GOVSI podkast: Dezinformacije – globalni izziv, ki zahteva evropski odziv

V najnovejši epizodi vladnega GOVSI podkasta se voditelj Zoran Potič pogovarja z Mario Giovanno Sesso iz organizacije EU DisinfoLab, ki že vrsto let preučuje vpliv dezinformacijskih kampanj in spodbuja krepitve odpornosti proti manipulativnim vsebinam v digitalnem okolju.

Dezinformacije kot orodje vplivanja
Gostja pojasni, da dezinformacije niso zgolj »lažne novice«, temveč premišljeno ustvarjene in razširjene informacije z zlonamernim namenom zavajanja javnosti. Njihov cilj je spodkopavanje zaupanja v demokratične procese, institucije in medsebojno solidarnost. Posebej nevarne so, ker pogosto vsebujejo zrno resnice, ki jim daje prepričljivost.

Ruske kampanje in globalne taktike
V pogovoru se sogovornika dotakneta obsežnih raziskav o ruski dezinformacijski operaciji Doppelgänger, v kateri so bile klonirane spletne strani znanih evropskih medijev, da bi širile proruske narative. Kampanja, ki še vedno traja, kaže, kako prefinjene in organizirane so takšne operacije ter kako težko jih je popolnoma odstraniti iz digitalnega prostora.

Svoboda govora in odgovornost platform
Sessa poudarja, da boj proti dezinformacijam ne pomeni cenzure, temveč zaščito svobode izražanja in pravice do resničnih informacij. »Svoboda govora ni svoboden doseg,« opozarja. Ključno orodje pri tem je Zakon o digitalnih storitvah (angleško Digital Services Act - DSA), ki v Evropski uniji vzpostavlja večjo preglednost in odgovornost spletnih platform.

Potrebna je skupna odpornost
Dezinformacije so postale stalnica sodobnega informacijsko-družbenega okolja, zato jih je treba obravnavati sistematično. Kot pravi gostja, »moramo biti pripravljeni ne le na odzivanje, ampak tudi na predvidevanje groženj.« Pri tem pa je nujno sodelovanje držav, raziskovalnih organizacij, medijev in civilne družbe.

Vabljeni k ogledu in poslušanju epizode podkasta!

[ENGLISH VERSION]

GOVSI Podcast: Disinformation – A Global Challenge Requiring a European Response

In the latest episode of the government GOVSI podcast, host Zoran Potič talks with Maria Giovanna Sessa from EU DisinfoLab, an organization that has been studying the impact of disinformation campaigns for years and promotes building resilience against manipulative content in the digital environment.

Disinformation as a Tool of Influence
The guest explains that disinformation is not merely »fake news« but deliberately created and disseminated information with the malicious intent to mislead the public. Its purpose is to undermine trust in democratic processes, institutions, and mutual solidarity. It is particularly dangerous because it often contains a grain of truth, which makes it more convincing.

Russian Campaigns and Global Tactics
The discussion touches on extensive research into the Russian disinformation operation Doppelgänger, in which cloned websites of well-known European media outlets were used to spread pro-Russian narratives. The ongoing campaign illustrates how sophisticated and organized such operations are—and how difficult it is to fully eliminate them from the digital space.

Freedom of Speech and Platform Accountability
Sessa emphasizes that the fight against disinformation is not censorship, but rather a protection of freedom of expression and the right to truthful information. »Freedom of speech is not free reach,« she notes. A key instrument in this effort is the Digital Services Act (DSA), which strengthens transparency and accountability of online platforms across the European Union.

Building Collective Resilience
Disinformation has become a permanent feature of the modern information society, and it must be addressed in a systematic way. As Sessa states, »We must be ready not only to respond to threats, but also to anticipate them.« Achieving this requires close cooperation among governments, research institutions, the media, and civil

Transcript

Vladni podkast GOVSI

Voditelj: Lep pozdrav in dobrodošli v novi epizodi podkasta GOVSI, v kateri se vračamo k temi, o kateri smo že dvakrat govorili — dezinformacije. Naj vas spomnim, da je UKOM pred časom začel kampanjo preBERI, preMISLI, PREVERI (v angleščini: reREAD, reTHINK, RECHECK), katere namen je povečati ozaveščenost javnosti o tem, da so informacije lahko kvarljivo blago, če jih ne jemljemo resno. O tej temi smo se pred časom pogovarjali s Siimom Kumpasom iz Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje, pred enim letom pa smo gostili uglednega profesorja iz Kalifornije, Nicholasa Culla. Tokrat pa je naša gostja - in od tega trenutka bom nadaljeval v angleščini - Maria Giovanna Sessa, ki nas bo popeljala skozi to zanimivo temo, imenovano dezinformacije. Maria, hvala, da ste se nam pridružili.

Gostja: Hvala, da ste me povabili.

Voditelj: Maria Giovanna Sessa dela pri organizaciji EU DisinfoLab in je strokovnjakinja za boj proti dezinformacijam. Maria, že več let delate v tej nevladni organizaciji, vendar ti lahko povem – skoraj nihče v Sloveniji ne ve, kaj DisinfoLab sploh je in kaj počne. Prosim, razložite nam.

Gostja: Prav imate, res je. V EU DisinfoLabu delam že več kot pet let in moram reči, da Slovenci niste izjema. Sem Italijanka in tudi v Italiji moram pogosto razlagati, kaj točno počnem in kaj je ta čudna organizacija, za katero delam. Res je, da smo dobro znani v našem mehurčku – v naši skupnosti, ki se rada imenuje »branilci«, vendar del tega …

Voditelj: Oprostite — branilci česa?

Gostja: Branilci pred dezinformacijami. In o tem bova gotovo še govorila. A res je, da smo manj znani širši javnosti, zato hvala tudi za to priložnost, da to nekoliko izboljšamo. Kaj torej počnemo? Kot ste omenili, smo nevladna organizacija, ki izvaja neodvisne raziskave. Vodim naše raziskovalne dejavnosti, ki se osredotočajo na zapletene kampanje dezinformacij, usmerjene proti Evropski uniji. Poleg tega imamo oddelek, ki se ukvarja z lobiranjem in zagovorništvom – torej s prizadevanji za izboljšave na ravni oblikovanja politik. Na primer, v zadnjih nekaj letih sem veliko delala pri izvajanju Zakona o digitalnih storitvah (Digital Services Act), tega obsežnega zakonodajnega akta, katerega cilj je narediti internet boljši prostor. Naše raziskovalne dejavnosti tako podpirajo oblikovanje politik – in obratno. To je naše delo.

Voditelj: Prav, torej je to delo vaše organizacije. Kaj pa vi osebno? Kakšno je vaše ozadje? Zakaj ste se odločili ukvarjati z dezinformacijami? Zakaj vam je to tako pomembno?

Gostja: Prihajam iz akademskega okolja. Imam doktorat iz političnih znanosti. Ukvarjala sem se z raziskovanjem strankarske politike, predvsem s tem, kako politične stranke oblikujejo svoje programe in teme na podlagi vedenja volivcev ter kako ti dve plati – volivci in stranke – vplivata druga na drugo. Ko smo začeli leta 2016, je bilo to prav tisto obdobje, ko se je prvič začel uporabljati izraz »lažne novice« (fake news). Takrat sem začela opažati, da politične stranke pogosto uporabljajo dezinformacije kot komunikacijsko orodje – in to me je začelo zanimati. Vedela sem, da želim to raziskovati, vendar zunaj akademskega okolja, saj mi je bolj ustrezalo bolj prilagodljivo in dinamično delovno okolje.

Kako pa sem prišla prav do EU DisinfoLaba? Kot se zgodi marsikaj dobrega v življenju – povsem naključno. Prek prijatelja, ki je poznal nekoga iz te organizacije. Takrat so iskali strokovnjaka za italijanski informacijski sistem in tako sem se pridružila. Pet let pozneje sem še vedno v isti organizaciji, le da zdaj v drugačni vlogi.

Voditelj: Ko sem vas predstavljal, sem omenil, da je Urad Vlade RS za komuniciranje začel kampanjo ozaveščanja o dezinformacijah. Povedali ste, da uporabljaš izraze, kot so »dezinformacije«, »lažne novice« in podobno. Bi jih lahko razložili?

Gostja: Seveda. Uporabila sem izraz fake news, ker je bil pred nekaj leti zelo moderen, a moram reči, da na našem področju vedno bolj prevladuje mnenje, da ta izraz ni ustrezen. Raje uporabljamo izraz dezinformacije. Dezinformacije pomenijo ustvarjanje in širjenje informacij, vsebin ali novic, ki so napačne, netočne ali zavajajoče. Ni nujno, da gre za nekaj, kar je stoodstotno neresnično – pravzaprav so najuspešnejše dezinformacije tiste, ki vsebujejo zrno resnice, a je to spretno izkrivljeno. Pomembno je, da imajo dezinformacije škodljiv namen – namen škodovati ali zavajati. Obstaja še en, dopolnjujoč izraz napačne infomracije (misinformation), ki pomeni enako – napačne, netočne ali zavajajoče vsebine –, vendar se te širijo brez zavedanja, da niso resnične. 

Tukaj mi pride na misel en prikupen primer v obliki risanke: starša rečeta otroku, ki je pravkar dobil novo kolo: »To ti je prinesel Božiček!« Starša vesta, da to ni res – torej širita dezinformacijo, čeprav nimata slabega namena. Ko pa otrok nato pokaže prijateljem svoje kolo in reče: »Poglejte, Božiček mi ga je prinesel!«, gre za napačno informacijo, ker otrok resnično verjame, da je to res.

Voditelj: Zakaj torej ne imenujemo tiste informacije, ki so namerno napačne – preprosto laži?

Gostja: To je dobro vprašanje. In deloma gre res za laži, čeprav … Mislim, da gre za precej kompleksno kombinacijo našega razumevanja resnice, ki je seveda odvisno tudi od naših izkušenj. Zato bi bil izraz »laž« nekoliko poenostavljen. Ko preidemo od posameznih lažnih informacij k celovitim kampanjam dezinformacij, vidimo veliko širši namen, večjo stopnjo usklajenosti in seveda notranji motiv, ki je lahko političen, ekonomski ali ideološki — pravzaprav kakršenkoli.

Zavedam se, da je to lahko frustrirajoče in da je skušnjava, da bi vse skupaj poimenovali »laži«, močna — in v večini primerov to niti ne bi bilo napačno. A menim, da pojem dezinformacije zajema širši pojav in bolje opisuje sam fenomen.

Voditelj: Ko sem se pripravljal na ta podkast, sem opazil, da ste raziskovali skrajno desna gibanja in njihove programe ter pri tem naletela na pojav »lažnih novic«. Obstaja razlika med desnim in levim političnim polom pri uporabi informacijskih tehnologij? Se razlikujeta v tem, kako uporabljata informacije?

Gostja: Najprej bi se navezala na svoje doktorske čase — takrat sem se pravzaprav osredotočila ne toliko na skrajno desnico kot na sredinsko desnico in na to, kako se je tradicionalna desnica znašla med dvema ognjema. Na eni strani je bila pod pritiskom zgodovinskih političnih alternativ — v evropskih demokracijah smo bili vajeni izmenjav oblasti med levico in desnico —, nato pa se je pojavila nova politična sila: skrajna desnica, ki je prvič v novem tisočletju postala realna možnost za prevzem oblasti. Moje raziskovanje se je ukvarjalo s tem, kako so se stranke v sredini morale soočati z obema — nasprotnikoma, a hkrati tudi občasnima zaveznikoma. Glede vašega vprašanja pa: ne bi rekla, da je dezinformacija nekaj, kar bi lahko pripisali izključno desnici ali levici. Če pogledamo vsebino, bi rekla, da je rdeča nit dezinformacij občutek ogroženosti življenjskega načina, kot ga poznamo — strah pred spremembami, naj bo to zaradi migracij, inflacije ali podnebnih sprememb. Dezinformacije torej temeljijo na teh strahovih. Če pa gremo onkraj vsebine, se vedenjski vzorci dezinformacij pogosto bolj ujemajo s skrajnimi deli političnega spektra, ker temeljijo na vzbujanju strahu, pretiravanju čustev, spodbujanju ogorčenja in jeze. To so elementi, ki se pogosto povezujejo s političnimi ekstremi. Res je, da danes, glede na zgodovinski trenutek, v katerem smo, večino dezinformacij povezujemo s skrajno desnico, saj je ta v zadnjih dvajsetih letih v Evropi postala vse bolj vplivna. A seveda to ni edina stran. Če se česa lahko naučimo, je to, da se lahko vsaka tema uporabi kot orožje.

Če vzamemo za primer Italijo: odnos do Rusije je bil tam tradicionalno precej naklonjen, odnosi so bili zgodovinsko dobri. Zato so danes ruske dezinformacije učinkovite predvsem pri delu volivcev, ki se nagiba k skrajni desnici – kar se vidi tudi po trenutni vladi. A levica pri tem ni izvzeta. Skrajna levica je bila v Italiji že dolgo dovzetna za ruske pripovedi, predvsem zaradi nekakšne nostalgije po časih Sovjetske zveze, ki pa seveda nimajo nič skupnega z današnjo realnostjo. Kot vidiš, se torej dezinformacije lahko uporabijo v prid katerikoli strani.

Voditelj: Nova realnost evropskega informacijskega prostora – kako bi jo opisali in kako jo razumete? Kakšno je trenutno stanje taktik dezinformiranja? Kako jih prepoznamo, kako jih analiziramo? Kako se kažejo v javnosti? Kdo so glavni proizvajalci dezinformacij?

Gostja: Najprej bi rekla, da je globalizacija svet v marsičem resnično zmanjšala. Tako v smislu vsebin, pripovedi kot tudi strategij in vedenjskih vzorcev vidimo, da so si ti po vsem svetu zelo podobni. Na primer, letos smo spremljali več volitev – od Nemčije do Poljske, Češke in Moldavije – in povsod smo naleteli na isto teorijo zarote: da so volitve ponarejene. Namen takih pripovedi je spodkopati zaupanje volivcev v izid demokratičnega procesa. To smo videli že prej, vidimo zdaj in – žal – bomo verjetno videli tudi v prihodnje. V tem smislu se soočamo z istimi vzorci povsod, čeprav se vsaka država na njih odziva glede na svoje družbene okoliščine in občutljive teme. Tako je denimo v Nemčiji poudarek na razkolu med vzhodom in zahodom, v Moldaviji pa na vprašanju Pridnestrja – vendar so osnovne vsebine in taktike povsod zelo podobne. V zadnjih nekaj letih se vse več ukvarjamo s pojmom FIMI, kar je kratica za foreign information manipulation and interference (tuj manipuliranje in vmešavanje v informacijski prostor). To je pravzaprav termin, ki ga je skovala Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje, da bi opisala vplivne operacije. Gre torej za star pojav z novim imenom.
Poudarek je na tujih akterjih, ki sodelujejo pri širjenju teh pripovedi in organiziranju kampanj. Pri tem govorimo tako o državnih kot o nedržavnih akterjih, ki pogosto sodelujejo z domačimi zavezniki ali posredniki v posameznih državah. Zato je to zelo kompleksen, večplasten pojav. Med največjimi igralci je v tem kontekstu seveda Rusija, pa tudi Kitajska in Iran. Naše raziskave pa se osredotočajo predvsem na Rusijo.

Voditelj: Evropska unija je prepovedala ruske medije, kar so nekateri označili kot kršitev svobode izražanja – vrednote, ki je v naših demokracijah zelo pomembna. Kako se torej spopadate z vprašanjem dezinformacij v političnem sistemu, kjer je svoboda govora tako visoko cenjena?

Gostja: Pričakovala sem, da boste odprli vprašanje svobode govora, ker je to eno ključnih vprašanj, ki se vedno znova pojavljajo.

Voditelj: Da, to je pomembno vprašanje.

Gostja: Se popolnoma strinjam. Boj proti dezinformacijam je v resnici boj za zaščito svobode govora.

Voditelj: Lahko to malo podrobneje razložite?

Gostja: Seveda. Svobodo govora bi morali razumeti tudi kot svobodo do dostopa do resničnih informacij in možnost izražanja lastnega mnenja. Obstaja zelo dober angleški izraz, ki pravi: Free speech is not free reach — svoboda govora ni svoboda dosega. Boj proti dezinformacijam torej ni cenzura, čeprav nekateri akterji to poskušajo prikazati tako. Ravno nasprotno – gre tudi za zaščito svobodnega izražanja, hkrati pa je treba priznati, da so nekatere vsebine, ki so lahko dezinformacije, popolnoma zakonite. Temu včasih pravimo grozljive, a zakonite vsebine (awful but lawful). To so vsebine, ki jih morda raje ne bi videli, a ne kršijo zakonov niti pogojev uporabe spletnih platform. Ker pa so na spletu prisotne, jih mehanizmi teh platform pogosto nesorazmerno ojačajo. Imamo opravka z algoritmičnimi sistemi, o katerih vemo zelo malo, saj so t. i. »črne skrinjice«, v katere platforme ne želijo, da bi imeli vpogled. Ti algoritmi pogosto nagrajujejo in širijo vsebine, ki so šokantne, skrajne in razdvajajo občinstvo. Tako se zgodi, da vsebine, ki bi morale ostati obrobne, dobijo nesorazmeren doseg – free reach, ki presega meje zdravega. Naj omenim še nekaj, kar me osebno zelo zanima – delam na področju t. i. spolno pogojenih dezinformacij, torej dezinformacij, usmerjenih proti ženskam, pa tudi širše – proti osebam, ki ne sodijo v binarne spolne kategorije, in pripadnikom skupnosti LGBTQ+. Končni cilj takšnih napadov je utišanje teh ljudi – da se zaradi strahu za svojo varnost ali ugled umaknejo iz javne razprave. In zato se moramo vprašati: kaj pa svoboda govora teh ljudi? Tudi to svobodo je treba zaščititi.

Voditelj: Prav zato, če vas prav razumem, vi in vaša nevladna organizacija močno podpirata regulacijo interneta.

Gostja: Da, drži.

Voditelj: Zakaj? Zdi se nekoliko protislovno – nevladna organizacija, ki podpira regulacijo?

Gostja: Ne bi rekla, da je protislovno. Mi se zavzemamo za takšno regulacijo interneta, ki bo varna in bo zagotavljala zaščito naših svoboščin, evropskih vrednot in temeljnih pravic.
Če pogledamo konkretno Zakon o digitalnih storitvah (Digital Services Act), ki je od leta 2022 popolnoma spremenil delovanje spletnih storitev v Evropski uniji, je to prav tisto, kar skuša doseči. Zakon uporabnikom zagotavlja večjo preglednost pri razumevanju, kako delujejo spletne platforme in iskalniki – na primer, kako deluje algoritmično ojačevanje vsebin. Omogoča tudi možnost uporabe »nevtralnega« prikaza vsebin, ki ni odvisen od priporočilnih sistemov, ter pravico do pritožbe in poprave, kadar uporabniki menijo, da je neka vsebina neupravičeno objavljena ali odstranjena. Gre torej za obliko zaščite, ki se izvaja znotraj demokratičnega okvira, ki ga imamo – in prav v tem je bistvo.

Voditelj: Jaz prihajam iz generacije, ki je doživela začetek interneta v devetdesetih letih. Pred nekaj tedni oziroma meseci smo imeli razpravo z gospodom z Ministrstva za digitalno preobrazbo, ki je dejal: v devetdesetih smo se borili za internet in mislili smo, da je internet končna oblika svobode – da je to to. Brez pravil, brez omejitev, svoboden prostor za vse. Zdaj pa, po mnogih letih, opažamo, da internet napadajo korporacije. In morda zato danes potrebujemo določene ukrepe na tem področju.

Gostja: Popolnoma se strinjam. Poslovni model se je od začetkov interneta bistveno spremenil — in danes gre pravzaprav predvsem za poslovni model. Ko so platforme pred leti uvedle algoritmične časovnice in priporočilne sisteme, se je vsebina, ki jo uporabnik vidi, začela prilagajati na podlagi različnih dejavnikov — vedenja uporabnika, interakcij in drugih značilnosti. A dejstvo je, da ne vemo natančno, kako ti sistemi delujejo, saj nam platforme tega ne razkrivajo. To je popolnoma spremenilo naravo interneta. Mislim, da je za uporabnike zelo pomembno razumeti naslednje: internet ni nevtralen. Če bi zdaj odprla svoj Instagram, bi videla povsem drugačne vsebine kot vi na svojem. In to seveda vpliva na to, kako dojemamo, razumemo in oblikujemo pogled na svet. Zato je regulacija vsekakor potrebna.

Voditelj: Danes imamo povsem drugačne informacijske procese. Pred nekaj desetletji so informacije obdelovali mediji, novinarji. Danes je vsak novinar, vsak je medij. Kot je rekel Elon Musk, če ste opazili – vsi smo proizvajalci informacij. Kako se v takšnem okolju sploh lahko kaj regulira, ko ima vsak svoje mnenje? Kako lahko urejamo ne samo informacije, ampak tudi mnenja?

Gostja: Seveda ne želimo regulirati mnenj, ampak ustvariti varna okolja, kjer se ta mnenja izražajo in širijo. Dovolite, da omenim še dejstvo o preverjanju dejstev (fact-checking), ki je glavni mehanizem za soočanje z dezinformacijami. Pogost očitek je: kdo odloča, kaj je res in kaj ni …

Voditelj: In komu lahko zaupamo?

Gostja: Prav to, komu zaupati – odlično vprašanje. In res je, to je legitimna dilema. A izhodišče bi moralo biti drugačno: preverjanje dejstev pomeni preverjanje dejstev, ne mnenj. Preverjevalci dejstev ne ocenjujejo mnenj. Naj vam dam primer: če nekdo trdi, da se pokol v Buči v Ukrajini ni zgodil – to se da preveriti. To je dejstvo, saj gre za dogodek, ki se je res zgodil, in obstajajo dokazi – posnetki z brezpilotnih letal, pričevanja žrtev in očividcev. To je mogoče preveriti. Če pa nekdo trdi, da se je Rusija odločila za napad na Ukrajino, ker se je počutila ogroženo zaradi morebitne širitve Nata – to pa je mnenje. Lahko se z njim strinjamo ali ne, vendar preverjanje dejstev tega ne bo nikoli zanikalo ali potrjevalo. To preprosto ni njegov namen.

Voditelj: A vendar obstajajo pripovedi – narativi. Eni na eni strani, drugi na drugi. Kako se pa s tem spopadate?

Gostja: Seveda. Ena stvar, ki jo opažamo, je, da so dezinformacije vedno bolj sofisticirane. Če vzamemo za primer tuje akterje – znova bom omenila Rusijo, ker sem jo že prej – vidimo, da imajo zdaj interes v tem, da povečujejo zmedo. Njihov cilj je ustvariti vtis, da resnice sploh ni mogoče poznati, ker je svet tako kompleksen in se vse dogaja hkrati. V takem kaosu pridobivajo prednost – saj spodbujajo nezaupanje. To smo jasno videli tudi v primeru vojne v Ukrajini. V prvih tednih po začetku invazije je Rusija zanikal, da bi sploh šlo za napad.

Voditelj: Da, govorili so o “posebni vojaški operaciji.”

Gostja: Tako je. A ko je postalo nemogoče to še naprej zanikati, so preprosto “zastrupili” razpravo – začeli so spraševati: ali res lahko veste, kaj se je zgodilo? Saj ste samo videli video. Kaj pa, če je bil posnetek prirejen ali izrezan? To ni več neposredno zanikovanje, temveč ustvarjanje dvoma. Podobno smo videli tudi pri podnebnih spremembah. Pred leti so obstajale popolne, jasne laži – »podnebne spremembe se ne dogajajo.« Danes, ko smo priča vse več naravnim nesrečam, je takšno zanikanje nemogoče. Zato se zdaj to zanikovanje “preoblači” v nove pripovedi. Pojavil se je izraz podnebni realisti – ti priznavajo, da se podnebne spremembe dogajajo, a trdijo: to ni posledica človekovih dejanj. Tako se odgovornost prelaga stran. Skratka, razprava postaja vse bolj kompleksna, kar pa je za ljudi še težje – saj postaja vse težje razločiti, kje se resnica konča in kje se začnejo laži.

Voditelj: Omenili ste Rusijo in njeno dejavnost. Kako dejavna je Rusija pri ustvarjanju kaosa in dezinformacij? Verjetno to spremljate in raziskujete. Kakšne so vaše ugotovitve?

Gostja: Rusija je pri tem izjemno dejavna. Obstaja več različnih ravni delovanja in operacij, 

Voditelj: Kako to opažate?

Gostja: To vidimo skozi številne dezinformacijske operacije, ki potekajo že vrsto let. Omenila bi na primer operacijo Doppelgänger, ki smo jo tudi sami raziskovali in analizirali.

Voditelj: O tem vas bom še posebej vprašal.

Gostja: Vidimo, da se ruski akterji zelo spretno vključujejo v obstoječe družbene strukture in predsodke – to sem že prej omenila. To je bistvo t. i. tujega informativnega manipuliranja in vmešavanja (FIMI): napade skušajo prikazati, kot da prihajajo od spodaj, iz domačega okolja, ne od zunaj. Internet omogoča prikrivanje identitet, kar ti akterji s pridom izkoriščajo, zato je zelo težko ugotoviti, kdo stoji za posamezno vsebino in ločiti tuje od domačih virov. K temu prispevajo tudi simpatizerji in podporniki, zaradi česar postane celotno delovanje zelo nejasno in kompleksno. Cilj takšnih dezinformacijskih napadov pa je spodkopavanje zaupanja v demokratične procese in vrednote naših demokracij.

Napadi se pogosto izvajajo v posebej občutljivih trenutkih – na primer v času volitev, ki so temeljni izraz demokracije, ali pa v obdobjih kriz, ko je družba že v negotovosti. Takrat je seveda najlažje stvari še poslabšati. Če so bile včasih takšne kampanje časovno omejene – recimo nekaj tednov pred volitvami –, danes zaradi družbenih omrežij in dejstva, da lahko vsak politik ali posameznik neposredno komunicira z množico sledilcev, ta tok informacij in dezinformacij nikoli ne preneha. Je stalen in nenehen.

Voditelj: Omenili ste operacijo Doppelgänger. Lahko razložite, kaj se skriva za tem? Po mojih izkušnjah gre za posnemanje spletnih strani in novičarskih portalov, ki so videti zelo prepričljivo. Zakaj? Kaj je v ozadju tega?

Gostja: Da, točno tako – so izjemno prepričljive. Doppelgänger je verjetno ena največjih in najbolj sofisticiranih kampanj dezinformacij, ki jih vodi Rusija. Ciljala je predvsem na Evropo, vendar tudi na številne druge države po svetu. Mi se osredotočamo na evropski vidik. Kampanja poteka najmanj od leta 2022. Ime Doppelgänger pomeni »dvojnik«, »posnemovalec«. Ruski akterji so kupovali domene, ki so bile skoraj identične domenam resničnih medijev – in jih dobesedno klonirali. Posnemali so logotipe, barve, postavitev spletne strani – vse – in na te klonirane strani objavljali pro-ruske članke in dezinformacije.
Uporabnik pa je mislil, da bere prispevek iz The Guardian, Le Monde, Süddeutsche Zeitung ali ANSA. In prav v tem je moč in nevarnost: lažna vsebina je dobila verodostojnost zaradi zunanje podobnosti s priznanimi mediji. Poleg tega je bil zelo pomemben del kampanje prisotnost na družbenih omrežjih. Akterji niso vedno ustvarili celotne lažne spletne strani, ampak so uporabljali določene URL-naslove, ki so vodili neposredno na klonirane vsebine. Da bi jih uporabniki sploh videli, so izvajali koordinirane kampanje na družbenih omrežjih – pogosto tudi plačane. Tako je bilo njihovo delovanje še bolj učinkovito in razširjeno.

Voditelj: Je bil EU DisinfoLab vključen v raziskovanje te kampanje?

Gostja: Da, seveda. Moj nadrejeni, izvršni direktor EU DisinfoLaba, je bil pravzaprav tisti, ki je kampanji nadel ime Doppelgänger, ki se je nato tudi uveljavilo po vsem svetu.
Kampanja je bila tako obsežna, da je pritegnila ogromno pozornosti – ne le medijev, temveč tudi številnih organizacij, ki so jo raziskovale in jo še vedno spremljajo, saj se nadaljuje še danes. V poročilih o grožnjah jo je večkrat obravnavala tudi Meta, prav tako so bili vanjo vpleteni vladni organi, ker so bile ponarejene celo uradne spletne strani državnih institucij – na primer francoskega zunanjega ministrstva in celo Nata. Čeprav kampanja še poteka, je njeno popolno odstranitev skoraj nemogoče doseči, saj akterji nenehno ustvarjajo nove kopije spletnih mest in družbenih profilov. Vendar pa je bila identifikacija izvajalcev uspešna. Danes vemo, da sta v kampanjo vključeni dve podjetji – Social Design Agency (SDA) in Struktura. Evropska unija ju je uvrstila na seznam sankcioniranih subjektov, vendar kljub temu še naprej delujeta, saj uporabljata posrednike in druge načine za izogibanje sankcijam. Uveljavljanje kazni je zato izjemno zahtevno.Za konec pa še nekaj zanimivega – lani je prišlo do velikega razkritja: anonimni vir je objavil številne dokumente podjetja SDA, ki natančno kažejo, kako je bila kampanja zasnovana. Iz njih je razvidno, da je delovala skoraj kot prava komunikacijska agencija – z načrti proračunov, temami, o katerih bodo poročali, celo z odobritvami posameznih memov ali karikatur, ter s cilji občinstev in merili uspešnosti (KPI-ji).
To je ponudilo neprecedenčen vpogled v to, kako sistematično in profesionalno deluje ruski aparat dezinformacij.

Voditelj: Ali vemo, koliko denarja so vložili v to kampanjo? In koliko ljudi so vključili v takšno operacijo?

Gostja: To je zelo težko natančno oceniti, saj je kampanja res ogromna. Ko smo prvič objavili poročilo o njej, septembra 2022 – torej pred tremi leti – smo ugotovili, da je bilo samo za oglase na družbenih omrežjih porabljenih več kot 100.000 evrov, kar je pravzaprav le majhen del celotnega proračuna. Torej, govorimo o res velikih zneskih.

Voditelj: Opazil sem, da Rusija vlaga milijarde dolarjev v podobne operacije dezinformiranja. To so izjemni zneski. Koliko pa v to področje vlagajo zahodne demokracije – v boj proti dezinformacijam? Kakšno je vaše mnenje? Ali vlade na tem področju počnejo dovolj?

Gostja: Stanje je med državami članicami EU zelo različno. Nekatere države to vprašanje jemljejo precej bolj resno kot druge. A obstaja skupna osnova, ki velja za vse – na primer Zakon o digitalnih storitvah (Digital Services Act), ki je enotna zakonodaja za vse države članice. Ta je izjemno pomembna in nujna. Naslednji korak pa je izvajanje zakonodaje – torej uveljavljanje pravil v praksi. Resnica je, da imamo na papirju odlična orodja in velik potencial za učinkovit boj proti dezinformacijam, vendar je njihova dejanska uporaba veliko težja. Na to se moramo osredotočiti.

Pomembno je, da vlade vprašanja transparentnosti in odgovornosti spletnih platform obravnavajo zelo resno. To je nujno, saj to ni nekaj začasnega. Dezinformacije so pojav, ki bo tu ostal – in se bo še naprej razvijal, tako kot se je do zdaj. Zato moramo biti pripravljeni ne le odzivati se, ampak tudi predvidevati grožnje.

Voditelj: Torej imamo na eni strani zakonodajo in regulacijo, na drugi pa gradnjo družbe. Kako torej graditi družbo, kako se pripraviti?

Gostja: Oh, lahko vprašanje. (smeh) Ne, seveda ne. Kot sem rekla na začetku – mi smo skromni in radi sami sebe imenujemo zagovorniki, zagovorniki resnice v komunikaciji. A to področje je ogromno in sestavljeno iz zelo različnih deležnikov: iz nevladnih organizacij, kot je tista, kjer delam sama, iz raziskovalnih inštitutov, pa tudi iz vladnih organov in platform. Gre torej za zelo raznoliko skupnost in rada verjamem, da vsi delamo za skupen cilj. Vendar pa moramo razumeti, da obstajajo velike razlike v močeh, vplivu in virih. Ko se recimo zgodijo volitve ali veliki dogodki, nas kot nevladne organizacije pogosto pozovejo, naj »naredimo razliko«, naj prispevamo svoj del. In verjemite, trudimo se po svojih najboljših močeh. A za to potrebujemo financiranje, trajnostni model in predvsem podporo državnih in evropskih institucij, da zagotovijo sistemske rešitve, ne le kratkoročnih projektov. Potrebujemo strukture, ki omogočajo dolgoročno delovanje, in podporo v obliki osnovnega financiranja ter tudi pravne zaščite, saj so organizacije, kot je naša, pogosto same tarča napadov. Pomembno je, da lahko vsi ti »zagovorniki« delujejo varno in brez strahu.

Voditelj: Omenili ste napade na vašo organizacijo oziroma podobne. Kaj s tem mislite? Kakšne napade imate v mislih?

Gostja: Gre za različne vrste napadov. Na primer napade na našo spletno infrastrukturo – civilnodružbene organizacije se pogosto soočajo z vdori v svoje spletne strani ali osebne elektronske naslove. Dogaja se tudi, da se osebni podatki razkrivajo javno – t. i. doxing –, kar je lahko zelo nevarno, saj ogroža zasebnost in varnost posameznikov. Poleg tega obstajajo tudi pravni pritiski – t. i. SLAPP tožbe (strategic lawsuits against public participation) – strateške tožbe, namenjene izčrpavanju posameznikov ali organizacij, ki delujejo v javnem interesu. Te tožbe so pogosto brez prave podlage, njihov namen pa je utruditi organizacije, jim pobrati sredstva za pravne stroške in jih potisniti v birokratske postopke, ki trajajo leta. Cilj vseh teh napadov je enak – ustaviti organizacije pri njihovem delu.

Voditelj: Prav, najlepša hvala za ta zelo zanimiv vpogled v temo in – veliko sreče pri vašem delu in vašem boju.

Gostja: Hvala lepa, najlepša hvala.

Voditelj: Hvala tudi vam za pozornost. To je bil podkast o dezinformacijah, vodil sem ga Zoran Potič. Lep pozdrav. 

[ENGLISH VERSION]

Government Podcast GOVSI

Host: Greetings and welcome to a new episode of the GOVSI podcast, where we return to a topic we’ve already covered twice before — disinformation. Let me remind you that some time ago, UKOM launched the campaign reREAD, reTHINK, RECHECK (in Slovenian: preBERI, preMISLI, PREVERI), which aims to raise public awareness that information can be a perishable good if we don’t take it seriously. Some time ago, we discussed this topic with Siim Kumpas from the European External Action Service, and a year ago we hosted the distinguished professor from California, Nicholas Cull. This time, our guest is... - and from that moment I will continue in English because our latest guest is Maria Giovanna Sessa, who will lead us through this intriguing subject – called disinformation. Maria, thank you for joining us.

Guest: Thank you for having me.

Host: Maria Giovanna Sessa works at EU DisinfoLab and is specialist in tackling disinformation. Maria, you’ve worked at that NGO for years, but I can tell you — almost nobody in Slovenia knows what DisinfoLab is or what it does. Please, explain us.

Guest: All right, so yes, it's true. I have been working at EU DisinfoLab for over 5 years now and I have to say that the Slovenians are not alone. I am Italian and in Italy I must often explain what I do exactly and what is this weird organisation that I work for. I have to say that we are well known in our bubble - in our community of would like to call ourselves defenders, - but part of that …

Host: Excuse me - defenders of what? 

Guest: Defenders from disinformation. And I'm sure that we will get into that. But yes, we are less known to the, to the public. So, thank you also for this opportunity to improve that. And what do we do? We are, as you mentioned, an NGO. So, we do independent research. I have the pleasure of overviewing our research activities which are on sophisticated disinformation campaigns that are targeting EU.  And we also have a branch that does lobbying and advocacy. So, trying to improve things more at the policy making level and for instance, in the last few years I have been really working on the enforcement of the digital services act and yeah, which is this huge act of legislation that is trying to make the Internet a better place and so our research activities inform our policy activities and vice versa, and that's what we do. 

Host: OK. That's your organisation’s work. And what about you? What is your background? Why did you choose to deal with disinformation? Why it's so important for you?

Guest: Well, I come from academia. I have a PhD in political science. I used to research party politics and specifically how political parties set their agenda and the issues on their agenda based on voting behaviour. And how these two aspects, the voters and the parties, influence one another. So, when we started in 2016, it was really the year where we started hearing the expression fake news. And I started to become acquaintance with the fact that political parties often used disinformation instead as a communication method and so I became interested in that. I knew that I wanted to do research but outside of academia. I enjoyed the more flexible, dynamic environment. 

But then how I came specifically to EU DisinfoLab is as many good things as possible in life. It was completely casual. So, through a friend, who basically knew somebody at the organisation, they were hiring for an expert Italian information system. That's where I came along. And five years after here I am still at the organisation, but in a different role.  

Host: Introducing you I mentioned that the Government Office of Communication started campaign of awareness of disinformation. Can you tell us you mentioned disinformation, fake news and so on. Can you explain those terms?

Guest: Yes. So, I used the term fake news because it was something that really, trendy a few years back and I have to say that I often hear at the field using this term. But I would say that it is an inaccurate term, and we should really opt for disinformation. So, disinformation is the spreading, the creation and spreading of information of content of news that is false or it's inaccurate, it's misleading. So, we don't have to think about something that is necessarily 100% false, also because let's say that the most successful disinformation is the one that has a little grain of truth, that that gets manipulated. Then disinformation has an intent which is malign, there's an intent to harm and to deceive. And that's also why we have another complementary term that is misinformation, which is the same, it's the false, inaccurate, misleading content, but that is shared without the knowledge it being false. So, there is a let's say a little cartoon that comes to my mind, where the parents say to a child who just received a new bicycle: Oh, this is from Santa Claus! And in that case the parents do know that it is not from Santa Claus from them. So, they repeat disinformation. Of course they don't have a malign intent there, but you get the idea. But when the child goes on to his friends and showing the new bike and saying, oh, look, I got it from Santa. That would be misinformation because he really does believe that it is from Santa.

Host: Why don't we call that false information which are intentional - just lies?

Guest: That's a good question. And they are in part lies, although it's … I think it is … There is such a complex combination of our understanding: being of the truths and is also of course indicated by our experience and probably lies would be reductive because when we are moving from civil information items to disinformation campaigns, we really see a bigger intent, a bigger effect of coordination and of course also interior motive that can go from political, economic ideological gain can be whatever. So, I know that it might be very frustrating and the temptation to call them lies and is strong and that would not be incorrect in most case. And I believe that disinformation is a wider than this and it really gets an idea of the of the phenomenon itself.

Host: While I was preparing for that podcast, I noticed that you were researching far right movements and their agenda, and you stumbled on fake news in that field. Is there a difference between right or left political sphere using information technologies. Is there any difference?

Guest: So, first, actually going back to my PhD days, my research focus on actually not really the charity itself, but on the centre right, and how the mainstream right was really between two fires because on the one hand they had pressures from the historical alternatives. Usually, we have always had this sort of alternation of government in European democracies and the then a new actor came out which was the far right and which for the first time since the new century. Probably it became a viable alternative for government. So exactly how these parties in the centre had to live with these two antagonists, but also perhaps sometimes allies. Going back to your question, I would not differentiate disinformation as something specifically of the right or of the left. Let's say that for …. Also going beyond the content. If we look at the content, I believe that disinformation like the probably the leitmotif of it is threatening life as we know it. So, the fear that things will change, whether it is migration or the inflation or I don't know climate change. So, it really plays on these spheres. But going beyond the content really the behaviour of disinformation probably aligns better with the extremes of the political spectrum because it plays on fear, it plays on exaggerating sentiments, on indignation, on rage. And that's something that often aligns with the extremes of the political spectrum. It is true that right now for where we are in history, because the far right has become more and more relevant in the last 20 years in Europe, we tend to look more at disinformation that aligns with the far right. But of course, it's not the only one. And if, we can learn something, is that issues can be weaponizing the way. And just to, I don't know, thinking about places and it's not Italian and Italy. If we take the sentiments with Russia, have always been rather tolerant. Italy has always had good relations with them with the country and so right now if we see disinformation from Russia, of course it speaks well to that part of the electorate that aligns with the far right. Because look, look at the government now that we have. But the left is not spared. We've always had especially the extreme left has always been very accepting of Russian narratives in Italy, specifically because there is some sort of nostalgia towards the old times of the Soviet Union, which of course are nothing aligned with what is happening today. But as you can see, uh, what we say is that it can be really played in either way.

Host: Actual new information sphere in Europe. How would you expect it and describe it? What is the state of the disinformation tactics? How do you recognise them? How to analyse them? How do they present us? Which are the main producers of disinformation? 

Guest: So, let's say, like a premise is that globalisation has really made the world smaller in some ways. So, in terms of both the content, the narratives and the strategies of the behaviours. We see that these are really aligned sort of everywhere. I don't know, like we have monitored a few elections this year from Germany to Poland to the Czech Republic and Moldova and one conspiracy theory about the elections being rigged, so bringing voters to doubt the results of the democratic process is something that we have seen everywhere. And we have seen it before. And when we will see it in the future, unfortunately. So, in these terms we are dealing with the same everywhere that, of course, it gets adopted nuance to what are the social structures in each country to what the countries specifically responds well to. So, I don't know what the issue of Transnistria in Germany would be, it would be the East- West divide, but the general content and the general tactics sort of see the same. And in the past few years we have started looking at what we call FIMI, which is an acronym that stands for foreign information manipulation and interference. It's honestly a fancy word coined by the European External Service to talk about influence operations. So, it's not new, it's just being rebranded, and it really focuses on the foreign actors playing into these narratives and organising these campaigns. And of course, we're speaking about state and non-state actors and how they use proxies from the domestic borders of European countries and of course it's a very complex problem because these actors can also count on sympathisers. So, it's a very multilayered phenomenon and yes of course Russia in this case is one of the biggest players, but also China and Iran. Our work focus is more on Russia.

Host: The European Union forbad Russian media and it was considered as violating freedom, relating freedom of speech. It's very important in our democracies, so how do you tackle this? Disinformation in the in the political system where freedom of speech is valued so much?

Guest: I was expecting you to bring up the theme of freedom of speech because it's one of the great questions that are kept being asked 

Host: Yes, but it's an important question.

Guest: Absolutely. And fighting disinformation is absolutely about protecting freedom of speech.

Host: Elaborate that please.

Guest: Yes, of course. So, freedom of speech should be understood as also freedom to have truthful information and to express one's opinion. So, there is this very good, I think English expression that is: Free speech is not free reach. So, fighting disinformation is not about censorship, although some actors are trying to frame it as such. It is quite the opposite. It is also ensuring that free expression is protected but also some content, for instance that might be disinformation, it's completely legal. It's what we sometimes call awful, but lawful. It seems that yes, you would rather probably not encounter, but they're not violating any laws, they're not violating even the terms of service of platforms. So, because they are there, because they’re online, the thing is that more and more and that is, it's not just malign actors, but it's really the architecture of platforms, they get amplified out of proportion. So, we have an algorithmic system that we know so little about because it's a black box that the platforms don't want to have, don’t want us to have a look into and that amplifies and rewards content that is often outraging extreme audience dividing. And so sometimes the issue is really that things that are not great but ok, they are there. It's probably part of the diversity and the freedom of speech they get out of fight so they get a free of reach that is out of proportion and then ultimately, I'm sure that we will get back to it. I have been doing some work on what we call gender-based information. So, disinformation against women, but also going beyond like binary narrative about gender nonconforming individuals, members of the LGBTQ plus community. And the ultimative goal of these attacks is to silence these people, to have them not participate in the in the public debate because they fear for their safety, they fear for their reputation, and so they disengage. So, what about freedom of speech of these people that we should protect.

Host:  Yes, that's why you and your NGO as much as I understand you, you're a strong supporter of the regulation of Internet.

Guest: Yes.

Host: Why? It's a little bit contradictory. NGO and regulation, and someone who's … 

Guest: Yeah, I don't think it's contradictory. What we advocate for is really a regulation of the Internet that makes it safe and ensure that our liberties, our European values and freedoms and liberties are protected. Looking specifically at this huge regulation that, since 2022, has revolutionised all the online services and in in the European Union, Digital Services Act, and that's exactly what it tries to do. It offers more transparency for users to understand how online services - and we're looking at platforms or search engines work - for instance, how the algorithmic amplification works, the possibility to have a feed that is not based on recommender systems, but it's sort of neutral, the possibility to appeal and have redress mechanisms for content that the users believe should not be on the platform that are. So, it offers really a lot of protection that happen within the democratic framework that we have.  

Host: I'm from the generation when Internet started in the 90s and we had a few weeks ago, months, a discussion. There was a guy from the ministry for Digital Transformation and he said we were fighting for Internet in the 90s, and we thought that Internet is final freedom that that's it, you know.  There are no regulations, the Internet is free for all. But now, after many years we notice that Internet is attacked by corporations. And that's why maybe we need measures for that field.

Guest: Absolutely. The business model has changed since the beginning of the Internet and it’s a business model. So, when platforms years ago introduced the algorithmic order feeds and recommender system, so content that gets recommended based on multiple characteristics, whether it's user behaviour and other sorts of interactions. But the reality is that we don't know exactly how that works because platforms wouldn't let us know. This has really changed things in the sense that – and I think it's very important for users to understand one thing - is that the Internet is not neutral. What we see if I now open my Instagram account would be very, very different from what you see on your own.  And that has an impact of course in how we come to see and understand and process the world. Regulation is needed.

Host: We have different media information processes. A few decades ago, media, journalists processed it. Now, everybody's a journalist, everybody's media. I say a statement of Eon Musk, if you noticed. So, how do we regulate that in environment, where everybody is producer of information, opinions? How do you regulate opinions, not just information? 

Guest: Well, of course we are not aiming to regulate opinions, but to create safe platforms, where these opinions are vehicles and travel. Let me just make a point also about fact checking which freezes content moderation, which is the main way in which I think most people come across countering disinformation. And attack that is often made is that you know who decides, what is true, what is false …

Host: Who to trust?

Guest: And who to trust, exactly. And that's fair, on the one hand. However, the, premise might be and should be another one. And it should be the one that phrase ‘fact checking’ is about fact checking facts, not opinions. And fact checkers do not aim to fact check opinions and let me give you an example. For instance, if somebody says that the Bucha massacres, they don't happen in Ukraine then that can be fact checked. That is a fact, because it's an event that did occur, and we can demonstrate it that there have been drones flying over the area. There are the accounts of the victims by witnesses. So that can be checked. But to say that for instance, Russia decided to invade Ukraine because they felt threatened by a potential enlargement of NATO. That's something we may very much agree or disagree on it, but that's an opinion and fact checking will never be about contradicting that somehow. That's not the purpose of it.

Host: But we have narratives. We have narratives, for one side, for the other side. How do you fight that?

Guest: Yes, we do. One thing is that disinformation is getting more and more sophisticated. And if we take foreign actors - I mean, I will go back to Russia because that's what I was mentioning earlier - they have an interest now in adding to the confusion, to the idea that the truth simply cannot be known, because everything is so complex and many things happen at once and there's an advantage to them in this in this chaos, in fueling this distrust. That's also something we have seen, for instance, regarding the war in Ukraine, like in the very first weeks. Russia was denying the invasion because … we were seeing in the beginning … 

Host: There was a special military operation … 

Guest: At some point it became impossible to deny it and so they just, you know, they just poisoned the conversation like - but can you really know what happened? But all you're seeing the video. Making the video, it was manipulated, or it was cut. And then that's not even like with another narrative, In the past, if we take climate change, there were full-fledged climate change lies. It is not happening. Full stop. Right now, with all the natural disasters that are happening, it's kind of impossible to say that it is not there. So, denial is rebranding as … You know what are climate realists? They think that yes, it is happening, but maybe it sounds like you think, but maybe you know, it's not men led. We don't have responsibility. So, the conversation is changing with this complexity and it's becoming worse probably for people because it becomes more difficult to understand where the truth stops, and the lies begin.

Host: You mentioned Russia and their activities. How active is Russia in making chaos, disinformation? You probably research it, you follow that. What's your observation?

Guest: It is very active. Let's see there are multiple 

Host: How do you see that?

Guest: We've seen it when we see it through multiple disinformation operations that have been happening for years. I'd like to comment some point, some elements about the Doppelganger operation, which we have researched.

Host: I’ll ask you about that.

Guest: And yes, we've seen how Russian actors really fill into existing social structures, as I mentioned, and social prejudices. That's the thing about FIMI is that it tries to frame attacks as if they were ground rules, as if they were bottom up. So, the Internet allows us to conceal identities very often and that's something that they absolutely play into and it becomes very difficult to perform attribution and to distinguish foreign from domestic actors, because sometimes as I mentioned before, there are sympathisers, there are supporters. And so, it gets very ambiguous and complex and of course, since the goal of filling of disinformation attacks is really to bring doubts about democratic processes, about the values of our democracies. The attacks are especially carried out during sensitive movements such as elections, which is the normal expression of the workings of our democracies or moments of crisis, where, of course, things are already not great - so why not make them worse? But we see them continuously. Before campaigns were done on specific periods of time prior to elections. Now, as I mentioned before, like the disintermediation of communication, the time that a leader can go on social media and talk to their audiences directly, and that anyone can go viral and can become relevant if they have a discrete following, regardless of their competencies. Of course, it means that the stream of information and disinformation is never ending, it’s continuous. 

Host: Yes, you mentioned Doppelganger. Can you explain what is behind that? My personal experience is that we notice some mimics of some kind of websites, news sites and they are quite persuasive. Why? What's behind that then explain.

Guest: Yeah, they are. Absolutely. So, Doppelganger is probably one of the biggest and most sophisticated Russian led campaigns of disinformation interference. It targeted Europe, but virtually a lot of other countries also outside. Of course, we focus more on the European aspects of it, and it was run at least since 2022. Doppelganger, as the word says, means clone look alike. So, basically these Russian actors would buy domain names of websites that were incredibly resembling to legal media, authentic media. And they would clone them. Literally. They would also mimic the logos, the colours, the layout and they would produce the pro-Russian articles of disinformation. However, the user of course would think that they are on The Guardian, on Le Monde, on Süddeutsche Zeitung, on ANSA. And that's the power. And that's the danger of it. The fact that these actors would gain legitimacy to their false content through the look alike of these authentic media. Besides the websites, another very important element of the Doppleganger is the social media presence. Because these actors did not create the full website, but would activate specific URL-s, so you would really need to know the URL of the cloned media and so … How would they get the content through to users or through a coordinated campaign on social media? That was also widely monetized. So, there's also of course.

Host: Was DisinfoLab engaged in that research?

Guest: Yes, we did. My boss, the executive director of the EU DisinfoLab was the one to name it Doppelganger. And the name was then widely adopted. Also, because the campaign has become so huge that it received a lot of attention. Not just from the media and a lot of organisations that have worked on it and still work on the monitoring because the campaign is ongoing. But also, on social media platforms as Meta covered in their threat report more than one time. And also, governments were involved because also governments at some point were mimicked. It was not simply online newspapers, but also institutions from national governments, for instance, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also NATO. So, it's been huge and there have been consequences. Although the campaign is ongoing, it is very difficult to eradicate such a campaign, because these actors continue creating instances of websites of social media. However, attribution has been successful and now we know that there are two companies that are involved in this campaign called the SDA, so Social Design Agency and Struktura. They have been put on the sanctions list of the European union, although they continue to find ways to circumvent it and to use proxies and again like. Enforcement is very, very complicated. There have been consequences. And then the last thing - because it's probably a fun fact, although it's boring - that I would like to mention is that we have unprecedented views on how disinformation, led by Russia works with Doppelganger. Because last year there has been a huge leak: somebody - of course, it is an anonymous source - leaked many documents from SDA, one of the entities involved, showing exactly how the campaign was manufactured and it was treated basically as if it was a communication agency: discussing budgets, discussing topics to cover, discussing whether a certain meme cartoon was approved or not, and with numbers, of course, audience targets of KPI's. And this was incredibly interesting, of course.

Host: Do we know how much money they invested in that? How much people they acquired for such operation?

Guest: It's actually very difficult to quantify because the campaign is so huge. Let's say that when we first published a report of the campaign back in September 2022 and again, we are speaking about 3 years ago, we had accounted for over 100,000 euros spent just on social media adds and it's really a small portion of it. So, it's huge.

Host: I noticed that Russia is investing billion dollars in similar operations of disinformation. That's a huge amount of money. How much money do Western democracies invest into tackling disinformation? What's your perspective, opinion? Are the governments doing enough on that field or not?

Guest: The situation is very diverse across the 27 Member States and some countries are taking the issue more seriously than others. Let's say that a common ground that is accessible to everyone is, for instance, going back to Digital Service Act, which is a common legislation of course, so that that is crucial and so important. Another issue will be and is already the enforcement. So, the implementation. The truth is that we have the tools on paper, and we have the potential to have such an impact but putting things in practice is not as easy and we should focus on that. And it's important that governments take the issue of transparency and of platform accountability really, really, seriously. And yeah, that's urgent because this is not temporary. This is something that is virtually here to stay and it will evolve the way it has evolved over the years. But we need to be ready not just to react, but also to anticipate the threats.

Host: On one side you have regulations and so on, and the other side is building society. How do we do that? How to prepare?

Guest: Oh, easy question. No, absolutely, of course it's not. I started by saying that we were modest, we like to call ourselves the defenders, the defender communicators. It's huge. It's made of so many different stakeholders. It's made of NGOs also like the one that I work for, but also other research institutes, also governments but also platforms. So, it's a very diverse crowd and I like to believe that everybody is working to the same objective. However, we need to understand that there is a diverse level of power and of agency and of resources there. Sometimes when I don't know, elections happen or when there are big events, we are asked as an NGO to make a difference, really do our best. And we try, believe me, we try, but of course for that we do need funding, we do need a sustainable model and we do need the national and international European authorities for this to really step up and ensure that we don't work just on a project basis, but there are follow-ups that are structures, that are not just ad hoc, but they are systematic and that we receive support that looks like again - core funding, but also supportive legal fees. Because organisations like my own get also attacked and that ensure that all these defenders can work in a safe way. 

Host: You mentioned attacking your organisation or a similar one? What do you mean by that? What kind of attacks?

Guest: There were attacks of different types for instance to our online infrastructure. Defenders from civil society often must face attacks on their websites or on their personal emails. It has happened that also personal information gets linked, gets doxed and of course it can be very, very dangerous to expose private information. Sometimes there are also legal cases against organisations, the so-called slabs, which are systematically losses against public participation. There are losses that are just thought exactly to wear out the energy. Also, the funding of small organisations and they are of course lost in timeless bureaucracy and legal fees. So that can come in in very different ways and ultimately the goal is again to have these organisations stop doing what they're doing.

Host: OK, thank you very much for your interesting insight into that topic and - good luck with your job, fight.

Guest: Thank you. Thank you so much.

Host: Thank you very much for listening. This was a podcast about disinformation, hosted by Zoran Potič. Best regards.