GOVSI Podkast: Oboroževanje brez socialne države je napačna pot, opozarja obramboslovka dr. Jelena Juvan

Slovenija je članica Nata že več kot dve desetletji, vendar razprave o vlaganjih v obrambo in vlogi zavezništva nikoli niso potihnile. Ob dnevu civilne obrambe je bila gostja podkasta GOVSI predstojnica Katedre za obramboslovje na Fakulteti za družbene vede, dr. Jelena Juvan.

Poudarila je, da je Nato več kot samo vojska, saj članstvo koristi celotni državi: »V Natu je celotna država in od članstva v Natu nima koristi samo vojska, ampak imamo vsi,« je dejala. Po njenem mnenju je varnost temeljni pogoj za normalno delovanje družbe – podobno kot je zdravje za posameznika.

Posebej je izpostavila, da mora biti oboroževanje razumljeno širše: »Oboroževanje je samo eden izmed vidikov krepitve odpornosti. Samo vlaganje v oboroževanje brez krepitve tudi socialne države, kar je temelj Evropske unije oziroma vseh, ki tu živimo, je napačna pot.«

V pogovoru je opozorila tudi na sodobne varnostne grožnje, od kibernetskih napadov do dezinformacijskih kampanj, ter na pomen civilne obrambe in samozaščitnega ravnanja državljanov. Kot je dejala, Slovenija sicer živi v »varnostnem mehurčku«, a prav to je lahko nevarno: »Varnost jemljemo kot nekaj samoumevnega, dokler je ne izgubimo.«

Pogovor je vodila Petra Bezjak Cirman. 

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Rearmament without a welfare state is the wrong path, warns defense expert Dr. Jelena Juvan

Slovenia has been a NATO member for more than two decades, yet debates about defense spending and the role of the Alliance remain lively. On the occasion of Civil Defense Day, the guest of the GOVSI podcast was Dr. Jelena Juvan, Head of the Defense Studies Department at the Faculty of Social Sciences.

She emphasized that NATO is more than just the military, since membership benefits the entire country: “In NATO, the whole state is involved, and membership is not only beneficial for the armed forces, but for all of us,” she noted. According to her, security is the fundamental precondition for the normal functioning of society – just as health is for the individual.

Dr. Juvan stressed that rearmament should be understood more broadly: “Rearmament is only one aspect of strengthening resilience. Merely investing in weapons without strengthening the welfare state – which is the foundation of the European Union and all who live here – is the wrong path.”

In the conversation, she also warned about contemporary security threats, from cyberattacks to disinformation campaigns, and underlined the importance of civil defense and citizens’ self-protection. As she put it, Slovenia lives in a kind of “security bubble,” which may be dangerous in itself: “We take security for granted – until we lose it.”

The conversation was hosted by Petra Bezjak Cirman.

Transcript

V Natu je celotna država in od članstva v Natu nima koristi samo vojska, ampak jih imamo vsi. 

Varnost je tudi temeljni pogoj za v bistvu normalno delovanje družbe, tako kot je zdravje za človeka. 

Pri vsaki objavi moraš nekoliko podvomiti, ali je resnično.  

Voditeljica Petra Bezjak Cirman: Dober dan in dobrodošli v novi 28. epizodi GOVSI podkasta. Moje ime je Petra Bezjak Cirman. Danes bomo govorili o obrambi, ki ni le vojaška naloga države, temveč celovit sistem, v katerega je vključena tudi civilna obramba. Ta ne skrbi samo za zaščito v času vojne, ampak gradi temelje naše varnosti, svobode in vsakdanjega življenja. Slovenija je članica Nata že več kot dve desetletji, a razprave o tem, koliko vlagati v obrambo, kako krepiti našo pripravljenost in kakšno vlogo imajo vojaki zunaj bojišč, so predvsem v zadnjem času ob vojnih grozotah zelo pestre, pa tudi čustvene. Z mano je danes docentka dr. Jelena Juvan, predstojnica Katedre za obramboslovje na FDV. Dober dan. 

Gostja dr. Jelena Juvan: Dober dan.

Voditeljica: Imate pa še kar nekaj nazivov, da jih bom kar prebrala: raziskovalka obrambnih politik, kibernetske varnosti in strokovnjakinja za evropsko varnost ter članica mednarodnih raziskovalnih skupin pri Natu. 

Gostja: Res je.

Voditeljica: Ni naključje, da smo vas povabili, kajti 28. septembra praznujemo dan civilne obrambe. A preden prideva do te teme, me zanima nekaj drugega. Vaša poklicna pot je v celoti povezana z obramboslovjem, predvsem skozi akademsko delo. Kaj vas je kot študentko pritegnilo k temu? 

Gostja: Ja, res je, jaz sem že celo poklicno pot na Fakulteti za družbene vede. Sem razmišljala o tem, zakaj sem se tako odločila. V času, ko sem bila na gimnaziji, so fakultete izvajale predstavitve po posameznih srednjih šolah in tako je tudi moja fakulteta imela predstavitev, kjer sem dejansko prvič slišala za obramboslovje in se mi je zdelo zanimivo. V času študija sem imela željo, da bi se potem pridružila Slovenski vojski, ki je potem nekako izzvenela tudi zaradi tega, ker so na nekem zdravstvenem pregledu ugotovili, da pač ne bi izpolnjevala pogojev. No, tako da potem je pač to bil nek tak premik. Še vedno nekako mislim, da je vojaški poklic častni poklic, da je poklic z nekim poslanstvom in s tega vidika mi je nekoliko žal, ampak okoliščine so bile pač take. Tako, da sem potem vpisala na obramboslovje. Po koncu študija so me povabili, da bi se prijavila na razpis za mlado raziskovalko. Kar sem potem v času podiplomskega študija tudi bila sprejeta oziroma sem to dobila in potem se je tako nadaljevala moja pot.

Voditeljica: Sodelavci so mi zaupali, da ste bili kot študentka tudi na Uradu vlade za komuniciranje, in sicer ste sodelovali pri kampanji za vstop Slovenije v zvezo Nato. Kakšni spomini vas vežejo na Ukom?

Gostja: Ja, res je.  Kar neko naključje na moji poklicni poti. V času podiplomskega študija je, če se prav spomnim, gospa Nada Serajnik Sraka, ki je na takratnem Uradu vlade za informiranje dobila nalogo, da izvede kampanjo za vstop Slovenije v Nato oziroma pred referendumom, je poklicala na našo katedro  v iskanju nekega študenta za študentsko pomoč. In tako sem jaz prišla zraven. To je bilo leta 2002 in sem bila celo tisto leto do zasedanja Nata v Pragi, ki je bil novembra 2002, potem pa s 1. januarjem 2003 sem se pa zaposlila na fakulteti. Imam izjemno lepe spomine, bilo je pa tudi zelo lahko bi rekla pregreto ozračje. Takrat glede članstva oziroma glede drugih alternativ članstva. Tudi kampanja v določenih delih naše družbe ni bila dobro sprejeta, je povzročila še več dodatnih vprašanj, kot dala odgovorov, tako da s tega vidika je bil potem tudi rezultat na samem referendumu, kar precej presenetljiv. 

Voditeljica: Ja, res je, če spomnimo: 2003 sta bila dva referenduma tako  za vstop v Evropsko unijo kot tudi v zvezo Nato, slogan pa je bil »Doma v Evropi, varni v Natu.« in izid na referendumu, ali smo za vstop v Nato, je bil …  Kar 66 % volivcev je bilo za …

Gostja: … kar je glede na vse razprave.. Predvsem ti nasprotniki vstopa v Nato so bili precej glasni, no, tudi vplivni. Tako, da teh 66 procentov … Mislim, da je bilo za vse nas, ki smo delali na tej kampanji, kar pozitivno presenečenje. 

Voditeljica: Zdaj pa kaže, recimo raziskava Ninamedie, da kar 74 % vprašanih podpira članstvo v Natu. Zakaj mislite, da se ta podpora spreminja? Zaradi vseh teh trendov in gibanj v svetu, ko gledamo globalne vojne, ali pa v soseščini? Ukrajina, Rusija? 

Gostja: Po mojem mnenju v zadnjem času vsekakor ima zelo velik vpliv vojna v Ukrajini oziroma celotno dogajanje na vzhodnem krilu zavezništva in tudi ta krepitev morda občutka ogroženosti tudi slovenske ozemeljske celovitosti s strani Rusije. Oziroma vse globalne spremembe: tako spremembe v stališčih Združenih držav Amerike do Nata, do Evropske unije. To se vsekakor pozna tudi na slovenskem javnem mnenju. Je pa res, da v primerjavi z drugimi državami članicami je pa Slovenija glede podpore članstvu še vedno, še vedno na repu. Kljub tej krepitvi podpore smo še vedno med zadnjimi. 

Voditeljica: Zakaj? Ker ne znamo predstaviti koristi? Jih morda vi naštejete? 

Gostja: Ja. Pa tudi, če lahko dodam, tudi zaradi tega, ker pri nas ni občutka ogroženosti. Vse javnomnenjske raziskave zadnjih let ali pa desetletji na prvo mesto groženj postavlja naravne nesreče. Vojaška grožnja je bila vedno na zadnjem mestu in tudi sedaj, v času, ko ruska vojaška agresija poteka na Ukrajino, so vojaške grožnje nekje zadaj v naši percepciji. Tudi to je res, kar ste sami povedali, da slovenske vlade ne glede na to, katere so bile, niso bile sposobno strateško skomunicirati prednosti članstva v Natu za celotno državo. Percepcija, da je članstvo v Natu samo stvar vojske, je zelo močna, in da je to stvar, ki se tiče samo Slovenske vojske ali pa ministrstva za obrambo - kar ni res. V Natu je celotna država in to je nekaj, kar se tiče nas vseh. Res pa je, da je prednost članstva v Natu daleč največja za slovensko vojsko in za njene pripadnike. Slovenska vojska je  dobila priložnost … S članstvom v Natu je dobila priložnost sodelovati z najbolj tehnološko razvitimi in usposobljenimi oboroženimi silami sveta, v sklopu zavezništva naši pripadniki odhajajo na različna usposabljanja, izobraževanja, predvsem v Združene države Amerike. Tisto, kar je pa država dobila, in tudi to bi bilo potrebno skomunicirati, je, da res imamo - čeprav to res zveni tako reklamno - imamo možnost soodločanja. Mi kot majhna država z nekim omejenimi viri smo del širšega, večjega kolektivnega zavezništva. In sedimo oziroma pač naš stalni predstavnik pri Natu sedi za mizo s predstavniki vseh držav članic zavezništva ne glede na velikost oziroma ne glede na »nepomembnost«. Torej, to je tisto. Nato odloča po konsenzu in vse države članice se morajo strinjati.

Voditeljica: Kako je pa s kolektivno obrambo? Zdaj smo videli: na Poljsko je priletelo nekaj dronov, se mi zdi, in se je sprožil tudi 4. člen. Kaj to pomeni recimo za Slovenijo, če bi tudi k nam kaj takšnega prišlo?

Gostja: Ja, 4. člen washingtonske pogodbe določa, da ima vsaka država članica v primeru nekega takšnega varnostnega dogodka pravico, da skliče posvetovanje oziroma pač, da se vse države medsebojno posvetujejo. Tudi Natov sistem oziroma zračne obrambe je odreagiral. Čeprav nekaj pomanjkljivosti se je pokazalo, predvsem s tega vidika, da Nato in tudi Poljska nima učinkovite zaščite, protidronske zaščite, kajti ena ključnih novosti vojne v Ukrajini je ravno ta množična uporaba brezpilotnih letalnikov. Na začetku vojne tudi Ukrajina ni imela učinkovite zaščite, kajti gre za uporabo … Torej, gre za nove oborožitvene sisteme oziroma za novo uporabo na že obstoječih oborožitvenih sistemih. Letenje oziroma uporaba v nekih rojih izjemno velikega števila brezpilotnih letalnikov - ko napadajo ti klasični sistemi zračne obrambe niso bili učinkoviti. To se je tudi sedaj pokazalo v tem primeru, tako da tudi Nato se je nekaj naučil iz teh 20 ali koliko 25 brezpilotnih letalnikov, ki so vdrli v poljski zračni prostor. 

Voditeljica: Meni se zdi, da imamo Slovenci na podlagi lastne izkušnje še vedno percepcijo vojne, da pridejo s tanki do meje? 

Gostja: Ja, res je. Je pa tudi res, da je vojna v Ukrajini vrnila to percepcijo nazaj, kajti vojna v Ukrajini v določenih pogledih je vojaški spopad v tistem najbolj tradicionalnem pomenu besede. V določenem časovnem obdobju je celo dobila lastnosti 1. svetovne vojne in tega pozicijskega vojskovanja. Ko sta se obe strani vkopavali v rove in se fronta ni premaknila nikamor. Je pa tudi v določenih vidikih visokotehnološki spopad, predvsem z uporabo brezpilotnih letalnikov, tudi umetne inteligence za določanje ciljev, za identifikacijo sovražnikovih ciljev oziroma položajev. Tako da gre za mešanico obojega. Je pa res, da gre za hibridno vojskovanje, kjer je vojaški del samo del tega. Je pa najbolj viden in tudi povzroča največjo škodo in trpljenje prebivalstva.

Voditeljica: O tem novodobnem vojskovanju bomo nekaj še pozneje. Če ostaneva še pri Natu. Omenili ste že, da je naša vloga pomembna v tem, da smo za mizo z velikimi državami. Kaj pa pomeni to za obrambne izdatke? Recimo, kot majhna država, Baltske države, namenjamo dovolj? Vemo, da po številkah še ne dovolj, ampak ali menite, da dovolj v primerjavi s kakšno drugo državo?

Gostja: Bi namenjali dovolj, če bi izpolnili vse tiste obljube, ki smo jih dali - tako glede odstotka BDP-ja za obrambo kot tudi glede ciljev zmogljivosti. Na žalost, zaradi določenih političnih okoliščin prvih obljub nismo oz. nekako nam jih ni uspelo uresničiti.  Tako da tisto, kar se je pa sedaj pokazalo … V preteklosti je Natu zadostovalo, da smo dajali obljube, sedaj pri ciljnih zmogljivosti, ki bi jih sedaj moral uresničiti, gre pa dejansko za to, da je treba dokazati, da jih imamo. Treba jih bo nekam poslati oziroma testirati in ne moremo več samo na papirju trditi, da imamo srednjo bataljonsko skupino. Slovenija mora narediti veliko večji korak naprej kot neke druge države, ki so postopoma dvigovale odstotke za obrambo ali pa krepile ciljne zmogljivosti. Bistvena razlika med nami in baltskimi državami je vsekakor ta izjemna zavest med baltskimi državami o neposredni vojaški ogroženosti s strani Rusije, kar nedvomno vpliva tudi na njihov odstotek BDP-ja, ki ga namenjajo za obrambo in tudi na pripravljenost vseh tradicionalnih obrambnih sistemov vseh treh baltskih držav na morebitno vojaško grožnjo. Mi nismo neposredno ogroženi s strani Rusije, tudi naša vloga v zavezništvu ni  - kar se tiče obrambe vzhodnega krila zveze Nato - ni neposredna vojaška, ampak je bolj, da bi nudimo zaščito komunikacijskim potem in v tem v nekem najbolj črnem scenariju zaustavljanje  napredovanja nasprotnikovih sil, da bi Nato dobil čas odreagirati.

Voditeljica: Se tudi vam zdi, da geografsko gledano države Juga, ki so v Natu, oddajajo manj za obrambo, Severa pa več.

Gostja: Ja, vse to potrjujejo tudi številke. Zelo velik razkorak je med dejansko ogroženostjo in pa tudi zaznavo ogroženosti med državami, ki mejijo neposredno na Ukrajino ali pa Rusijo oziroma Belorusijo, in pa državami, evropskimi južnimi državami. Države, ki - Španija, Portugalska, Italija - se soočajo s popolnoma drugimi izzivi, njim je še vedno … Prihodi migrantov so še vedno njihova prioriteta oziroma soočanje s temi izzivi in vsekakor se počutijo nekoliko zapostavljene, kajti govori se izključno o oboroževanju, okrepitvi evropskih obrambnih zmogljivosti. Medtem ko druge grožnje pa niso izginile. Tako niso izginile niti naravne nesreče zaradi klimatskih sprememb. Te naravne nesreče bodo pogostejše, povzročale bodo vedno večjo  škodo, tudi človeške žrtve. Ta vojaška grožnja, vojaška grožnja z Vzhoda je dejansko samo prišla v skupek vseh groženj, s katerimi se danes soočamo.

Voditeljica: In to smo videli recimo v Španiji, ko so bile poplave letos.

Gostja: Ja, res je. Poplave, konec koncev tudi poplave, ki smo jih imeli v Sloveniji, ali pa požar na Krasu nakazuje na to, da so posledice, ki jih povzročajo, in obsežnost teh naravnih nesreč, vedno večje.

Voditeljica: Zdaj se mora v vsem tem konsenz najti še z ZDA, z največjo članico.

Gostja: Ja, Združene države Amerike res so dejansko od konca druge svetovne vojne nudile varnostna zagotovila  Evropi. S prihodom oziroma s spremembo na vrhu ameriške administracije so se bistveno spremenila stališča tako do zveze Nato kot tudi do Evrope. Prioriteta ZD ni Evropa, je drug del sveta, je Kitajska in oni vse svoje resurse in pozornost usmerjajo ta tja. Evropska unija pa bo morala najti nek svoj prostor pod soncem v teh spremenjenih geostrateških in pa globalnih razmerah.

Voditeljica: Kako v tej luči zdaj vidite vse te spremembe? Pri Evropski Komisiji imamo program Re-arm načrt trenutne Evropske komisije za vnovično oboroževanje Evrope.  Je to odgovor na to, da bomo ostali sami brez tega ščita ZDA?

Gostja: Torej, oboroževanje je samo eden izmed vidikov krepitve odpornosti. Gre vsekakor tudi za zavarovanje kritične infrastrukture. V zadnjem obdobju so imeli tudi na evropski celini nekaj dogodkov, na primer električne mrke, izpade električne energije, prekinitve v letalskem prometu, ki so nakazali na neko visoko stopnjo ranljivosti, da o kibernetskih napadih sploh ne govorim. Tako da s tega vidika samo vlaganje v oboroževanje brez krepitve tudi socialne države, kar je  temelj Evropske unije oziroma vseh, ki tu živimo, je napačna pot. Je pa res, da krepitev obrambnih zmogljivosti ima tudi lahko zelo močno odvračalno vlogo in to je tisto, kar Evropska unija želi nasprotniku ne glede na to, kdo to je trenutno ali pa v prihodnje, dati jasno sporočilo: da se je sposobna sama obraniti in že s tem odvrniti neke potencialne nasprotnike.

Voditeljica: Tukaj bomo naleteli zagotovo že v Sloveniji vidimo na komunikacijske izzive. Kako prepričati ljudi? Mnogo je razlag da Slovenci smo narod, ki je bil vedno za mir in da ne razumemo tega, da se je treba oborožiti, če imaš pač nasprotnike, recimo v velikih državah, ki so zelo dobro oborožene. 

Gostja: Ja, res je. Pa tudi po mojem mnenju je ta zgodovinski spomin desetdnevne vojne za osamosvojitev Slovenije zelo kratek. Zelo pogosto se primerjamo na primer s Hrvaško, ampak hrvaška domovinska vojna je trajala tri, štiri leta in pri njih je to še vedno vgrajeno  v del te njihove narodne identitete. In oni dobro vedo, zakaj imajo vojsko in zakaj so jo, nekoč v preteklosti, potrebovali, da je obranila dele hrvaškega ozemlja. Pri nas pa je ta mirovna politika oziroma mirovna prizadevanja res so bolj vgrajena v našo narodno identiteto. Pomemben vidik je tudi zgodovina.  Pred osamosvojitvijo v času Jugoslavije vsaj bila neuvrščena. Torej, nekako se je uspešno pozicionirala med zahodni in vzhodni blok. Ko se je Slovenija osamosvojila, so bile zelo močne razprave o tem, kako naj  Slovenija v prihodnje zagotavlja svojo varnost. Veliko je bilo tudi alternativ, ena je bila nevtralnost, tudi govorilo se je o demilitarizaciji, pa je potem bila sprejeta odločitev, da Slovenija vstopi v zvezo Nato. Nekako ta razprava nikoli ni bila opravljena do konca, kar vidimo, da se sedaj ponovno ponavlja. Tudi letos poleti, ko je obstajala možnost oziroma je bil napovedan potencialno referendum o članstvu v Natu, so se  ponovno pojavljale iste alternative in tudi isti akterji, ki so leta 91 ali pa 97 ali pa 2002 nasprotovali članstvu v Natu. Torej, nekako ni nam uspelo opraviti širše družbene razprave o tem, zakaj Nato potrebujemo in zakaj je to - jaz bi rekla - edina opcija za Slovenijo.

Voditeljica: Ali drži, da še nihče ni izstopil iz Nata?

Gostja: Ja, to drži. Pravno gledano nobena država, ki je postala članica zavezništva, še ni izstopila iz Nata. Francija je leta 1966 pod predsednikom, takratnim predsednikom Charles de Gaullom izstopila iz integriranega vojaškega poveljstva, ker naj se ne bi strinjali z ameriško prevlado v zvezi Nato. Ampak nikoli pa niso izstopili tudi iz političnega dela, tako da so ostali zavezani 5. členu. Takrat so tudi francoske vojaške baze izvzeli izpod Natovega poveljstva, to se je pa spremenilo leta 2009. Takrat je bil francoski predsednik Nicolas Sarkozy, ki je spremenil to odločitev nazaj. In se je Francija vrnila v vojaški del zavezništva. Potem, na primer, Grčija je imela neke takšne pobude 1974, ko je prišlo do dogodkov na Cipru, pa ni izstopila, potem Turčija tudi vsake toliko časa malo zagrozi, ampak Turčija tudi sama zaradi svojega geostrateškega položaja tudi ona potrebuje Nato, tako kot Nato potrebujejo njo. Formalno 13. člen washingtonske pogodbe omogoča izstop oziroma določa, kako država izstopi:  po dvajsetih letih ima pravico, da eno leto vnaprej napove odstop, potem pa … Skladno z našo nacionalno zakonodajo: če je bil pristop ratificiran v parlamentu, potem bi verjetno tudi izstop moral biti ratificiran. Letos poleti, ko je bilo veliko razprav o tem, se spomnim - mislim, da je dekan pravne fakultete dr. Miro Cerar govoril o tem, da bi moral biti uporabljen isti pravni postopek kot za vstop.

Voditeljica: So se pa pridružile članica …

Gostja: Največjo širitev je Nato doživel po koncu hladne vojne. Tudi mi smo 2004 vstopili skupaj z desetimi članicami, se mi zdi, ko je Nato imel to veliko širitev na Vzhod. Največja sprememba pa, tudi za evropsko varnostno arhitekturo, vsekakor pomeni vstop Švedske in Finske kot direktna posledica ruske vojaške agresije na Ukrajino. To je tudi izjemno bilo presenetljivo. Konec koncev, Švedska, ki je stoletja bila nevtralna, Finska, ki je sicer imela vsiljeno nevtralnost od konca 2. svetovne vojne dalje, ki sta veljali za pojem nevtralnosti v Evropi, sta se odločili za ta korak. Poleg tega Avstrija … Prejšnji teden je avstrijska zunanja ministrica … Ni napovedala, ampak dejala, da Avstrija tudi razmišlja o tem, da bi vstopila v Nato oziroma, pač, da ne bi bila več nevtralna. Je pa res, da tudi avstrijska nevtralnost je stvar državne pogodbe, tako da vse te nevtralnosti, ki smo jih imeli na evropskem kontinentu oziroma so, so specifične. Vsaka država, ki je nevtralna, ima svoje značilnosti.

Voditeljica: Državni sekretar za nacionalno varnost Vojko Volk reče, da se verjetno Švedi in Finci niso nekega jutra zbudil in bili hipnotizirani, ampak da so dobro vedeli, zakaj vstopajo.

Gostja: Teh pobud oziroma nekih idej o tem, da bi na Švedskem pristopili v Nato, na Finskem, jih je bilo več. Ampak ta dokončen korak naprej so naredili zaradi vojne v Ukrajini zaradi zavedanja, da Rusija  vojaško ogroža tako Finsko, ki je imela izjemno slabe izkušnje s Sovjetsko zvezo, zgodovinsko gledano, in tudi Švedsko, ki je geografsko  blizu Rusiji.

Voditeljica: Še eno pojem ste omenili: nevtralnost. V vseh teh razpravah čez poletje, mislim, da je nekdo omenil, da nevtralnost veliko stane?

Gostja: Ja, nevtralnost … Če gledamo odstotke BDP-ja, ki jih zdaj nevtralne države namenjajo, to niso visoke številke. Ampak gre za vzpostavljene sisteme. Avstrija je že vrsto desetletij nevtralna in koncept obrambnega sistema je drugačen in ima splošno vojaško obveznost. Nevtralnost pomeni, da smo za lastno obrambo prepuščeni izključno sami sebi, kar pomeni, da mora naš obrambni sistem vsebovati vse sestavine in strukture, da bi ta obrambni sistem bil učinkovit. In nekako najbolj nazorni prikaz je, da je Nato tisti, ki nam zagotavlja varnost zračnega prostora. Prvo, kar bi morali narediti, je  razmisliti o tem, kako bi mi zagotavljali varnost našega zračnega prostora. Zdaj, glede na majhnost našega ozemlja neka letala niso primerna, ker bi vzletela in bi potem - pogosto smo predmet nekega humorja - bi potem odletela nad Avstrijo. Skratka, letala vsekakor ne, so pa pač drugi sistemi, ki zagotavljajo varnost zračnega prostora: sistemi dolgega dometa srednjega dometa, kratkega dometa. To pa  je izjemno, izjemno drago.

Voditeljica: Če poenostaviva: če bi zdaj recimo leteli droni proti nam. Če bi bili nevtralni, bi morali imeti sisteme … 

Gostja: Bi morali mi sami odreagirati…

Voditeljica: … zdaj pa pomaga Madžarska, mislim pa, da tudi Italija ...

Gostja: Mislim, da trenutno je Madžarska tista, ki … V primeru, da se v našem zračnem prostoru zazna nek tak daleč »nedobrodošel obiskovalec«, bi morala Madžarska odreagirati. 

Voditeljica: S tem da se po moje še niti ne zavedamo, da – ampak to je laično mnenje – zaradi jedrske elektrarne smo še kar zanimivi …

Gostja: Ja, to je res. In tudi sedaj, ko se veliko govori o nakupih sistemov zračne obrambe v Sloveniji, Iris, namenjena sta izključno varovanju Jedrske elektrarne Krško in pa Luki Koper. Pa verjetno tudi kakšen bo za prestolnico.

Voditeljica: Gremo zdaj še malce na civilni del obrambe. Nekaj ste ga že sami omenili, ker vemo, da obramba ni samo vojska. Omenila sem že, da je vlada 28. september razglasila za dan civilne obrambe. Ta dan je simboličen, saj je bil tega dne leta 1990 v Sloveniji sprejet ustavni zakon o izvedbi ustavnih amandmajev na področju ljudske obrambe. S tem so se postavili temelje obrambnega načrtovanja države. Nam lahko poveste kaj več o tem sploh, kaj je civilna obramba?

Gostja: Ja, po našem zakonu o obrambi se obramba deli na vojaško obrambo in civilno obrambo. Vojaška obramba … Nosilec izvajanje vojaške obrambe je Slovenska vojska. Civilna obramba je pa podpora delovanju vojaške obrambe v vojnih razmerah. Torej, kako družba z vsemi svojimi strukturami prispeva k učinkoviti obrambi v vojni. Je pa res, da je to zelo zastarel koncept. Danes, ko govorimo o civilni obrambi, lahko pridemo tudi na področje odpornosti družbe, ki je sedaj nekoliko bolj aktualen koncept. Civilna obramba je nekoč vključevala psihološko obrambo, gospodarsko obrambo, torej, kako  vsi subjekti družbe prispevajo k obrambi države. Obramba države pa je lahko razumljena tudi bistveno širše kot samo vojaška obramba. Tudi danes ne govorimo samo o vojaških grožnjah, ampak o hibridnih grožnjah,  na primer, obramba pred kibernetskimi napadi oziroma krepitev zavedanja vseh nas, da je grožnja v kibernetskem prostoru, da smo tarča vsak dan in kako se na primer obranimo. S tem tudi mi, ko to vemo oziroma delujemo preventivno, prispevamo oziroma krepimo odpornost družbe pred kibernetskimi napadi. Ali pa na primer samozaščitno obnašanje vsakega posameznika,  tudi zavedanje, na primer, da v primeru nekega rušilnega potresa v Ljubljani, da strukture zaščite reševanja ne bi bile oz. ne morejo pomagati čisto vsakemu takoj, ampak da se ljudje v prvih urah po nekem kriznem dogodku zanesemo, skušamo zanesti na sebe ali pa na svoje. In šele potem pričakujemo pomoč nekih struktur. V primeru neke nesreče večjih razsežnosti je tudi narejeno, ko mu je potrebno pomagati - zdravstvenim ustanovam, vladnim strukturam, treba je ohraniti nemoteno delovanje države in vseh odločevalcev. Čeprav je to zdaj zelo grdo povedano, ampak državljani oziroma navadni ljudje morajo v prvi vrsti sami znati pomagati sebi.

Voditeljica: Zelo je bilo aktualno, da so nekatere evropske države, delile tudi napotke, kako se samozaščititi. Tako daleč pri nas ravno zaradi tega, ker se počutimo dovolj varne, nismo šli …

Gostja: Ne, ker se to vedno povezuje z …Trenutno se to povezuje z vojno v Ukrajini. V Sloveniji je precej močna percepcija o tem, kaj nam pa kdo hoče in kaj bo Rusija nam hotela. Kar je na nek način res. V primeru, dajmo reči, uresničitve najbolj črnega scenarija, mi ne bomo primarna tarča ruskega vojaškega delovanja, smo pa glede na naš geostrateški položaj ena izmed ključnih držav oziroma poti za premike Natovih sil na vzhodno krilo. Tako da s tega vidika so pa lahko naše komunikacijske poti tarča napadov, predvsem pa Luka Koper. Luka Koper je  ključno pristanišče za delovanje oziroma za prihod Natovih sil v ta del Evrope n in potem za pot proti vzhodnemu krilu. Treba je tudi upoštevati zelo močne ruske dezinformacijske kampanje, ki se dogaja v evropskem prostoru in ki v določenih delih Evrope, in po mojem mnenju Slovenija tudi sam sodi, so padle na zelo plodna tla. Glede na določene objave na internetu, ki krožijo po spletu, po X-u ali po različnih teh socialnih omrežjih, se lahko domneva, da v ozadju gre za organizirane dezinformacijske kampanje. Gre za plasiranje nekih dezinformacij v slovenski prostor, na katere pač … Določene skupine so to sprejele kot resnico, na primer, ko so se zgodili vdori brezpilotnih letalnikov v poljski zračni prostor, so bile zelo številne objave o tem, da to ni res, da so Ukrajinci tisti, ki so poslali te drone, da itak mediji lažejo in da nič od tega ni res. Oblikovanje nekih takih objav je lahko tudi zelo nevarno.

Voditeljica: Tako je. Razdvojujejo družbo in če vemo, da se dajejo milijoni za to, mi pa nismo dovolj še naredili na naši strani, da bi izobrazili ljudi, a ne, kako prepoznati, da so to lažni profili?

Gostja: Ja, ker je še vedno neko prepričanje, saj piše na internetu, pa je res. Videl sem na tik toku, pa je res. Ampak tisto, kar Rusija počne, sicer ne direktno, ampak ima cel kup nekih skupin, ki so posredno financiranje s strani ruske vlade. Njihova naloga je, da plasirajo dezinformacije v evropski prostor. Na primer v začetku vojne v Ukrajini so na Poljskem imeli kampanjo, tako na spletu kot tudi v fizičnem smislu, katere namen je bil  diskreditirati ukrajinske begunce in obrniti poljsko javnost proti ukrajinskim beguncem. Kajti takrat je poljska bila prva država ... To je država, ki je sprejela največje število ukrajinskih beguncev.

Voditeljica: Ja, tudi Francija je zelo na udaru in vse to se veže na politike, ki jih sprejemajo predsedniki vlad. Mi podpiramo Ukrajino, Francija podpira Ukrajino. Zdaj se zelo širi, tudi kakor sem opazila, iz Izraela kampanja, da v Gazi ni lakote. Izraelska vlada je milijone namenila Googlu, da to predvajal na YouTubu. Skratka, ljudje se sploh ne zavedajo v Sloveniji, si upam trditi, kaj vse se  dogaja na spletu.

Gostja: Ja, mislim, da se ne. Pri vsaki objavi moraš nekoliko podvomiti, ali je resnična. Tudi, na primer, pri objavah na X prejšnji teden so bile posnetki, kako Rusija ob vojaški vaji Zapad 2025 premika raketne sisteme Iskander v Kaliningradu. Ampak ti raketni sistemi se tam nahajajo že od leta 2008. Torej, to ni nič novega. Tudi glede na domet teh raketnih sistemov je popolnoma vseeno, ali se ta nahaja levo ali desno od določene ulice. Je pa verjetno cilj te objave bil tudi ustvariti neko paniko na Zahodu, kar pomeni, da … Seveda ni samo Rusija tista, ki pač razvija svoje zgodbe, tudi seveda Ukrajina jih, da krepi evropsko podporo svoji obrambi.

Voditeljica: Na uradu smo zasnovali kampanjo – Preberi, premisli, preveri - tako da imamo tudi nekaj napotkov za tiste, ki želijo lahko preberete na naši strani gov.si/dezinformacije, ves čas pa prevajamo tudi novičnik, ki ga pripravljajo v Evropi, kjer imamo zaznane tudi dezinformacije, ki prihajajo iz Rusije. Tako da upamo, da tudi mi malce pomagamo državljane izobraziti, da bodo bolj pozorni na to. Prej ste nekaj tudi že omenili kibernetske napade. Vse to so hibridne grožnje. Slovenija je bila del tega lani, sicer naj bi šlo - jaz se ne spoznam na to - za enostavne napade, ko daš nekaj dolarjev in ti ne deluje spletna stran?

Gostja: To ni treba dolarjev, v bistvu najdeš navodila na spletu in potem je to zelo enostavno. Jaz imam predmet Varnost v informacijski družbi, kjer se s študenti ukvarjamo s takimi zadevami in to je resnično preprosto. In to je bistvena razlika med grožnjami danes in v preteklosti. Vojne so bile vedno drage in ti sodobni oborožitveni sistemi so ekstremno dragi. Danes pa lahko dejansko s tem, da najdeš navodila na internetu, če si malo bolj vešč, ali pa znaš dostopati do temnega spleta, lahko povzročiš kolaps električnega omrežja, na primer, v Španiji … Ne rečem, da se je to zgodilo v Španiji, ampak z enim klikom lahko dejansko sesuješ preskrbo z električno energijo v določeni državi, na primer.

Voditeljica: Ampak tudi španski premier, recimo, je v koaliciji, Macron, tako kot predsednik Golob, a ne... Imajo podobne poglede na zunanjo politiko in vsi ti so tarča  tega ruskega kibernetskega vojskovanja.

Gostja: Ja in tudi prepričana sem, da tudi tisti, ki se s tem ukvarjamo, se ne zavedamo oziroma ne vemo o vsega, kar Rusija plasira v evropski prostor. Sicer obveščevalne službe opozarjajo na to …  Pri vsaki taki objavi je pač treba podvomiti, se vprašati, kaj bi lahko bilo v ozadju. 

Voditeljica: Ko so bili ti DOS napadi … Neka ruska skupina se je razglasila, da je ona tista, ki jih je sprožila. Spomnim se, da so tudi uporabljali zelo čustvene besede, ne in se skuša na naše emocije zaigrati - podoben jezik imamo bratje, mi nismo proti vam ... 

Gostja: Ja, pa tudi lansko leto, se mi zdi januarja, ko so slovenske osnovne šole pa srednje šole prejele tisto grozilno elektronsko pošto. V ozadju naj bi bile neke ruske hekerske skupine. Cilj tega je v destabilizirati pač državo oziroma destabilizirati razmere v neki državi in pač vzbuditi strah, ne? Seveda je bil strah za vse, ki imamo otroke po šolah. Že to je bilo izjemno zaskrbljujoče dogajanje. Torej, kljub temu, da je v ozadju šlo za neko očitno, pa ni bilo verižno, pismo, ampak poslano na večino šol v Sloveniji, kmalu potem še na Hrvaškem, pa tudi v drugih evropskih državah.

Voditeljica: Slovenija je tudi izključila še enega diplomata, se pravi persona non grata, ruskega. Tudi to je bil del teh naših ukrepov povračilnih zoper takšno propagando, ki so jo izvajali.

Gostja: To je dokaz, ne, da se tudi na našem ozemlju, čeprav v naši percepciji smo mi majhni, nepomembni. Ampak takšno delovanje je pri nas prisotno. Tudi odkritje teh dveh ruskih vohunov, ki sta tukaj živela tajno življenje večletne in si ustvarila svoje neko novo življenje, pomeni, da smo mi še kako zanimivi za tuje obveščevalne službe.

Voditeljica: Ravno te dni sta avtorja knjige, ki je zdaj o tem izšla - Knjiga Swap (izmenjava) - na obisku v Sloveniji in sta povedala, da ima Slovenija tukaj ključno vlogo. In bom spet secirala Vojka Volka. On rad pove, da če bi bila onadva nepomembna vohuna ju ne bi pričakal Putin in rdeča preproga.

Gostja: Ja to je bilo tudi nek zelo dober pokazatelj, da.

Voditeljica: Da sta imela pomembno vlogo v njihovem obveščevalnem sistemu … Skupaj sva našteli kar nekaj teh aktivnosti. Ali menite, da Slovenci še vedno ne verjamejo, da nismo oaza miru?

Gostja: Mislim, statistično gledano vedno določena skupina ali pa delež ljudi, ki dvomi v vse. Mislim, da je tudi pandemija covida 19 zelo dobro pokazala to oziroma je to nekako še bolj eksponiralo. Ne moremo pričakovati, da se bodo vsi zavedali tega. Poleg tega tudi - ljudje se ne zanimajo vsakodnevno politiko, ne zanima jih, kaj se dogaja okoli njih, pač živijo v nekem svojem varnostnem mehurčku. Dovolj je pa, da se o tem govori. Državne strukture so tiste, ki so odgovorne za to, da se krepi odpornost. Vsekakor pa je pričakovati … Mislim popolnoma normalno je, da so določene kritike oziroma da pač ljudje dvomijo v vse to. Jaz si to razlagam tako, da je veliko lažje živeti, če dvomiš v vse. Kajti na žalost resničnost zna biti zelo črna in zelo grda in se odločiš, da temu ne boš verjel in greš lažje skozi življenje. Je pa tudi res, da t. i. varnostni mehurček je nekaj, kar … Vse javnomnenjske raziskave, ki smo jih v preteklosti izvajali tudi na fakulteti glede varnosti, so pokazale, da v Sloveniji živimo v varnostnem mehurčku. Pod Alpami smo srečni, noben nam nič noče, kar tudi vpliva na našo percepcijo ogroženosti. 

Voditeljica: Kako bi vi ocenili obrambno pripravljenost Slovenije na lestvici od ena do 10 in zakaj?

Gostja: Torej, ne morem enostavno odgovoriti na to vprašanje. Obrambna pripravljenost države je odvisna od številnih dejavnikov in tudi ocenjuje pripravljenost glede na grožnje. Če bi šlo res za grožnjo neposrednega vojaškega spopada, intenzivnosti, potem Slovenska vojska ni sposobna samostojnega delovanja. Je pa res, da Slovenska vojska ni namenjena temu. Slovenska vojska in Slovenija je v Natu od leta 2004. Mi smo zgradili obrambni sistem kot del sistema kolektivne obrambe in Slovenska vojska kot takšna nikoli ni bila organizirana z namenom, da samostojno brani slovensko ozemlje. Tudi naše zmogljivosti so komplementarne, zmogljivostim Nata. Mi smo del sistema kolektivne obrambe in vse temelji na predpostavki, da v primeru, da bo treba, da bo aktiviran 5. člen washingtonske pogodbe, bo Nato branil vse države članice oziroma tisto, ki to potrebuje.

Voditeljica: Katere tri prioritete bi si morali postaviti kot država, da zagotovimo dolgoročno varnost?

Gostja: Torej, v luči trenutnih varnostnih razmer moramo predvsem okrepiti lastne obrambne zmogljivosti, prispevati h krepitvi obrambnih zmogljivosti Evropske unije, kajti naša prihodnost je v Evropski uniji. Mi smo del evropskega varnostnega okolja in ne glede na to, kaj se zgodi globalno oziroma ali bo prišlo do spremembe v razmerju med Združenimi državami Amerike in Evropsko unijo ali znotraj Nata, mi se moramo osredotočati na Evropsko unijo. Poleg tega: Rusija je blizu. Rusija bo ostala. Torej, bo potrebno najti nek način skupnega sobivanja na evropski celini, ne da bi se medsebojno ogrožali.

Voditeljica: Veliko se je govorilo o tem, da se zdaj ruši ta red, ki je bil ustvarjen po 2. svetovni vojni.

Gostja: Ja. Mednarodna skupnost, kot je obstajala po 2. svetovni vojni ali pa po koncu hladne vojne, še bolje, ne obstaja več. Pravila se ne upoštevajo, kar zelo dobro vidimo v Gazi, novih pravil pa še ni. Novih struktur še ni. Vzpostavlja se nek nov svetovni red, kjer predvsem Rusija želi odigrati pomembnejšo vlogo, Kitajska se je vsem tem času izjemno okrepila in dvignila v tistem delu sveta, postala globalni akter. Tako da to je … Spreminjajo se razmere. Pravila se bodo še vzpostavila, kršijo se pa trenutno veljavna pravila in ni učinkovitih vzvodov, da bi se to sankcioniralo. Varnostni svet OZN, ki je v času hladne vojne igral zelo pomembno vlogo pri vzdrževanju svetovnega miru in varnosti, je  blokiran, ne deluje. Treba bo najti neko novo formulo. Vprašanje pa je, kakšna bo.

Voditeljica: Mnogi očitajo Evropski uniji, da ni dovolj močna nasproti teh držav, ki ste jih omenili. Jaz bi dodala še ZDA zraven, ki blokira določene zadeve v Varnostnem svetu.

Gostja: Evropska unija se je vsa ta desetletja preveč zanašala na Združene države Amerike. Evropska unija je od leta 91 dalje imela politične cilje, da postane pomembnejši svetovni akter ali pa tudi varnostni akter, pa je to v bistvu bolj zgodba o neuspehu kot uspehu. Bilo je kar nekaj neuspelih takšnih angažmajev. Konec koncev 1992, no, 1991, ko je Slovenija razglasila samostojnost, pa potem Hrvaška, pa ko se zgodijo oboroženi spopadi, Evropska unija oziroma, takrat Evropska skupnost, je še bila poslala neoborožene opazovalce, na bojišče, med katerimi so bile tudi človeške žrtve.  Pa potem  so Združeni narodi prišli nekako reševati spor na ozemlju nekdanje Jugoslavije in šele z vstopom ZDA so se vse vojne začele končevati. Potem 1999, ko je Nato izvedel zračno vojaško operacijo na Zvezno republiko Jugoslavijo, se je tudi pokazalo, da je Evropska unija brez ameriških vojaških zmogljivosti pač popolnoma neučinkovita. Tako da ta prihod ameriškega predsednika Donalda Trumpa na položaj predsednika je zelo močna streznitev, ki opozarja na to, kar bi Evropska unija že zdavnaj morala narediti, pa ni, ker ji ni bilo treba. Sedaj pa v bistvu nima izbire. 

Voditeljica: V vsem tem kontekstu se moram še malo vrniti na dezinformacijske kampanje. Tudi lastniki vseh teh platform so, ali kitajski ali ameriški, a ne?

Gostja: Ja, to je res.

Voditeljica: In to spodbujajo. Ker tudi akt o digitalnih storitvah jim ne prepreči tega, kar je Evropska unija želela regulirati, pa ni uspešna. To vidimo pri našem delu

Gostja: Ja, pa tudi v ozadju gre pač za dobiček. Vse te digitalne platforme so  v bistvu najbogatejša podjetja globalno in zakaj bi oni dovolili, da ljudje ne izražajo svojih mnenj, tudi če so sovražna ali pa nasilna, ker s tem pač imajo dobiček, ne?

Voditeljica: Za zaključek, ker greva proti koncu še mogoče dve vprašanji, kratki. Katero napačno predstavo o obrambi ali vojski bi želeli razbiti?

Gostja: Ja, vsekakor to, da je Nato izključno stvar vojske. To je nekaj, kar vsem nam, če lahko tako rečem, v vseh teh letih ni uspelo spremeniti v percepciji slovenske javnosti. Torej, v Natu je celotna država in od članstva v Natu nima koristi samo vojska, ampak imamo vsi. Je pa res, da varnost je vrednota, ki je samo po sebi umevna in ne zavedaš se je, dokler je ne izgubiš. In to je največja nevarnost vsega tega. Varnost je tudi temeljni pogoj za normalno delovanje družbe, tako kot je zdravje za človeka. Poleg tega pa še to: da mi plačujemo, da Nato nekaj od nas zahteva … Nato nikoli ni od nas zahteval. Nato je nekaj pričakoval. Te zaveze so se pojavile šele pred kratkim. Nato ni nikoli od nas zahteval, mi v Nato prispevamo zaradi lastne varnosti.

Voditeljica: In še zadnje vprašanje: kaj pa lahko sami naredimo za večjo varnost in odpornost?

Gostja: Samozaščitno obnašanje vsakega posameznika je na prvem mestu. Približno 14 dni nazaj ob izjemno slabih vremenskih napovedi so opozarjali na poplave. Vsak, ki živi  na poplavnem območju ali pač na območju, kjer prihaja do izbruha podtalnice ali pa tudi kanalizacije, se mora zavedati, kaj mora narediti, da, na primer, to prepreči oziroma zmanjša škodo. In potem tisto, kar se že vrsto let govori: treba je začeti z vzgojo najmlajših. Seveda, letom primerno in starosti primerno, ampak da tudi otroci v šolah se zavedajo nevarnosti in kaj lahko oni sami naredijo? Mislim, da je zelo dober primer žled 2014, ki je pokazal na to izjemno odvisnost celotne države od preskrbe z elektriko. Danes je ta odvisnost še bistveno večja. Kot se je pokazalo so najbolj samopreskrbni oziroma samozaščitni posamezniki na agrarnih okoljih, ki morda imajo doma celo agregate, ki imajo nekaj zaloge hrane, ki so sposobni si zagotoviti hrano za nekaj dni, najmanj pa  ljudje v velikih mestih oziroma v mestih v blokih, kjer je vse na elektriko in si ne moreš skuhati kosila oziroma pogreti obroka, če nimaš elektrike.

Voditeljica: Gospa Juvan, najlepša hvala. Upam, da sva razbili kakšen mit o tem …

Gostja: Jaz tudi …

Voditeljica: … da Nato ni tak bav bav, kot ga prikazujejo nekateri. Hvala, da ste bili naša gostja, in upam, da se še kdaj usedeva. 

Gostja: Z veseljem. 

Voditeljica: Vsem, ki ste nas spremljali, pa želim lep dan in spremljajte naš podkast na vseh platformah, kjer spremljate podkaste. Nasvidenje. 

----------------

  NATO is a whole country, and NATO membership does not only benefit the military, but we all have them.

Security is also a fundamental condition for the essentially normal functioning of society, just like health is for humans.

With every announcement, you have to question a little whether it is true.

 Host Petra Bezjak Cirman: Good day and welcome to the new 28th episode of the GOVSI podcast. My name is Petra Bezjak Cirman. Today we will talk about defense, which is not only a military task of the state, but a comprehensive system that also includes civil defense. This not only provides protection in times of war, but also builds the foundations of our security, freedom and everyday life. Slovenia has been a member of NATO for more than two decades, but discussions about how much to invest in defense, how to strengthen our readiness and what role soldiers play outside the battlefields have been very varied and emotional, especially recently, given the horrors of war. With me today is Assistant Professor Dr. Jelena Juvan, Head of the Department of Defense Studies at the Faculty of Defense. Good afternoon.

Guest Dr. Jelena Juvan: Good afternoon.

Host: You have quite a few more titles that I will just read out: researcher in defense policies, cybersecurity and expert in European security and member of international research groups at NATO.

Guest: That's right.

Host: It's no coincidence that we invited you, because on September 28th we celebrate Civil Defense Day. But before we get to that topic, I'm interested in something else. Your career path is entirely connected to defense studies, mainly through academic work. What attracted you to this as a student?

Guest: Yes, that's right, I've already spent my entire career at the Faculty of Social Sciences. I've thought about why I made that decision. When I was in high school, faculties held presentations at individual high schools, and so my faculty also had a presentation, where I actually heard about defense studies for the first time and I found it interesting. During my studies, I had a desire to join the Slovenian Army, which then somehow faded away because a medical examination determined that I would not meet the conditions. Well, so then it was a kind of shift. I still somehow think that the military profession is an honourable profession, that it is a profession with a mission, and from that perspective I am a little sorry, but the circumstances were just that. So I enrolled in defense studies. After finishing my studies, I was invited to apply for a young researcher position. Which I was accepted during my postgraduate studies, or rather, I got it, and then my path continued like that.

Host: My colleagues told me that as a student you were also at the Government Office for Communications, and that you participated in the campaign for Slovenia's entry into NATO. What memories do you have of Ukom?

Guest: Yes, it is true. Quite a coincidence in my professional career. During my postgraduate studies, if I remember correctly, Ms. Nada Serajnik Sraka, who was assigned to run a campaign for Slovenia's entry into NATO, or rather, before the referendum, at the then Government Office for Communications, called our department looking for a student for student assistance. And that's how I got involved. That was in 2002 and I was there the whole year until the NATO summit in Prague, which was in November 2002, and then on January 1, 2003, I got a job at the faculty. I have extremely fond memories, but it was also very, I could say, an overheated atmosphere. At that time, regarding membership or other alternatives to membership. The campaign was also not well received in certain parts of our society, it raised more questions than it answered, so from this perspective the result of the referendum itself was also quite surprising.

Host: Yes, it is true, if we remember: in 2003 there were two referendums, both for joining the European Union and for NATO, and the slogan was "At home in Europe, safe in NATO." and the result of the referendum, whether we are in favour of joining NATO, was... As many as 66% of voters were in favour of...

Guest: ... which is, considering all the discussions... Especially those opponents of joining NATO were quite vocal, well, influential. So that these 66 percent... I think it was quite a positive surprise for all of us who worked on this campaign.

Host: Now, for example, a Ninamedia survey shows that as many as 74% of respondents support NATO membership. Why do you think this support is changing? Because of all these trends and movements in the world, when we look at global wars, or in the neighbourhood? Ukraine, Russia?

Guest: In my opinion, the war in Ukraine, or the entire events on the eastern wing of the alliance, and also this strengthening of the feeling of threat to Slovenian territorial integrity by Russia, has definitely had a very big impact recently. Or rather, all global changes: changes in the positions of the United States of America towards NATO, towards the European Union. This is certainly also felt in Slovenian public opinion. But it is true that compared to other member states, Slovenia is still, still at the tail end in terms of support for membership. Despite this strengthening of support, we are still among the last.

Host: Why? Because we don't know how to present the benefits. Maybe you can list them?

Guest: Yes. And, if I may add, also because there is no feeling of threat in our country. All public opinion polls in recent years or decades have put natural disasters at the top of the list of threats. The military threat has always been in the last place and even now, at a time when Russian military aggression is taking place in Ukraine, military threats are somewhere in the back of our perception. It is also true what you yourself said, that Slovenian governments, regardless of which ones they were, were not able to strategically communicate the advantages of NATO membership for the entire country. The perception that NATO membership is only a matter for the military is very strong, and that this 

a matter that concerns only the Slovenian Armed Forces or the Ministry of Defence - which is not true. The entire country is in NATO and this is something that concerns all of us. However, it is true that the advantage of NATO membership is by far the greatest for the Slovenian Army and its members. The Slovenian Army has gained the opportunity... With NATO membership, it has gained the opportunity to cooperate with the most technologically advanced and qualified armed forces in the world, and within the alliance, our members go for various training and education, especially to the United States of America. What the country has gained, and this too should be communicated, is that we really do have - although this really sounds like advertising - we have the opportunity to co-decision. We, as a small country with somewhat limited resources, are part of a broader, larger collective alliance. And we sit, or rather our permanent representative to NATO sits at a table with representatives of all member states of the alliance, regardless of size or "insignificance". So, that's it. NATO decides by consensus and all member states must agree.

Host: What about collective defense? Now we've seen: I think a few drones flew into Poland, and Article 4 was also triggered. What does that mean for Slovenia, for example, if something like that were to happen to us?

Guest: Yes, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty stipulates that in the event of such a security incident, each member state has the right to convene a consultation, or rather, that all countries consult with each other. NATO's system, or air defense, also reacted. Although some shortcomings have been revealed, especially from the perspective that NATO and Poland do not have effective protection, anti-drone protection, because one of the key innovations of the war in Ukraine is precisely this massive use of drones. At the beginning of the war, Ukraine also did not have effective protection, because it involves the use of... So, it involves new weapons systems, or new use of already existing weapons systems. Flying or using in some swarms an extremely large number of drones - when they attack, these classic air defense systems were not effective. This has also been demonstrated in this case, so that NATO has also learned something from these 20 or maybe 25 drones that invaded Polish airspace.

Host: It seems to me that Slovenians, based on our own experience, still have a perception of war that is about getting to the border with tanks?

Guest: Yes, it is true. But it is also true that the war in Ukraine has brought this perception back, because the war in Ukraine is in certain respects a military conflict in the most traditional sense of the word. In a certain period of time, it even acquired the characteristics of the First World War and this positional warfare. When both sides dug in their trenches and the front did not move anywhere. But it is also in certain aspects a high-tech conflict, mainly with the use of drones, also artificial intelligence for setting targets, for identifying enemy targets or positions. So it is a mixture of both. But it is true that it is hybrid warfare, where the military part is only part of it. But it is the most visible and also causes the greatest damage and suffering to the population. Moderator: We will talk about this modern warfare a little later. If we stay with NATO. You have already mentioned that our role is important in that we are at the table with large countries. What does this mean for defense spending? Let's say, as a small country, the Baltic states, are we spending enough? We know that according to the numbers it is not enough, but do you think it is enough compared to any other country? Guest: We would allocate enough if we fulfilled all the promises we made - both in terms of the percentage of GDP for defense and in terms of capability goals. Unfortunately, due to certain political circumstances, we did not or somehow failed to fulfil the first promises. So what has now become apparent... In the past, it was enough for NATO to make promises, now in terms of target capabilities, which it should now fulfil, but the point is actually that we need to prove that we have them. They will need to be sent somewhere or tested, and we can no longer just claim on paper that we have a medium-sized battalion group. Slovenia needs to take a much bigger step forward than some other countries that have gradually increased their percentages for defense or strengthened their target capabilities. The essential difference between us and the Baltic states is definitely this exceptional awareness among the Baltic states of the direct military threat from Russia, which undoubtedly also affects their percentage of GDP that they allocate to defense and also the readiness of all traditional defense systems of all three Baltic states for a possible military threat. We are not directly threatened by Russia, and our role in the alliance is not - as far as the defense of the eastern wing of NATO is concerned - not a direct military one, but rather to provide protection for communication routes and, in some worst-case scenario, to stop the advance of the enemy forces so that NATO has time to react. Host: Do you also think that, geographically speaking, the countries of the South that are in NATO spend less on defense, and the countries of the North spend more. Guest: Yes, all this is also confirmed by the numbers. There is a very large gap between the actual threat and also the perception of threat between the countries that border directly on Ukraine or Russia or Belarus, and the countries, the European southern countries. Countries that - Spain, Portugal, Italy - are facing completely different challenges, they still... The arrival of migrants is still their priority or facing these challenges and they definitely feel somewhat neglected, because the talk is exclusively about armament, strengthening European defense capabilities.

While other threats have not disappeared. Neither have natural disasters due to climate change. These natural disasters will become more frequent, they will cause ever greater damage, including human casualties. This military threat, the military threat from the East, has actually just become part of the set of all the threats we face today.

Host: And we saw this, for example, in Spain when there were floods this year.

Guest: Yes, it is true. Floods, after all, also the floods that we had in Slovenia, or the fire in the Karst, indicate that the consequences they cause and the scale of these natural disasters are increasing.

Host: Now, a consensus must be found in all of this with the USA, the largest member.

Guest: Yes, the United States of America has indeed offered security guarantees to Europe since the end of World War II. With the arrival or change at the top of the American administration, attitudes towards both NATO and Europe have changed significantly. The priority of the United States is not Europe, it is another part of the world, it is China, and they are directing all their resources and attention there. The European Union will have to find its own place under the sun in these changed geostrategic and global conditions.

Host: How do you see all these changes in this light now? At the European Commission, we have the Re-arm program, the current European Commission's plan for rearming Europe. Is this the answer to the fact that we will be left alone without this US shield?

Guest: So, armament is only one aspect of strengthening resilience. It is certainly also about securing critical infrastructure. Recently, there have also been a few events on the European continent, such as blackouts, power outages, air traffic disruptions, which have indicated a high level of vulnerability, not to mention cyber attacks. So from this perspective, investing only in armaments without also strengthening the welfare state, which is the foundation of the European Union and of all of us who live here, is the wrong path. It is true that strengthening defense capabilities can also have a very strong deterrent role, and this is what the European Union wants to send a clear message to the adversary, regardless of who it is currently or in the future: that it is capable of defending itself and thereby deterring some potential adversaries.

Host: We will certainly encounter communication challenges here, we can already see them in Slovenia. How to convince people? There are many explanations that Slovenians are a nation that has always been for peace and that we do not understand that it is necessary to arm ourselves if you have opponents, for example in large countries that are very well armed.

Guest: Yes, it is true. And in my opinion, this historical memory of the ten-day war for Slovenia's independence is very short. We very often compare ourselves with Croatia, for example, but the Croatian Homeland War lasted three, four years and for them this is still built into part of their national identity. And they know very well why they have an army and why they needed it, once upon a time, to defend parts of Croatian territory. But here, this peace policy or peace efforts are really more embedded in our national identity. History is also an important aspect. Before independence, during the time of Yugoslavia, it was at least non-aligned. So, somehow it successfully positioned itself between the Western and Eastern blocs. When Slovenia gained independence, there were very strong discussions about how Slovenia should ensure its security in the future. There were also many alternatives, one was neutrality, there was also talk of demilitarization, and then the decision was made for Slovenia to join NATO. Somehow this discussion was never completed, which we see is now being repeated again. Even this summer, when there was a possibility or a potential referendum on NATO membership was announced, the same alternatives and the same actors who opposed NATO membership in 1991 or 1997 or 2002 reappeared. So, somehow we have not managed to have a broader social discussion about why we need NATO and why this is - I would say - the only option for Slovenia.

Host: Is it true that no one has left NATO yet?

Guest: Yes, that's true. Legally, no country that has become a member of the alliance has ever left NATO. France withdrew from the integrated military command in 1966 under the then president Charles de Gaulle, because they allegedly did not agree with American dominance in NATO. But they never withdrew from the political part, so they remained committed to Article 5. At that time, they also excluded French military bases from NATO command, but this changed in 2009. At that time, it was French President Nicolas Sarkozy who changed this decision back. And France returned to the military part of the alliance. Then, for example, Greece had some such initiatives in 1974, when the events in Cyprus occurred, but it did not leave, then Turkey also poses a little threat every now and then, but Turkey itself, due to its geostrategic position, also needs NATO, just as NATO needs it. Formally, Article 13 of the Washington Treaty allows for withdrawal, or rather determines how a country withdraws: after twenty years, it has the right to announce its withdrawal one year in advance, and then... In accordance with our national legislation: if accession was ratified in parliament, then probably withdrawal should also be ratified. This summer, when there was a lot of discussion about this, I remember - I think the dean of the Faculty of Law, Dr. Miro Cerar, spoke about the fact that the same legal procedure should be used as for accession.

Host: But the members joined...

Guest: NATO experienced its largest expansion after the end of the Cold War. We also joined in 2004 together with ten members, I think, when NATO had this big expansion to the East. The biggest change, also for the European security architecture, is definitely the accession of Sweden and Finland as a direct consequence of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. That was also extremely surprising. After all, Sweden, which has been neutral for centuries, Finland, which has had enforced neutrality since the end of World War II, which were considered the epitome of neutrality in Europe, decided to take this step. In addition, Austria... Last week, the Austrian Foreign Minister... She did not announce, but said that Austria is also considering joining NATO, or rather, that it would no longer be neutral. However, it is true that Austrian neutrality is also a matter of a state treaty, so all these neutralities that we have had on the European continent or are, are specific. Every country that is neutral has its own characteristics.

Host: State Secretary for National Security Vojko Volk says that the Swedes and Finns probably did not wake up one morning and were hypnotized, but that they knew very well why they were joining.

Guest: There were several of these initiatives or ideas about joining NATO in Sweden, in Finland. But they took this definitive step forward because of the war in Ukraine, because of the awareness that Russia militarily threatens both Finland, which had extremely bad experiences with the Soviet Union, historically speaking, and also Sweden, which is geographically close to Russia.

Host: You mentioned another concept: neutrality. In all these discussions over the summer, I think someone mentioned that neutrality costs a lot? Guest: Yes, neutrality... If we look at the percentages of GDP that neutral countries are now dedicating, these are not high numbers. But these are established systems. Austria has been neutral for many decades and the concept of a defense system is different and has a general military obligation. Neutrality means that we are left exclusively to ourselves for our own defense, which means that our defense system must contain all the components and structures for this defense system to be effective. And somehow the most clear illustration is that NATO is the one that guarantees us the security of our airspace. The first thing we should do is think about how we would guarantee the security of our airspace. Now, given the small size of our territory, some planes are not suitable because they would take off and then - we are often the subject of some humour - they would then fly over Austria. In short, definitely not airplanes, but there are other systems that ensure airspace security: long-range, medium-range, short-range systems. But this is extremely, extremely expensive.

Host: To simplify: if, for example, drones were flying towards us now. If we were neutral, we would have to have systems...

Guest: Should we react ourselves...

Host: ... and now Hungary is helping, and I think Italy is too...

Guest: I think that currently Hungary is the one that... In the event that some such far-flung "unwelcome visitor" is detected in our airspace, Hungary should react.

Host: In my opinion, we are not even aware that – but this is a layman's opinion – we are still quite interesting because of the nuclear power plant …

Guest: Yes, that is true. And even now, when there is a lot of talk about the purchase of air defense systems in Slovenia, Iris, they are intended exclusively for the protection of the Krško Nuclear Power Plant and the Port of Koper. And probably also what it will be for the capital.

Host: Now let's move on to the civilian part of defense. You have already mentioned something yourself, because we know that defense is not just the army. I have already mentioned that the government has declared September 28th as Civil Defense Day. This day is symbolic, because on this day in 1990, the Constitutional Act on the Implementation of Constitutional Amendments in the Field of People's Defense was adopted in Slovenia. This laid the foundations for the country's defense planning. Can you tell us more about what civil defense is?

Guest: Yes, according to our Defense Act, defense is divided into military defense and civil defense. Military defense... The Slovenian Army is the main force implementing military defense. Civil defense, however, is the support for the operation of military defense in wartime. So, how society with all its structures contributes to effective defense in war. It is true that this is a very outdated concept. Today, when we talk about civil defense, we can also come to the area of ​​​​social resilience, which is now a slightly more current concept. Civil defense once included psychological defense, economic defense, so how all subjects of society contribute to the defense of the state. State defense can also be understood much more broadly than just military defense. Even today, we are not only talking about military threats, but also about hybrid threats, for example, defense against cyber attacks or strengthening the awareness of all of us that the threat is in cyberspace, that we are a target every day and how we defend ourselves, for example. By doing this, we too, when we know this or act preventively, contribute to or strengthen the resilience of society against cyber attacks. Or, for example, the self-protective behaviour of each individual, including the awareness, for example, that in the event of a devastating earthquake in Ljubljana, that the structures of protection and rescue would not be or cannot help everyone immediately, but that in the first hours after a crisis event, people rely, try to rely on themselves or on their own. And only then do we expect help from some structures. In the event of a major disaster, it is also done when it is necessary to help - health institutions, government structures, it is necessary to maintain the smooth operation of the state and all decision-makers. Although this is now very badly said, but citizens or ordinary people must first and foremost know how to help themselves. Host: It was very relevant that some European countries also shared instructions on how to protect themselves. We haven't gone that far here precisely because we feel safe enough...

Guest: No, because it's always associated with...Currently it's associated with the war in Ukraine. In Slovenia there's a pretty strong perception of what someone wants from us and what Russia will want from us. Which is true in a way. In the event of, let's say, the realization of the worst-case scenario, we will not be the primary target of Russian military action, but given our geostrategic position, we are one of the key countries or routes for the movement of NATO forces to the eastern flank. So from this perspective, our communication routes may be the target of attacks, especially the Port of Koper. The Port of Koper is a key port for the operation or for the arrival of NATO forces in this part of Europe and then for the route towards the eastern flank. It is also necessary to take into account the very strong Russian disinformation campaigns that are taking place in the European space and which in certain parts of Europe, and in my opinion Slovenia itself, have fallen on very fertile ground. Given certain publications on the Internet that are circulating on the web, on X or on various social networks, it can be assumed that there are organized disinformation campaigns in the background. It's about placing some disinformation in Slovenian space, which just... Certain groups accepted this as truth, for example, when there were drone incursions into Polish airspace, there were very many posts saying that this is not true, that the Ukrainians are the ones who sent these drones, that the media is lying anyway and that none of this is true. Creating some such posts can also be very dangerous.

Host: That's right. They are dividing society and if we know that millions are being spent on this, but we haven't done enough on our side to educate people, how can we recognize that these are fake profiles?

Guest: Yes, because there is still a belief, because it says on the Internet, and it is true. I saw it on TikTok, and it is true. But what Russia is doing, not directly, but it has a whole bunch of groups that are indirectly funded by the Russian government. Their task is to place disinformation in European space. For example, at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, they had a campaign in Poland, both online and in physical terms, the purpose of which was to discredit Ukrainian refugees and turn the Polish public against Ukrainian refugees. Because at that time, Poland was the first country ... It is the country that accepted the largest number of Ukrainian refugees.

Host: Yes, France is also very much under attack and all this is connected to the policies adopted by the prime ministers. We support Ukraine, France supports Ukraine. Now, as I noticed, the campaign that there is no hunger in Gaza is spreading very widely, also from Israel. The Israeli government has allocated millions to Google to broadcast this on YouTube. In short, people in Slovenia are not at all aware, I dare say, of what is happening online.

Guest: Yes, I think not. With every publication, you have to question a little whether it is true. Also, for example, in the posts on X last week, there were videos of Russia moving Iskander missile systems in Kaliningrad during the Zapad 2025 military exercise. But these missile systems have been there since 2008. So, this is nothing new. Also, considering the range of these missile systems, it makes no difference whether it is located to the left or right of a certain street. But the goal of this post was probably also to create some panic in the West, which means that... Of course, it is not only Russia that is developing its stories, Ukraine is also of course doing so, to strengthen European support for its defense.

Host: At the office, we have created a campaign – Read, Think, Check – so we also have some instructions for those who want to read them on our website gov.si/dezinformacije, and we are also constantly translating a newsletter that is being prepared in Europe, where we have also detected disinformation coming from Russia. So we hope that we are also helping to educate citizens a little bit so that they will be more attentive to this. You have already mentioned cyber attacks. These are all hybrid threats. Slovenia was part of this last year, otherwise it is supposed to be - I don't know about this - simple attacks when you give a few dollars and your website doesn't work? Guest: It doesn't have to be dollars, you can basically find instructions online and then it's very easy. I have a course on Security in the Information Society, where we deal with such matters with students and it is really simple. And this is the essential difference between threats today and in the past. Wars have always been expensive and these modern weapons systems are extremely expensive. But today, by actually finding instructions on the Internet, if you are a little more skilled, or if you know how to access the dark web, you can actually cause the collapse of the electricity grid, for example, in Spain... I'm not saying that this happened in Spain, but with one click you can actually collapse the electricity supply in a certain country, for example.

Host: But the Spanish Prime Minister, for example, is also in the coalition, Macron, as is President Golob, but no... They have similar views on foreign policy and they are all targets of this Russian cyber warfare.

Guest: Yes, and I am also convinced that even those of us who are involved in this are not aware or do not know about everything that Russia is placing in the European space. Otherwise, the intelligence services warn about this... With every such announcement, you have to question it, ask yourself what could be behind it.

Host: When there were these DOS attacks... A Russian group declared itself to be the one who initiated them. I remember that they also used very emotional words, no and they are trying to play on our emotions - we have similar language, brothers, we are not against you...

Guest: Yes, and also last year, I think in January, when Slovenian primary and secondary schools received that threatening email. There were supposedly some Russian hacker groups behind it. The goal of this is to destabilize the country or destabilize the situation in a country and to instil fear, right? Of course, there was fear for all of us who have children in schools. That alone was an extremely worrying development. So, despite the fact that there was some obvious thing behind it, it was not a chain letter, but it was sent to most schools in Slovenia, and soon after in Croatia, as well as in other European countries.

Host: Slovenia also expelled another diplomat, a persona non grata, from Russia. This was also part of our retaliatory measures against such propaganda that they were carrying out.

Guest: This is proof, not that even on our territory, even though in our perception we are small and insignificant. But such activities are present here. The discovery of these two Russian spies, who lived a secret life here for several years and created a new life of their own, also means that we are still very interesting to foreign intelligence services.

Host: The authors of the book that has just been published about this - The Swap Book - are visiting Slovenia these days and they said that Slovenia plays a key role here. And I will dissect Vojko Volk again. He likes to say that if those two were insignificant spies, Putin and the red carpet would not have awaited them.

Guest: Yes, that was also a very good indicator, yes.

Host: That they played an important role in their intelligence system... We listed quite a few of these activities together. Do you think that Slovenians still don't believe that we are not an oasis of peace?

Guest: I mean, statistically speaking, there is always a certain group or a proportion of people who doubt everything. I think that the Covid-19 pandemic has also shown this very well or has somehow exposed it even more. We cannot expect everyone to be aware of this. In addition, people are not interested in everyday politics, they are not interested in what is happening around them, they just live in their own security bubble. But it is enough that it is talked about. State structures are the ones responsible for strengthening resilience. But it is certainly to be expected... I think it is completely normal that there is some criticism or that people doubt all this. I interpret this as meaning that it is much easier to live if you doubt everything. Because unfortunately, reality can be very dark and very ugly and you decide not to believe it and go through life more easily. But it is also true that the so-called security bubble is something that ... All public opinion surveys that we have conducted in the past, including at the faculty regarding security, have shown that we live in a security bubble in Slovenia. We are happy under the Alps, no one wants anything to us, which also affects our perception of threat.

Host: How would you rate Slovenia's defense readiness on a scale of one to 10 and why?

Guest: So, I can't easily answer this question. The country's defense readiness depends on many factors and also assesses readiness in terms of threats. If it were really a threat of direct military conflict, intensity, then the Slovenian Army is not capable of independent action. But it is true that the Slovenian Army is not intended for this. The Slovenian Army and Slovenia have been in NATO since 2004. We built a defense system as part of a collective defense system and the Slovenian Army as such was never organized with the intention of independently defending Slovenian territory. Our capabilities are also complementary to those of NATO. 

We are part of a collective defense system and everything is based on the assumption that if Article 5 of the Washington Treaty needs to be activated, NATO will defend all member states or those that need it.

Host: What three priorities should we set as a country to ensure long-term security?

Guest: So, in light of the current security situation, we must first and foremost strengthen our own defense capabilities, contribute to strengthening the defense capabilities of the European Union, because our future lies in the European Union. We are part of the European security environment and regardless of what happens globally or whether there will be a change in the relationship between the United States of America and the European Union or within NATO, we must focus on the European Union. In addition: Russia is close. Russia will stay. So, it will be necessary to find some way of coexistence on the European continent without threatening each other.

Host: There has been a lot of talk about the fact that this order that was created after World War II is now being destroyed.

Guest: Yes. The international community, as it existed after World War II or, better yet, after the end of the Cold War, no longer exists. The rules are not being followed, which we can see very clearly in Gaza, and there are no new rules yet. There are no new structures yet. A new world order is being established, where Russia in particular wants to play a more important role, and China has become extremely strong and elevated in that part of the world during this time, becoming a global player. So that is... The situation is changing. The rules will still be established, but the currently valid rules are being violated and there are no effective levers to sanction this. The UN Security Council, which played a very important role in maintaining world peace and security during the Cold War, is blocked, it is not working. Some new formula will have to be found. The question is what it will be.

Host: Many accuse the European Union of not being strong enough against the countries you mentioned. I would also add the USA, which is blocking certain matters in the Security Council.

Guest: The European Union has relied too much on the United States of America for all these decades. Since 1991, the European Union has had political goals to become a more important global actor or a security actor, but this is essentially more of a story of failure than success. There have been quite a few failed such engagements. After all, in 1992, well, 1991, when Slovenia declared independence, and then Croatia, and when armed conflicts occur, the European Union, or, at that time, the European Community, sent unarmed observers to the battlefield, among whom were human victims. And then the United Nations came to somehow resolve the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and only with the entry of the United States did all the wars begin to end. 

Then in 1999, when NATO carried out an air military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it also became clear that the European Union is completely ineffective without American military capabilities. So the arrival of American President Donald Trump to the position of president is a very strong sobering up, which draws attention to what the European Union should have done a long time ago, but did not, because it did not have to. Now it basically has no choice.

Host: In all this context, I have to go back a little to the disinformation campaigns. The owners of all these platforms are also Chinese or American, right?

Guest: Yes, that's true.

Host: And they encourage this. Because even the Digital Services Act does not prevent them from doing what the European Union wanted to regulate, it is not successful. We see this in our work

Guest: Yes, and even in the background it is all about profit. All these digital platforms are basically the richest companies globally and why would they allow people not to express their opinions, even if they are hostile or violent, because that's how they make a profit, right?

Host: In conclusion, since we're coming to the end, maybe two more short questions. What misconception about defense or the military would you like to dispel?

Guest: Yes, definitely the fact that NATO is exclusively a matter for the military. This is something that all of us, if I may say so, have not managed to change in the perception of the Slovenian public in all these years. So, the entire country is in NATO and NATO membership does not only benefit the military, but we all have it. But it is true that security is a value that is self-evident and you don't realize it until you lose it. And that is the biggest danger of all this. Security is also a fundamental condition for the normal functioning of society, just like health is for humans. In addition to this: that we pay, that NATO demands something from us... NATO has never demanded something from us. NATO expected something. These commitments have only recently emerged. NATO has never asked us to do so, we contribute to NATO for our own security.

Host: And one last question: what can we do ourselves to increase security and resilience?

Guest: Self-protective behaviour by each individual comes first. About 14 days ago, during extremely bad weather forecasts, warnings were issued about floods. Anyone who lives in a flood zone or in an area where groundwater or sewage is erupting must be aware of what they must do, for example, to prevent this or reduce the damage. And then what has been said for many years: we need to start by educating the youngest. Of course, age-appropriate and age-appropriate, but also that children in schools are aware of the danger and what they can do themselves? I think a particularly good example is the 2014 ice storm, which showed this exceptional dependence of the entire country on the electricity supply. Today, this dependence is even greater. As it turned out, the most self-sufficient or self-protective individuals are those in agrarian environments, who may even have generators at home, who have some food supplies, who are able to provide themselves with food for a few days, and the least so are people in large cities or in cities in blocks, where everything is powered by electricity and you can't cook lunch or heat up a meal if you don't have electricity.

Host: Ms. Juvan, thank you very much. I hope we've dispelled some myths about this...

Guest: Me too...

Host: ...that NATO is not as bogeyman as some people make it out to be. Thank you for being our guest, and I hope we can sit down again sometime.

Guest: With pleasure.

Host: I wish everyone who followed us a good day and follow our podcast on all the platforms where you follow podcasts. Goodbye.