Zakaj to nekdo govori? Si to res želiš? Veliko ljudi bo reklo, da to ni potrebno. Si predstavljate svet, če oglaševanje ne bi bilo uspešno? To moramo preseči in resno govoriti o medijih za prihodnost in stabilnost našega načina življenja.

Voditelj: Čas je potekel. Hvala za vaš optimizem in da ste to delili z nami.

Cull: Ni za kaj. V veselje mi je biti v Sloveniji in del tega pogovora. Hvala lepa.

Voditelj: Ste prvič v Sloveniji?

Cull: Tako je, prvič. 

Voditelj: Upam, da se imate lepo. 

Cull: Zelo.

Voditelj: Hvala. 

Cull: Ni za kaj.

[ENGLISH VERSION]

Government podcast GOVSI.

Host Zoran Potič: Welcome in the new episode. We're discussing disinformation again. At the start of our campaign earlier this year we spoke to Siim Kumpas from the European External Action Service. We're continuning with this topic in autumn so I'm pleased to introduce a renowned professor from California, Nicholas J. Cull. Welcome, Mr. Cull. 

Nicholas Cull: Thank you. 

Host: Let me put some words about you. And then I'm going to invite you to present yourself to Slovenian public. Nicholas Cull is presented by his university as a pioneer scholar and educator in the field of public diplomacy. 

Cull: Yes. 

Host: He is historian of the role of mass communication and in foreign policy. Nicholas Cull is actually British. 

Cull: Yes. 

Host: Ex European, but after the Brexit. 

Cull: After Brexit. Yes, yes, yes. 

Host: You lost that. And you are just American now.

Cull: No, I'm just an American. Yes, yes. That's true. 

Host: Just continue. You can. 

Cull: But I would say that of all these things, it's important that my background is in history, because I feel that with this question of disinformation, one of the most important things is to understand that this is not something that has been invented in the last five years. This has always been with us. There are even examples of disinformation in ancient times. I have some in my book. I have examples from ancient Greece, you know? So, I think the point, Zoran, is that it may seem overwhelming now, but if we reflect on a long term understanding of how to deal with this problem, we have a lot more knowledge and a lot more experience at our disposal than we might originally think. So it's like that. The book on babies that begins. Don't panic. You already know more than you think. We should have that in a book about disinformation, too. Don't panic. We do know how to deal with this if we take it seriously. And if we think about it carefully. 

Host: And if someone is interested in your lectures, he could go to California. Where is your faculty? In Los Angeles? University of Southern California. 

Cull: That's right. 

Host: Okay. This information you mentioned, that's not a new phenomenon. Uh, What is the difference between what is disinformation today and what is the difference with comparing to propaganda? 

Cull: Okay. Well, my definition of propaganda is that it is a mass communication conducted for political reasons. So political mass communication. I don't think propaganda has to necessarily be dishonest or malicious. I think sometimes people just want to persuade a public to do something. However, we live in a world where the word propaganda is a bad word, and there are historical reasons for that, that it's been associated with actors who were considered bad in the judgment of history. The term originated with the Vatican. So because so much history was written by people who didn't like the Vatican, their favorite word for describing spreading the faith from 1540 onwards became a negative, a negative word. But it didn't begin that way. However, disinformation is much more specific. Whereas you can say there's a neutral form of propaganda. There's no neutral form of disinformation. Disinformation is communicating something which you know to be untrue for a disruptive reason. So the only reason somebody spreads disinformation is to make life harder for their adversary. And so I see it as, as a particular tactic of propaganda. And one of the, maybe least moral tactics in the propaganda toolbox. Well, disinformation is not a new phenomenon as you mentioned. 

Host: What's the difference between disinformation in Cold War era and now maybe? 

Cull: Yes. Okay. Well, I, you know, as a historian, one of the things I've looked at was, how the United States dealt with Soviet disinformation in the Cold War, and I was able to talk to the experts who fought against that disinformation. And some of them were able to compare to what's happening now, they're still alive. And the big story, the devastating story used by the Soviet Union in the Cold War, was the idea that the HIV Aids virus was an American biological weapon which had escaped. But if you look at how that story was prepared and launched, it took years to design and launch that story in a convincing way. Part of the way that that was done was by faking and publishing scientific journal articles and then reporting it in newspapers in Africa, which would then be quoted in a newspaper in Egypt and in a magazine in India. Until over many months, there was an impression that multiple researchers in many countries in the world had come to the conclusion that the Aids virus was a biological weapon that had gone wrong. So this was a successful and very disruptive disinformation story. But you jump forward to our present times, and disinformation stories are not created with that level of attention to detail. It's like comparing a a novel with just a joke or something that somebody has thought up in half an hour. But because of the power of the internet disinformation stories you can have... So the British Foreign Office counted 32 different disinformation stories around a single incident in in Britain, the attempted poisoning of former Soviet, a former Russian agent, Sergei Skripal, in 2017. I think that the Kremlin objective in publishing through the embassy website 32 Two different versions of explanations, 32 explanations for that incident. They weren't trying to convince anybody. They were just trying to maximize doubt. Characteristics of disinformation today would be the attempt to throw multiple explanations at a single incident and not care if most of them are ignored. The enemy is no longer an ideology, really. It's just the idea of of of truth, right? It's like an assault on the idea that the world is knowable. Because if the world isn't knowable, if nothing's true, then you just you just trust the strongest man in the building who, from the Kremlin point of view is Mr. Putin. So why would they care about truth? 

Host: Well, strategy changed a little bit 40 years ago. There was an importance in quality. Now is quantity. 

Cull: Now it's quantity. Yes, absolutely. This is it. 

Host: Because the technology. 

Cull: Yes, it's quantity. It's flooding the market with contradictory stories so that people don't know what's what's true and mistrust everything. And disinformation is now such a phenomena that, you know, the forums like G7, G20 are discussing that topic. That's, that's quite unusual to discuss that phenomena at that level. Well, I think it's very important that they do. And to me, my sense is that we have to reexamine the nature of the security of the state and part of how a state becomes secure is by ensuring its reputation is secure. And we can see based on what our adversaries are doing, that they're seeking to attack the reputation of states, to make people doubt the integrity of the state, to make its citizens doubt the integrity of the state, to make its neighbors doubt that state. And our challenge, then is how do you develop reputational security? Now, this goes beyond the way in which reputation worked in the immediate postwar period, where small countries would bring in somebody to come up with a good logo or a slogan and, and brand the nation and seek to build soft power. Right. I don't think that's what we're doing now. We're not trying to get more tourists or increase our exports. Now, if you can communicate a reputation that people admire when something goes wrong, you've got a chance of surviving. So to explain what I mean, compare the problem for Ukraine in 2014, when nobody knew what the country was, when its story wasn't known around Europe and Ukraine in 2022. In 2014, Ukraine was reputationally insecure. Nobody knew their story. By 2022, they had succeeded in building a reputation, explaining what the country was, what was the nature of their threat. And when Ukraine was threatened in 2022, Europe reacted and came to the defence of the country and argued that Ukraine had to be supported, and part of that was understanding the threat of disinformation. But part of it as well was that Ukraine had worked to not be the stereotype that it had in 2014, but to develop its democracy further, to actually be a more admirable place. And I think that all around reputational security strategy has not only defeating the disinformation that's being targeted at you, but also has to do with reform and paying attention to problems that you and your, uh, your allies have so that the disinformation is less critical and less valid. This even goes to the United States. So for me, when the Russians were saying in the Cold War, oh, the United States is a racist country, the wisest American leaders understood. You don't only show the ways in which that isn't true, you also reduce the ways in which that is true. So this is, to me, a complex reputational security strategy. 

Host: Yes. Because we are now in an interesting time, because information is the core of our world democracy. 

Cull: Yes, absolutely. 

Host: With disinformation techniques you sow disorder. You threaten democracy. What are the techniques or how can democracy defend itself? 

Cull: Well, the first thing to do is to understand that democracy is under attack. I think that disinformation is a challenge for everybody. So we should have a conversation that includes everybody to build a defense against disinformation. You need to understand what the nature of the disinformation is. So a response begins with listening. We need to track disinformation and to see where stories are being introduced, which populations are being exposed, to which stories. And one of the techniques that worked in the Cold War was to take a story that the main adversary, the Soviet Union at that time, was using in one location, and then showing the use of that story to a different public. And because that shows the lack of credibility of the country using the disinformation. Excuse me, Britain has done very well by showing how Russia used multiple ridiculous, contradictory stories to describe the Skripal attack. And this diminishes the credibility of the Russian Foreign Ministry as a communicator. So you need to listen to be able to say, but you know, this foreign ministry, they said one thing on Monday, another thing on Tuesday, another thing on Wednesday, another thing on Thursday. Because the Foreign Ministry concerned assumes that people will only listen on Wednesday, or some people will only listen on Monday. They don't assume somebody is listening every day comparing and then publishing their their claims. So I believe that exposing disinformation is the beginning of this. 

Host: And in this information environment there is a role of media and journalism. 

Cull: Yes. 

Host: Both play an important role in that society. Information and journalism has been changing. The principle of citizen journalism is arising. Mainstream media, especially print media, has become weaker and fact checking methods have become increasingly lax.

Cull: Yes. 

Host: So that creates perfect conditions for the spread of disinformation. 

Cull: Absolutely.

Host:  How can journalists and the media uphold their credibility, trust as a response to the increasing prevalence of disinformation? 

Cull: Well, I think this is a massive problem. And it's made worse in places where the media is market sensitive, where media is being driven by a desire to, or a need to make money because the media want to be first with the story, and would rather be first with a big story and get a lot of attention than be lost, but be 100% accurate. So even a minor story like the story of the Australian breakdancer Raygun, right? That story has attracted tremendous rumour. Like there's a rumour that her husband was a part of the mechanism through which she was selected for the Olympics, and this was widely reported by legitimate media. Now, I'm sure this wasn't a Russian conspiracy to undermine Australian sport diplomacy, but it's still done damage, and it shows how people are willing to repeat something that sounds plausible, so they are enhanced in their own social network. How we deal with this, where it counts, I think, is through the development of the fact checking infrastructure. So the case I've looked at most is the case of Ukraine, where, a fact check website was established called Stopfake and other European nations helped Ukraine to develop this site in multiple languages. And you can go to Stopfake and check a story, see if it's genuine. You can see where stories have occurred before, and often disinformation is quite lazy. And you'll find, oh, this is a repeat of an old story, like the idea that the Americans have a secret biological warfare laboratory in Ukraine is a major story, which is an obvious recycling not only of the Cold War stories, but the Korean War stories going back. Absolutely. The major East bloc allegation about the Americans in Korea in the 50s was that they were using biological weapons against North Korea. So this is this is very uninventive stuff. And it comes round and round and round. We can even predict what some of the stories are going to be. And that is one of the major breakthroughs to predict and say when things change next week or we think Putin is going to invade, and when he does, he's going to say X, Y and Z. And when he does invade and does say X, Y, and Z, it doesn't only remove his credibility, but it puts him into a into a hole as somebody who can really not be trusted, I think this is a great... It's called the prebunking technique. And it's a very effective technique. 

Host: Yes. But, you know, in the era of artificial artificial intelligence, which can produce a lot of deepfakes and so on, it's very hard to for the public to distinguish.

Cull: And this is why we have to talk about this. And it's great that you're having this conversation. So I think that some media has done a really good job of explaining that people should expect deep fakes. And my mother was who's over 90 years old and called me the other day and she was saying, you know, you have to look out at photographs. Be sure to count the number of fingers in a photograph, because artificial intelligence can't create hands yet. So the hands always look a bit funny. So check. If you're looking at a photograph online, check the number of fingers. So this message of being a critical audience member has even reached 91 year old ladies living in England. Now that is a good sign. It's a good sign that people are tuning in to the potential for deepfake manipulation, but we're facing a tremendous, challenge and the ability not just of malign political actors to use deepfakes. But, you know, there's a story right now about teenagers in South Korea creating pornographic images of classmates using the tools they have on their cell phones to do this. So this is going to be an interpersonal, societal issue. The more we work on building a literate public, a public that's informed about the dangers of disinformation and AI, and the sooner we do that, the better. But I don't think it's I think it should be a priority, even at kindergarten, to tell kids about, uh, disinformation and AI fakes. Discussion and education. 

Host: But do you think that this is enough because, you know, every effort to regulate, for example, I don't know, social media and so on is labeled as the restrict to freedom of speech. We can have that discussion... 

Cull: But of course, of course it is because some people have a vested interest in being able to do whatever they like and making as much money as possible. One thing as a British person who is now no longer an EU citizen, I miss the EU's regulation because this is an insulation for EU citizens from the worst excesses of the internet. And I think regulation and regulatory authorities are important and, check the, you know, the what I tell my students is that you can't expect, well, you know, you can't expect a tech millionaire to vote for his own restrictions. He's always going to argue that he should have a complete freedom to say whatever he wants. But you have to rein in impulse and do what's best. Not for one billionaire, but for an entire society. 

Host: In what ways has the spread of disinformation eroded public trust in journalism and traditional media outlets? Where we are now, in your opinion? 

Cull: The problem is that regardless of content, the structure of the media environment has undermined legacy media in the past. Media has always come to us through an editor, right? Media has been curated. Now... 

Host: Regulators? 

Cull: Yeah. Either a regulator or just somebody who said that goes in the newspaper. That story doesn't go in the newspaper. And acts as a gatekeeper. Now we are our own gatekeeper, and we judge whether we are going to share media based on who did it come from. Right. Do I trust the person who sent this story to me, which usually we think. Are they somebody like me and they that can be exceptionally like from the same street. You know, it's not just a little bit like me. Do they speak Slovenian? Right. It means... Are they the same age as me? Do they also like Taylor Swift? And do we... So there are extraordinary levels of similarity. And the other part of choosing whether you're going to pass on a message is, is this message going to make me look better to my own social network? 

Host: That means, you know, you are saying that every citizen should be some kind of editor. 

Cull: Well, the problem is every citizen is some kind of editor, but not every citizen knows it. So waking up citizens to their responsibility as an editor to their network, this is part of what we need to do and to say, look, it was possible during the pandemic to teach people about social distancing. Now we need to understand, not only do you not stand next to somebody when you've got a cough, also when you've got a piece of information, you have to think. Think once, think twice before you pass it on. Because just as you don't want to be the person who gives somebody a virus, you don't want to be the person who gives somebody a false story. So I think part of good citizenship around information is thinking before you send on a story, but also maybe pushing back against the friend who sends you something that you don't welcome, who sends you something that's tendentious, that ethnic joke. That was the main thing we joked about was differences between ethnic groups. But at some point that stopped and that involved people saying, you know what, I don't want to hear a joke about a Scotsman and an Irishman going into a bar, you know, let's talk about something else. And we have to have this attitude to disinformation. We have to feel: You know what? I don't want to share this, but also I don't really want to hear it. And if people feel that there's a social disincentive to sharing disinformation or something that might be disinformation, then the whole engine of spreading disinformation, which has always been looking cool within your network, that is cut off. And that's what happened in the past, right? During World War Two, there were posters that would say, be careful what you say. You never know who's listening. Don't pass on rumors and even cartoons demonizing people who love to spread stories. They were made to seem absurd, and creating a negative image for people who spread rumors undermines the main reason that they do it. Because the people who spread this information on think of themselves as being more intelligent because they're trying to find the real truth of what's going on in a situation. So identifying and they actually are more intelligent, or statistically more intelligent. But having them worry about being seen as being less intelligent is, is the way that you start to deincentivize the spreading of disinformation. 

Host: Maybe practical advice is what proactive measures can use organizations to implement to minimize the spread of disinformation on their platforms or?

Cull: Well, I think content moderation is really important. It's important that you pay attention to what's being said on your platform and have good community guidelines. And to maybe warn people who are coming on the site to be careful what they post. And there's also a whole ecology out there of fake users, bots and inauthentic websites that tweet and retweet and to encourage people to be on the lookout for fake users, for artificial presence online. And I think sometimes people know about this in terms of, in terms of, social interactions, that they figure that there probably isn't a rich young girl from China who's interested in being their online friend. That's probably a bot, but somebody who's passing on a story about the corruption of a politician, they may be less critical in recognizing a political bot than they are recognizing a bot on a more social level. Well, that's a whole whole society approach. Building the resistance environment against the disinformation. 

Host: But what is the role of the, for example, government. What can governments do to limit the spread of disinformation and how far can they go to ensure that we don't descend into total control and censorship? What can a government do in that environment? What kind of measures? 

Cull: I think that media education is important. I think that nurturing a free and transparent media culture is important because we know that people believe disinformation when they don't have other sources about a story. So nobody's interested in disinformation about a story that they know they are completely informed about. Right. Disinformation comes in to fill a gap when there is a blind spot. So the more that government can avoid the blind spot, the less likely it is that their population will seek a disinformation explanation. So transparency, investment in free media, tolerance of media that is hostile or critical of the government, even welcoming a level of criticism. This is part of how a country builds a democratic sensibility that is resistant to disinformation. So I think that there is a... Right now democracy really is challenged and disinformation is exploiting a challenge. It's also exploiting an economic downturn and a difficult moment coming out of the pandemic. So we have to meet that challenge head on and rediscover, reassert democratic values. And that's the environment in which it will be, in which disinformation will find it hard to prosper.

Host: For the end. Can you can you give a some kind of advice to ordinary consumer of the news information, how to survive in this digital era with a lot of... 

Cull: My favorite advice actually comes from God. Might sound rather surprising, but do you remember in the Bible at the very beginning, when Adam and Eve have eaten from the Tree of knowledge and they are suddenly aware of their nakedness, and God comes upon them in the garden and they're hiding and they say, we're hiding because we are naked. And what does God say? Do you remember? Who told you that you were naked? Who told you that you're naked? And that is a really important question that every time we look at media, we should ask, where does this media come from? Where does this message come from? But especially when the message is undermining our society. So when we see our society and our values challenged, we should say who told us that we are naked? Who told Europe that its democracy falls short. Who told us that our alliances aren't real? Who told us that there is no meaning in our structures? That there is no difference between a world of oligarchs and a world of reliable institutions and seeking out who told us these things? I think, building a resilience against believing these things. So keep in mind who says so, who is behind that message? Being an informed consumer and even more importantly, an informed distributor of information is the key to defeating this challenge.

Host: Are you optimist? Pessimist?

Cull: I am optimistic about the ability of people when they really reflect and stabilize around a challenge to come to the right decision. And I think if we believe in democracy, we have to have confidence in in the people. But people have to recover the best in democracy, which I think is not in speaking and expressing your views as much as in listening, listening to each other and understanding each other as fellow members of a community. So I'm optimistic in the process. But it takes a while when a new media has become available for publics to understand the damage that can come from that medium. So it's like when a body that has to get used to a new virus, we have to develop the antibodies to help us stabilize in the presence of a new virus. And we have to develop media literacy specific to a new mechanism of communication. And I think we are doing that with social media. The world is starting to come to terms and to to restabilize. The problem is that as we're restabilizing, artificial intelligence comes along and we have to as we're completing one process, we're beginning another. And presumably something will come after artificial intelligence. And then another thing and another thing. So the scale of technology means that we cannot rest. We have to always be thinking about the integrity of our media environment. And that's why this needs to be from kindergarten onwards. A thing we talk about part of parenting to ask, you know, where did this message come from? Why is somebody saying that? Is that really what you want? And, you know, a lot of people will say, we don't need to do that because can you imagine a world if advertising wasn't effective? You know. So but we have to rise above that and talk seriously about media for the for the future and stability of our way of life. 

Host: Okay. Time is up. Nick, thank you for for your optimism and sharing it with us. 

Cull: Oh, you're very welcome. And, Zoran, it's a pleasure. It's a pleasure to be in Slovenia. Pleasure to be part of this conversation. 

Host: For the first time in Slovenia? 

Cull: First time. Yes, absolutely. 

Host: I hope you enjoyed it. 

Cull: Very much.

Host: Thank you.

Cull: You're welcome.