O dezinformacijah v ruski vojni proti Ukrajini

V najnovejši epizodi podkasta GOVSI nadaljujemo s temo dezinformacij in informacijske vojne. Tokratni gost je Mykhailo Dankanych, ukrajinski veteran in strokovnjak za boj proti ruskim dezinformacijam, ki opozarja, da se informacijska fronta ne odvija le v Ukrajini, temveč tudi znotraj Evropske unije. V pogovoru z voditeljem Zoranom Potičem gost pojasni, da informacijska vojna ni ločen pojav, temveč del širše kognitivne vojne, katere cilj je širjenje kaosa, nezaupanja in razkrajanje družbene kohezije.

Priče kot najmočnejši odgovor na lažne narative
Dankanych izpostavi, da je eden najbolj učinkovitih načinov boja proti dezinformacijam pogovor z ljudmi, ki so dogodke doživeli na lastni koži. Svoje delo povezuje s projektom To Break the Fake, v okviru katerega zbira pričevanja nekdanjih ukrajinskih vojnih ujetnikov. Po njegovih besedah so prav njihove izkušnje ključne za razumevanje, kako se ruski narativi gradijo in utrjujejo skozi leta. 

Ruski narativi v Evropi in tudi v Sloveniji
Gost poudari, da Rusija informacijsko deluje tudi v evropskem medijskem prostoru. Njegova ekipa spremlja medije v različnih državah EU in išče značilne propagandne fraze, ki se ponavljajo v proruskih narativih. Med najnovejše analizirane države uvrščajo tudi Slovenijo, kjer so zaznali več virov, ki širijo ruske dezinformacijske vzorce.

»Dezinformacij ni mogoče premagati — se pa moramo upirati«
Pomembno sporočilo epizode je, da dezinformacij ni mogoče v celoti odpraviti, saj se bodo z razvojem tehnologije in umetne inteligence širile še hitreje. Kljub temu je, kot poudarja Dankanych, ključno vztrajati: izobraževati, preverjati vire in krepiti kritično mišljenje že pri otrocih. Epizodo zaključi s pozivom: »Bodite skeptični.«

Pogovor si lahko ogledate na YouTube kanalu Vlade Republike Slovenije.

[ENGLISH VERSION]

On Disinformation in Russia's War against Ukraine
In the latest episode of the GOVSI podcast our guest is Mykhailo Dankanych, a Ukrainian veteran and expert in countering Russian disinformation, who warns that the information front is not taking place only in Ukraine, but also within the European Union.

In conversation with host Zoran Potič, the guest explains that information warfare is not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a broader cognitive war, aimed at spreading chaos, distrust and undermining social cohesion.

Witnesses as the strongest response to false narratives
Dankanych highlights that one of the most effective ways to fight disinformation is to speak with people who have experienced events first-hand. He connects his work to the project To Break the Fake, through which he collects testimonies from former Ukrainian prisoners of war. According to him, their experiences are essential for understanding how Russian narratives are constructed and reinforced over time.

Russian narratives in Europe—and in Slovenia as well
The guest emphasises that Russia also operates in the European media space. His team monitors media outlets across various EU countries, searching for recurring propaganda phrases that appear in pro-Russian narratives. Among the most recently analysed countries is Slovenia, where they have identified several sources spreading patterns typical of Russian disinformation.

»Disinformation cannot be defeated — but we must resist«
A key message of the episode is that disinformation cannot be completely eliminated, as it will spread even faster with the development of technology and artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, as Dankanych stresses, it is essential to persist: to educate, verify sources and strengthen critical thinking from an early age. He concludes the episode with a simple call: »Be sceptical.«

You can watch the episode on YouTube.

Transcript

Voditelj: Lep pozdrav in dobrodošli v novem podkastu GOVSI, v katerem nadaljujemo s temo, ki smo jo tukaj že večkrat obravnavali – dezinformacije. Naj vas spomnim, da je Vladni urad za komuniciranje (UKOM) pred časom zagnal kampanjo »Preberi – Premisli - Preveri«, katere namen je ozaveščanje javnosti o tem, da so informacije lahko zelo hitro pokvarljivo blago, če jih ne jemljemo resno. Pred časom smo se o tej temi pogovarjali s Siimom Kumpasom iz Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje. Nato smo gostili uglednega profesorja iz Kalifornije Nicholasa Culla. Na kongresu DezinfoLab smo imeli zanimiv pogovor z Mariem Giovannijem Sessom, tokrat pa smo v studio uspeli pripeljati ukrajinskega gosta, Mykhaila Dankanyicha.

Voditelj: Mykhailo, hvala, ker ste se nam pridružili. Ste strokovnjak za boj proti dezinformacijam iz Rusije. Preden začnemo s to temo, vas prosim, da se predstavite in poveste nekaj o svojem ozadju.

Mykhailo Dankanych: Živjo, veseli me, hvala za povabilo. Pred obsežno invazijo Rusije na Ukrajino sem delal na dveh področjih. Prvo področje so bili mediji. Približno sedem let sem delal na televiziji Zakarpattijske regionalne televizijske hiše. Takrat je bila to javna televizija. Delal sem tudi kot projektni vodja pri različnih mednarodnih projektih. Leta 2022 pa sem, tako kot mnogi Ukrajinci, odšel v vojno in tam preživel skoraj dve leti.

Voditelj: Bili ste na fronti.

Gost: Da, sem veteran. Zame je vedno težko to sploh izreči, ker si veterana predstavljam kot nekoga starejšega, recimo iz druge svetovne vojne in podobno. Ampak ja, lahko se imenujem veteran. 31. decembra 2022 sem bil priča izmenjavi ruskih in ukrajinskih vojnih ujetnikov. Takrat je bilo šele prvo leto vojne in sem razmišljal: v redu, moram narediti veliko fotografij, ker ko bom kolegom, s katerimi sem delal pri mednarodnih projektih, povedal, kaj sem videl in čemu sem bil priča, mi ne bodo verjeli. Zato moram imeti slike, da jim jih pokažem. Veliko ukrajinskih vojakov, ki so se vračali, je bilo zelo suhih. Razumel sem, da so tam stradali in podobno. Pogovarjal sem se tudi z nekaterimi izmed njih in eden izmed njih je zdaj napisal knjigo, ampak to je že druga zgodba. Takrat sem razumel, da želim narediti nekaj, da bi govoril o njihovih zgodbah. Šele čez eno leto sem naredil prvi intervju in se odločil, da naredim projekt, kot sem jih delal že pred obsežno invazijo. Samo naredil sem ga. Povezal sem informacije in vojne ujetnike, ker obstaja veriga, ki povezuje ti dve temi. Ta veriga je naslednja: pred več kot 20 leti, ko je Putin postal predsednik, je ena njegovih prvih potez bila ta, da je prevzel vse medije. Začeli so svojo družbo polniti z dezinformacijami, z narativi proti Zahodu, o ruskem imperiju in tako naprej. Po mojem mnenju je skoraj izgubljena živa žrtev tega procesa, ker je bil znotraj Rusije in je vse to doživel fizično, ne samo informacijsko.

Voditelj: Tako ste razvili projekt »To Break the Fake«, če prav razumem. Nam ga lahko nekoliko podrobneje opišete?

Gost: Da. Vse se je začelo s to idejo. In potem, čez eno leto, ko sem zapustil vojsko, sem začel razmišljati, kako lahko prispevam k naši zmagi ali vsaj k odporu proti Rusiji. Ker imam izkušnje z delom v medijih in s projektnim vodenjem, sem se odločil: v redu, naredimo projekt. Najprej je šlo za majhno srečanje v Lvovu. Tam je bila skupina francoskih prostovoljcev, ki so prišli pogledat Ukrajino, mesta, vojno in vse to. Organiziral sem srečanje z nekdanjim vojnim ujetnikom, s tistim, ki sem ga spoznal ob izmenjavi na meji. Zanje je bilo zelo zanimivo, pa tudi zame. Videli smo, da je to res nekaj zanimivega, zato sem se odločil za novo srečanje. Nato smo zaprosili za sredstva pri Mednarodni renesančni fundaciji. Našli smo partnerje in zdaj je naš glavni partner Ministrstvo za zunanje zadeve Ukrajine, ki nam pomaga pri navezovanju stikov z veleposlaništvi in organizaciji dogodkov, povezanih z informacijskimi temami in vojnimi ujetniki. Sodelujemo tudi z ukrajinskimi organizacijami za preverjanje dejstev, kot je VoxCheck Center za boj proti dezinformacijam, ter z nekaterimi drugimi organizacijami.

Voditelj: Prosim, razložite mi, kje je povezava med vojnimi ujetniki in dezinformacijami. Kje je problem? Kako to razložiti?

Gost: Po mojem mnenju je eden najboljših, morda celo najboljši način boja proti dezinformacijam pogovor z nekom, ki je bil priča dogodku. Na primer, če pride do prometne nesreče, lahko o tem berete v medijih, kar je napisal novinar. Morda je bil tam, morda ne. Če pa se pogovarjate z voznikom ali policistom, ki je bil tam in je vse videl, dobite verjetno najbolj popolno sliko. Lahko postavite kakršna koli vprašanja – kakšna je bila hitrost, kakšna je bila reakcija voznika in tako naprej. Enako velja tukaj. Ljudje, ki so bili v ujetništvu, so videli, kako se obnašajo pazniki, o čem govorijo, kako ravnajo z Ukrajinci in kako z ruskimi ujetniki. Razlike so zelo velike in količina informacij, ki jih lahko zberemo, je res velika. Naredil sem vprašalnik za približno 30 nekdanjih vojnih ujetnikov in jim postavil več vprašanj glede informacij in dogajanja v zaporih. Skoraj vsi so povedali, da je bil edini vir informacij, ki so mu verjeli in za katerega so menili, da je resničen, prihod novih ujetnikov.

Voditelj: Novi ujetniki?

Gost: Da. Ker vse drugo … včasih je bil radio, včasih televizija, včasih pogovori, včasih sestanki, ki jih je organizirala uprava. A temu niso verjeli, ker so se povsod ponavljali isti narativi, ki jih Rusija že leta širi proti Ukrajini. Na primer: Ukrajina ne obstaja, vašo državo smo že osvojili, nimate se kam vrniti, tukaj boste ostali do smrti in podobno. Zanimivo je, morda celo nenavadno, da ti ukrajinski vojaki niso bili deležni nobenih usposabljanj o tem, kaj so dezinformacije ali kako jih prepoznati. A so se kljub temu uprli tem narativom, ker poznajo resnico. Zato se mi zdi zanimivo, da njihove zgodbe uporabimo za razlago, kako Rusija deluje od znotraj.

Voditelj: Kako to deluje?

Gost: Imam zelo zanimiv primer. Imeli smo dogodek v Črni gori in smo se z letališča s taksijem peljali do kraja, kjer smo bivali. Voznik taksija nas je vprašal, od kod smo, in povedali smo, da smo Ukrajinci. Nato je vprašal: zakaj se Ukrajina bori proti Rusiji? Saj sta to dve pravoslavni in tradicionalni državi. Zakaj se borite? Ne bi se smeli boriti. Vsi pravoslavni bi morali biti skupaj in živeti … imamo iste vrednote in podobno.
Poskušal sem mu razložiti situacijo, potem pa sem to vprašanje vključil tudi v vprašalnik za nekdanje vojne ujetnike. Spraševal sem jih, kakšno je bilo ravnanje ob največjih praznikih, kot so pravoslavni prazniki – božič, velika noč. Kaj se je dogajalo v zaporih?
Glavni odgovor je bil, da se ni dogajalo nič. V nekaterih zaporih so jim celo poskušali prikriti, kateri dan je. Nekateri ujetniki so si skrivali skodelico, na katero so označevali dneve, ker so želeli vedeti, kdaj je božič ali velika noč. Ko je ta dan prišel, so si med seboj samo rekli: »Vesel božič« ali »Veselo veliko noč«. Če je ruski paznik to opazil – in včasih so jih ujeli s to skodelico – so bili še bolj pretepeni.

Voditelj: To pomeni, da pazniki niso bili verni ali pa je šlo za taktiko.

Gost: Rekel bi, da je največ, kar se je zgodilo, to, da so ob veliki noči rekli: v redu, tukaj je duhovnik. Ta jim je dal eno jajce za deset ljudi v celici. Ujetniki pravijo, da so to delili med vse, potem pa so bili še bolj pretepeni. Tako se ne ravna s pravoslavnimi, če si vsaj malo veren.

Voditelj: To je bila perspektiva iz Črne gore, torej pogled od daleč. V Ukrajini in Rusiji pa potekajo zelo konkretni dogodki. Imamo bojišče v Ukrajini, velike spopade, Ukrajina se bori za preživetje in svojo državo. Po drugi strani pa obstaja tudi bojišče v digitalnem prostoru. Nam lahko opišete to digitalno bojišče?

Gost: Najprej bi rekel, da je ta tema zelo, zelo široka. O tem bi lahko govorili zelo dolgo. Informacijska vojna je samo del kognitivne vojne, kognitivna vojna pa je še veliko širša. Če se vrnemo k razliki med bojiščem v Ukrajini in informacijskim bojiščem: glavna razlika je, da tukaj ni fronte. Dosežeš lahko kogarkoli, kjerkoli na planetu, samo s tem, da nekaj objaviš in poskušaš doseči svoje cilje. To poskušam razlagati na naših dogodkih, ko govorim z mediji, politiki in vsemi, ki pridejo. Razlagam, da vi vidite frontno črto v Ukrajini, a Evropejci pogosto ne opazijo, da frontna črta obstaja tudi znotraj Evropske unije. Rusija napada informacijsko in poskuša sejati kaos povsod. To ni nekaj, kar lahko preprosto blokiraš in se s tem konča. Obstajajo tudi razlike v tem, kako evropske države dojemajo ta problem. Ko smo bili v Latviji, Latvijci prepovedujejo vse, kar lahko širi ruske narative ali ideje. Po mojem mnenju je to zato, ker so blizu – imajo mejo in vedo, kaj se zgodi, če ne ukrepajo. Na primer v Španiji ali celo v Franciji je pogled drugačen, ker je Rusija daleč. »Ne more nas doseči.« A lahko vas doseže – preko informacijske vojne.

Voditelj: Kaj pa Zahodni Balkan? Imate kakšne izkušnje ali vpogled v to območje? Tam so države, kot so Srbija, Črna gora … zgodovinsko in mentalno povezane z idejo velikega slovanskega brata, Rusije in podobno.

Gost: To je del, kjer moram omeniti še drugo smer našega dela. Spremljamo medijski prostor evropskih držav in do zdaj smo spremljali 12 držav. Najnovejši sta Slovenija in Avstrija. V Sloveniji smo na primer našli tri vire, ki po našem petstopenjskem algoritmu ustrezajo definiciji virov ruske dezinformacije.

Voditelj: Prosim, razložite nam to. Kako ste to našli?

Gost: Imamo majhno skupino prostovoljcev, med njimi IT-strokovnjake in medijske ljudi. Jaz nisem tehnik, bolj sem govorec. Oni uporabljajo spletna orodja za iskanje ključnih fraz v medijskem prostoru. Te ključne fraze zelo dobro poznamo, ker jih Rusija uporablja že desetletja. Na primer fraza »kijevski režim«. To je prvi znak – nekaj je sumljivo. To uporablja samo ena država. Ali pa »ukrajinski nacionalisti«, »ukrajinski nacisti«, »korupcija Zelenskega«, »propad Zahoda«, »izdatki Nata« in podobno. Takih fraz je veliko, recimo 20. Nato pogledamo, koliko spletnih strani jih uporablja, naredimo analizo in preverimo po petih stopnjah. Na ta način smo našli več kot 100 spletnih strani, ki delujejo na ozemlju Evropske unije, v teh 12 državah, in so po našem mnenju izjemno toksične.

Voditelj: In v Sloveniji ste našli tri spletne strani? Katere lahko izpostavite?

Gost: Tri. Spomnim se imena prve, največje. Mislim, da je to Insider.com. In tam so zelo dobri primeri, ne samo fraz, ampak celo fotografij, ki jasno kažejo, kako proruska je ta spletna stran. Zanimivo se mi zdi tudi to, da ko smo našli te dezinformacije, smo jih posredovali našemu Ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve in rekli: v redu, tukaj so informacije, prosimo, pošljite jih svojim kolegom v Evropski uniji, morda bodo kaj ukrenili. Nato pa so nas v začetku letošnjega leta kontaktirali naši varnostni organi, ker so videli naše dogodke. Tudi njim smo predlagali: v redu, lahko vam posredujemo te informacije, naredite nekaj s tem. Posredovali smo jim analizo in povedali so nam, da so jo poslali nekaterim službam v evropskih državah, hkrati pa so te vire blokirali na ozemlju Ukrajine. Zame je to nekoliko smešno, ker so nekatere strani blokirane v Ukrajini, v resnici pa delujejo v Evropski uniji in vplivajo na državljane Evropske unije. Zakaj jih torej ne blokirate? To je vprašanje. In običajno rečem …

Voditelj: Nismo v vojni z Rusijo …

Gost: Niste v vroči vojni z Rusijo, ste pa v informacijski vojni z Rusijo – ne glede na to, ali vam je to všeč ali ne, ali verjamete ali ne. To je dejstvo, to se da izračunati. Če obstaja sto spletnih strani, ki širijo ruske narative, in to niso samo narativi v smislu »Ukrajina je slaba in Rusija dobra«. To so tudi narativi, da je Zahod slab, NATO slab, da ste vsi slabi.
V zaporih so slišali več takšnih narativov. Zelo močan narativ je bil na primer: Evropa je »gejropa«. Ukrajinci, zakaj ste se borili za svojo »gejropo«? Zakaj se niste borili skupaj z nami, z Rusi, proti Natu? To so stvari, ki jih slišijo.

Voditelj: Kdo je po vašem mnenju uspešnejši v boju proti narativom in dezinformacijam – Ukrajina ali Rusija? Spomnim se znane fotografije predsednika Zelenskega na začetku vojne, ko je s svojo ekipo posnel video in rekel: »Tukaj smo, ne bežimo.« Takrat je obstajal narativ, da vodstvo Ukrajine beži, da ste ostali sami. A to se je obrnilo. Kdo po vašem mnenju zmaguje v informacijski vojni? Ali ste uspešni pri vseh teh strategijah proti ruskim narativom?

Gost: Najprej mislim, da danes, ob vsej digitalni količini podatkov in umetni inteligenci, dezinformacij ni mogoče zares premagati. Ne samo ruskih, katerekoli dezinformacije. Nastajale bodo vedno bolj in vedno več jih bo v prihodnosti.

Voditelj: To je zanimivo vprašanje – kako se boriti? Kako zmagati to vojno?

Gost: Nemogoče. Nemogoče je zmagati, vendar se je treba upirati. To je proces, ki bo spremljal vse nas. Gre za dolgoročno perspektivo. Mislim, da moramo otroke učiti, kako biti bolj skeptični in kako preverjati informacije. To bi moralo biti del šolskega sistema.
Če govorimo kratkoročno – mislim, da je dobra ideja blokirati toksične vire, ker to Rusom vzame več časa in sredstev, da ustvarijo nove. To je proces. Če pa govorimo o tem, kdo zmaguje, Rusija ali Ukrajina – trenutno Rusija zapira svoj medijski prostor. Mislim, da skušajo doseči raven Severne Koreje. Po zadnjih javno dostopnih informacijah zapirajo in ugašajo celo Telegram, ki je njihov, pa tudi WhatsApp.

Voditelj: V redu.

Gost: Želijo, da vsi v Rusiji uporabljajo njihov lasten komunikator. Mislim, da se imenuje Max. To je državni komunikator. Želijo, da vsi uporabljajo samo tega in nič drugega, ker želijo imeti popoln nadzor, podobno kot na Kitajskem.

Voditelj: To je podobno kot v času hladne vojne, ko je obstajala železna zavesa in popolnoma drugačen svet.

Gost: Da, vendar takrat ni bilo interneta, danes pa je. Prepričan sem, da veliko Rusov razume, kaj se dogaja. Uporabljajo VPN-je, spremljajo novice. Razumejo realnost. A bojijo se ukrepati, ker se soočajo z ogromnim aparatom FSB ali drugih varnostnih struktur. Kljub temu Rusija poskuša sistem še bolj zapreti. V Ukrajini tega ne počnemo, ker imamo odprto družbo. Če bi poskušali kaj takega, bi imeli novo revolucijo. Ukrajinci se borimo za svobodo – to se je začelo leta 2004, nato 2014. Ukrajinci smo zelo svobodoljubni in si ne morem predstavljati, da bi se kaj takega zgodilo pri nas. Če pa obstaja velik vir ruske propagande ali dezinformacij, ja – ta vir se blokira in vsi to sprejemajo.

Voditelj: Ali lahko spremljate, kaj se dogaja v ruskem medijskem prostoru? Ali imate še vedno dostop?

Gost: Da, obstaja velika količina tako imenovanih vojnih blogerjev. Ne mislim, da je kdo od njih zares svoboden ali neodvisen. Vsak od njih, recimo, igra igro na strani FSB ali kakšne druge strukture ali enote. V zadnjem času to spremljam bolj zase, da bi razumel, kaj se tam dogaja. V zadnjih nekaj mesecih opažam, da so začeli govoriti o velikih izgubah, ki jih ima Rusija. Mislim, da so te izgube tako velike, da jih ne morejo več skrivati in o njih ne govoriti. Ker ljudje tem blogerjem ne bi verjeli. Kako lahko rečeš, da je vse v redu, če imam na primer deset prijateljev, ki so bili ubiti v Ukrajini? Druga stvar, o kateri so začeli govoriti, so zelo veliki problemi v gospodarstvu. Včasih je to tako: »Imamo zelo velike probleme, zelo velike probleme – ta tovarna je zaprta, premogovniška industrija je zaprta, vse je slabo.« To so stvari, ki so dovolj velike, da jih ne moreš več zanikati. In to daje nekaj upanja. Morda se bo gospod Putin odločil: v redu, dovolj je. Ali pa bo šel do konca, do razpada Rusije ali česa podobnega.

Voditelj: To ni samo vojna na bojišču v Ukrajini in informacijska vojna, gre tudi za vojno izčrpavanja – kdo bo to zdržal. Ali veste, kakšen je položaj prebivalcev na okupiranih ozemljih v Ukrajini, kako so obravnavani in kakšna propaganda oziroma dezinformacijski procesi tam potekajo?

Gost: Za Ukrajince na okupiranih ozemljih je zelo zapleteno komunicirati z Ukrajinci na neokupiranem ozemlju. Bojijo se, ker jim lahko pregledajo telefone in podobno. Že majhna komunikacija s sorodniki je lahko razlog za zapor. Ena od stvari, ki jo želim omeniti na podlagi pogovorov z nekdanjimi vojnimi ujetniki, je, da je v ruskih zaporih veliko civilistov. Ne zato, ker bi zagrešili kakšno kaznivo dejanje, ampak zato, ker so bili ob napačnem času na napačnem mestu. Tam ostajajo in ne vedo, kdaj bodo izpuščeni – preprosto ne vedo. Pogosto so rusko govoreči in bili so celo primeri ljudi, ki so imeli radi Rusijo, jo občudovali in podpirali Putina, pa so kljub temu v zaporu, ker so bili ob napačnem času na napačnem mestu. Kar zadeva dezinformacije na teh ozemljih – gre za iste dezinformacije, ki se širijo po Rusiji. Najhujše pa je po mojem mnenju to, da poskušajo vplivati na otroke. V šolah organizirajo srečanja z veterani ali vojaki ruske vojske in otrokom razlagajo, da je Ukrajina zelo slaba, Zahod zelo slab in Rusija zelo dobra. Vzgajajo družbo, ki bo tolerirala vojno, sovražila Ukrajino in Zahod. To je po mojem mnenju najhujše.

Voditelj: Koliko sredstev Rusija namenja informacijski oziroma informacijski vojni? In na drugi strani – koliko za to nameni Ukrajina?

Gost: Mislim, da imata obe strani verjetno tajne proračune za to. Tega ne vem.

Voditelj: To si lahko predstavljam, ja.

Gost: Iz javnih virov sem našel, da Rusija za to nameni približno dve milijardi dolarjev. To je tisto, kar lahko nekako prešteješ, a nevidni del – tega ne poznamo. Če govorimo o Ukrajini, mislim, da je glavno orodje televizijski maraton. Ko vklopiš televizijo, različni kanali predvajajo isti program. To deluje že več kot tri leta. Ne bi rad govoril o učinkovitosti, a proračun – prav tako po javnih virih – znaša približno 20 milijonov dolarjev na leto. To je neprimerljivo. Obstaja pa nekaj, česar ni mogoče izmeriti – to je ukrajinska civilna družba, nevladne organizacije, prostovoljci in posamezniki, kot smo mi. Iščemo sredstva pri mednarodnih ali ukrajinskih skladih samo zato, da širimo resnico o razmerah. Tega Rusija ne more početi, ker ne morejo odkrito priti v Evropo in govoriti o tem. Lahko poskušajo, ampak … Obstajajo tudi nekateri blogerji in politiki, ki širijo takšna stališča, a na srečo ljudje na to gledajo bolj sumničavo kot takrat, ko slišijo zgodbo navadnega Ukrajinca.

Voditelj: Pred letom dni sem bil na predavanju o preverjanju dejstev v Ukrajini. Opisali so strategijo čebeljega panja: vsaka čebela je majhna in krhka nevladna organizacija, a ko odkrijejo resno problematične informacije, združijo moči. Ali tudi vi delujete po tem modelu?

Gost: Ne mislim, da je to centralno usklajeno, ker ima vsaka organizacija svoje področje. Včasih so faze podobne, a malo drugačne. Tudi mi. Ne morem reči, da smo klasična organizacija za preverjanje dejstev. Odločil sem se, da moramo najti svojo pot – podobno, a drugačno. Zato spremljamo medije, se pogovarjamo z vojnimi ujetniki in to povezujemo, kar nas dela posebne. Druge organizacije imajo svoje projekte: nekatere spremljajo ukrajinske medije, druge ruske, tretje evropske. Skoraj vsi razkrivajo lažne novice. Če združimo vse to, imamo raznolikost organizacij in prostovoljcev, ki se premikajo proti istemu cilju. A kot sem rekel – dezinformacij ni mogoče v celoti premagati. Edini način, da jih zmanjšaš, je odstranitev virov. Viri pa niso samo spletne strani ali televizijski kanali, temveč tisti, ki to financirajo. Mislim, da bi bil naš medijski prostor veliko čistejši, če bi Rusija izginila iz njega.

Voditelj: Ali imate vpogled v to, kako je Rusija organizirana na področju medijev oziroma informacijske vojne? Je to centralizirano? Vodi to vlada ali FSB? Imate takšno razumevanje?

Gost: Bil sem na eni konferenci, kjer je potekala panelna razprava tudi o tej temi. Gre za zelo veliko kombinacijo različnih elementov. Mislim, da je pred enim ali dvema letoma prišla v javnost informacija – ne želim širiti dezinformacij, zato se imena organizacije, ki je to objavila, ne spomnim – da v Rusiji obstaja neka agencija. Glavna organizacija, ki proizvaja dezinformacije, propagando in podobno. Imena se ne spomnim.

Voditelj: Bila je nameščena v Petrogradu, kajne?

Gost: Ne vem. Nisem prepričan. Torej, obstaja ta agencija – na internetu lahko najdete ime, nekaj v zvezi s kognitivnimi zadevami ali podobno. Začeli so iskati poslovneže, IT-strokovnjake in druge ljudi, civiliste, ki delajo na različnih področjih, in jih usposabljati. Mislim, da je ideja ta, da imajo civiliste, ki nimajo nobene neposredne povezave z vlado ali vojsko, ampak jim razložijo, kaj govoriti, oziroma z njimi komunicirajo, da širijo informacije, ki jih želijo širiti. Mislim, da je bilo to v Sloveniji, ko je bila družina, ki je živela v Argentini, nato pa se je vrnila sem.

Voditelj: Ja, to so bili ruski vohuni.

Gost: Da. Ruski vohuni, ki so bili približno 20 let v Argentini.

Voditelj: Da, zelo dolgo obdobje.

Gost: Njihov otrok sploh ni vedel, da so njegovi starši Rusi. Na isti konferenci, ki sem se je udeležil, so povedali, da Rusija dejansko uporablja vohune, včasih pa jih sploh ne moreš imenovati vohuni. V našem razumevanju je vohun nekdo, ki poskuša pridobiti tajne informacije in jih poslati v Moskvo. A to ni edino, kar počnejo. Včasih jih uporabljajo zgolj za širjenje informacij. Predstavljajte si, da imate restavracijo in veliko prijateljev, ki prihajajo k vam. Ni vam treba obesiti napisa »Rad imam Rusijo«, ampak se lahko z njimi pogovarjate in rečete: ja, morali bi uničiti Ukrajino, ker to sploh ni prava država, Rusija bi morala prevladati in postati spet velika, potem bo vse v redu. Če to govoriš kot prijatelj, je dojemanje povsem drugačno, kot če to vidiš v novicah.

Voditelj: To je morda bolj učinkovito.

Gost: Seveda je. Ker če nekoga poznaš, mu običajno zaupaš. Ta oseba ti ne bo rekla neposredno: Putin je dober, ampak malo tega, malo onega, v tem svetu ni resnice … in ljudje to kupijo.

Voditelj: Zanimivo. Mykhailo, naš čas se izteka. Hvala za vaše predavanje, za zanimiv vpogled v realnost Ukrajine in informacijsko vojno. Hvala tudi vam, drage poslušalke in poslušalci. Tokrat je bil z vami Zoran Potič. Lep pozdrav.

Gost: Hvala. Najlepša hvala za povabilo. In prosim, bodite skeptični do vsega.

[ENGLISH VERSION]

Host: Warm greetings, and welcome to a new GOVSI podcast, where we continue with a topic, we have addressed here several times before—disinformation. Let me remind you that some time ago the Government Communication Office (UKOM) launched the "Read, Think, Check" campaign, aimed at raising public awareness that information can be a highly perishable commodity if we do not take it seriously.

Some time ago, we discussed this topic with Siim Kumpas from the European External Action Service. We then hosted the distinguished California-based professor Nicholas Cull. At the DezinfoLab congress, we had an interesting conversation with Mario Giovanni Sesso, and this time we have managed to welcome a Ukrainian guest to the studio, Mykhailo Dankanych.

Host: Mykhailo, thank you for joining us. He is an expert in countering disinformation from Russia, and before we begin with that topic, Mykhailo, please introduce yourself and tell us about your background?

Mykhailo Dankanych: Hi, nice to see you and thank you for inviting me here. So, before full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, I used to work in two areas. The first area was media. I worked for seven years or something in TV station of Zakarpattia Regional TV Company. Then it was a public TV, and I also worked as a project manager for different international projects. But in 2022, like many Ukrainians, I went to war and spent almost two years there.

Host: You were on the front.

Guest: Yes, I'm a veteran. It's always hard for me even to say this because I cannot apply it to myself because, like veteran is someone old from you know Second World War and so on. But yes, I can call myself also veteran. So, I have in 31st of December 2022 I was like witnessing exchange of the prisoners of Russian and Ukrainian ones. By that time, it was only first year of the war, so I was thinking, OK, I have to make a lot of pictures because when I talked to my colleagues that I worked with in international projects, when I will tell them what I have witnessed and what I have seen, they will not believe me. So, I need to make pictures to show them. Because many Ukrainian soldiers that were coming back, they were very thin. So, I understood that they were having hunger in there and so on. So, and I also talked to several of them and one of them has now written a book, and like...That's another story. But at that point I understood that I want to do something to talk about their stories. And in a year only I have seen the first interview, and I decided to make a project as I could do before full-scale invasion. But I just made it. connecting this information and prisoners of the war (POW) because there is a chain that connects these two topics. And the chain is: over 20 years ago, when Putin became President, one of the first things that he did, he grabbed all the media and they started to pump their society with this information, with narratives against West, about Russian empire, and so on, so on so… And in my perspective, he's like almost lost a live victim of this process because he has been inside Russia and he felt everything physically, not just informational way.

Host: That's how you developed the project ‘To break the fake’ as much as you understand. Can you describe that? A little bit more about that project?

Guest: Yeah. So, it all started from this idea. And then in a year when I resigned, and I started to think how to give my conduct to our victory or just to resist Russia. So, I had this background, I work in media, and I worked with project management management. I decided OK, let's make a project. So, first it was like small meeting in Lviv. There was a group of French volunteers. They just came to see Ukraine to see cities and war and everything. And I organised a meeting with the POW, the one that I met on that border, when there was exchange, and it was so interesting for them. It was also interesting for me. So, I see that, yeah, it's something interesting. So, I decided to make another meeting. Then we applied for a grant for International Renaissance Foundation. We found partners and now our main partner is Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine because they help us to reach embassies, and they organize events with this information topic and POW. We also communicate with factchecking agencies in Ukraine like WaxCheckCentre for countering disinformation and some other organisations.

Host: Yes. Please explain to me where the connection between prisoners and disinformation? Where is the connection? Where's the problem? How to explain that? Make us understand that?

Guest: Yeah, well, in my opinion one of the best or maybe even the best way to counter disinformation is to talk with someone who is witness of the occasion. So, for example, if there is a car accident, you can read about it in use and that would be something the journalist has written. Maybe, he was there, maybe he wasn't there. But if you talk to a driver or a police officer that were there and they have seen everything, what happened, that will give you like the probably the fullest picture. And you can ask any questions, like what was the speed, what was, I don't know, the reaction of the driver and so on. So, you can ask, and you can fulfil your curiosity and have the correct information. So, I think that the same is with this. People that were in captivity, they have seen how the guards are behaving, what they are talking about, how they treat Ukrainians, how they treat Russian prisoners. So, there is a very big difference and there's a very actually big amount of information that we can collect from there. For example, I have made a questionnaire for about 30 war prisoners, and I asked them several questions on matter of this information according to what was happening in prisons. Almost all of them said that the only source of information they actually believed, and they thought that that's the only thing they had was the newcomers.

Host: The new prisoners?

The Guest: Yeah. Because everything else … Like there was a radio, sometimes they turned on TV, sometimes they had talks, sometimes there were some meetings that were organised by the administration. But they did not believe anything of that because mainly there was the same narratives that Russia spreads to Ukraine over years. Like - Ukraine doesn't exist, we have already conquered your country, and you have no home to go back, you will stay here till your death in this prison and so on, so on. So, it's actually a little bit, maybe even strange, because all these people, Ukrainian soldiers, they haven't attended any let's say trainings or anything like how to counter disinformation or understand what disinformation is. But they have faced … They know the truth and they have faced the narratives Russia trying to put in their minds and they resisted on this. So, I find it kind of interesting and I'm trying to use them to tell their story and to explain how Russia works inside.

Host: How does it work?

Guest: I have a very interesting case. So, we had an event in Montenegro, and we took a taxi from airport to someplace we were staying. So the taxi driver, he asked us where are you from and we were saying we are Ukrainians. and he is asking, so why Ukraine is fighting with Russia? Because, you know, it's two orthodoxy and traditional countries, so, why are you fighting? You should not fight. We should all orthodox be together and live in … We have the same values and stuff like that. And I was trying to explain him and then I also put this question into a questionnaire to other POWs. So, what was treatment on the biggest holidays like Orthodox or holidays - Christmas, Easter. So, what was happening in prisons? So, mainly the main answer is that nothing happened and they … in some prisons they were trying not to give information what day is today. So, some prisoners they were trying to hide some cup where they marked days, because they wanted to know when it's Christmas and when it's Easter and when this day came, they were, you know, just saying to each other - Happy Christmas. Christmas or Happy Easter. And if Russian guard would know this - and sometimes they got caught with this cup - so they would be beaten even more. So,

Host: That means that the guards weren't religious or that there is the tactics.

Guest: I would say the highest thing that happened like when they tried to say, OK, it's Easter. So, there was a priest, and he would give them one egg for 10 people inside the cell. And they say that they would share this act for everyone and then they would be beaten even more. That's not how you thread the same orthodox as you are. If you are just a little bit religious.

Host: Well, that was a Montenegro perspective, you know, from far away. There was a specific story of events in Russia and Ukraine. It's a little different perspective. But we have we have, you know There is a battlefield in Ukraine, there is there are big fights, Ukraine is fighting for survival and their state. On the other side, you also have battlefield in digital arena. Can you describe us this digital battlefield?

Guest: Well, first of all, this whole topic is very, very wide. Like you know, you can talk about a lot of things in here. The informational war is only a part of cognitive war. And cognitive war is even wider. But if we come back to the difference within the battlefield in Ukraine and the battlefield in informational area: the main difference is that there is no frontline. You can reach anyone in any part of the planet by sitting whatever you want to make some actions and to try to reach your goals. That's what I'm trying to explain, when we have these meetings and I'm talking with the medias, politics, and everyone who comes to our events. I’m just trying to explain that, OK, so you see the front line in Ukraine that you somehow, I think that Europeans don't mention that there is a frontline in the European Union. Because Russia is attacking informationally and it's trying to support chaos wherever it is. It's something that you cannot just block, and it will not go further. And there is actually a difference on how European countries see this problem, because when we were in Latvia, Latvians are banning everything they can, which spreads Russian narratives or Russian ideas and so on. And in my opinion, it's because they are close, they have their border, and they know what will happen if they do nothing with this. For example, in Spain or even in France, it's a little bit different because, you know, Russia is far away. Yeah. So, it cannot reach us. Yes, it can reach you. But it reaches you by the information warfare.

Host: And how about the Western Balkans? Do you have any experience, introspective in that? Because there are, you know, there is Serbia, Montenegro as you mentioned. There are different states, which historically they mentally historically they are connected with this big Slavic idea and the Russians, Big Brother and so on. And so on, yeah …

Guest: So, that's the part where I have to mention the other direction that our organisation is doing we are monitoring mediasphere of European countries and by now it's 12 countries that we monitored. The newest that we did are actually Slovenia and Austria. And for example, in Slovenia we found, I think there were 3 sources that, let's say they fit our five stages algorithm as the source of Russian disinformation.

Host: So, please explain this to us and how. How did you find it?

Guest: Well, we have a small group of volunteers among them IT and media person. And what they do - because I'm not a technician, I'm more like a spokesman. But what they do is they use web tools to search the key phrases in the media sphere and the key phrases is something that we know very well, because Russia is using them for decades. For example, if you have this phrase ‘Kiev regime’. So, it's like the first mark - ok, something suspicious here. Because …

Host: Who uses that phrase?

Guest: Yes, it's only one country that would use that. So, Or ‘Ukrainian nationalists’, ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ or ‘corruption by Zelensky’ or ‘decline of West’, ‘NATO expenditure’ and so on. There's many of them and you can use like 20 for example and then you see the number of web pages that share it and then you make analyse and then you just - ok, so we have these five grades and we just see, OK, this web page. OK. One check. Yes, the second - yes. So, in By this we have found over 100 web pages that are working in the territory of European Union countries, in these 12 countries specifically, that are like top, top toxic on our opinion.

Host: And in Slovenia, you have found three websites? Which one can you expose?

Guest: Three. I remember the name of the first one, like the biggest one. That's Insider.com, I think. And there is, like, very good examples, not just the phrases, but even the pictures that show how prorussian this web page is. And the interesting thing for me is that, for example, disinformation that we found it, we tried it, we gave it to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we said - ok, so here is information, please send it to your colleagues to the European Union, maybe they will do something with this. And then, at the beginning of this year, our Security Service, they contacted us because they have seen our events. And we proposed them also- ok, we can give you this information, do something with this. So, we gave this analysis to them and what they did, they told us that they sent it to some services in European countries, but they also blocked these sources on the territory of Ukraine. So, and for me it's a little bit funny because, you know, some pages are blocked in Ukraine, but they are actually pages that work in European Union and they influence European Union citizens. So, why you are not blocking that? That is a question. And I usually used to say…

Host: We are not in the war with Russia …

Guest: You're not in a hot war with Russia, but you are in the informational war with Russia - whether you like it or not, believe it or not believe it. Well, it is a fact like you know you can count this. If there is 100 of web pages that shares Russian narratives, and that's not just, you know, narratives that says ok, Ukraine is bad and Russia is good. That's also narratives that West is bad, NATO is bad and you are all bad. So, in prisons One, several narratives that being heard, and I think that very strong narratives like: Europe is a gayrope. Ukrainian, you wanted, why did you fight for your gayrope? Why did you? Why didn't you fight it with us with Russians against NATO. That's what they hear. So…

Host: Who is more successful in fighting narratives and counterfighting narratives and disinformation - Ukraine or Russia? Because I remember, it's famous, there is a famous picture of Mr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, at the beginning of the war taking pictures video with his staff, saying - we are here, we are not running. Because there was a narrative, the leadership of Ukraine is running, he's escaping and Ukraine's, you're left alone. But it turned around. Zelensky said - we are here, we are standing and fighting against Russia. Who is Who is winning that informational war from your perspective? Are you successful with all these strategies countering Russian narratives?

Guest: Well, first of all, I think that it is impossible nowadays with all the digital data and the AI to counter disinformation. Not just Russian, but any disinformation. It will be produced, I think that more and more in the future.

Host: This is interesting question, how to counter? How to win that war?

Guest: Yes, so impossible, but you have to resist. It's impossible to win. But it's a process that will go on with everyone of us. There is like long perspective and I think that that's we need to teach our children on how to be more sceptic and how to check information. And I think that something should be in schools. If we talk about short terms then … Yeah, I think that it’s a good idea to block the toxic sources because it will take more time and resources for Russians to grow new ones and so on. So, it's a process. And if we talk about who is winning Russia or Ukraine, well Russia strategy now - they're closing their mediasphere. I think that they are trying to reach the level of North Korea, something like that. Because the latest news I've seen on public that they are closing and shutting down, even Telegram, which is theirs and also What's up?

Host: OK.

Guest: So, they want everyone to use their … I think it's called Max. It's a messenger, government messenger. So, they want everyone in Russia use that messenger and they don't want anyone to use something else, because they want to control everything, like in China.

Host: That's similar like in during the Cold War. You know, there was a big wall, iron curtain and there was a complete difference.

Guest: Yes, but you know, there was no internet in that period and now there is. I'm pretty sure that a lot of Russians, they do understand everything, what is going on. They have, they are using VPNs to see the news and so on. They do understand what is happening. Just they are afraid to do something to deal with this big, big company of FSBay or Mono or whatever, like special forces in Russia. But they are trying to tighten it up and to close it as much as possible. In Ukraine, we don't do that because we have open society and if you would do something like that, we would have another revolution, probably. Everyone is like - we are fighting for our freedom and that's, you know, started in 2004, then 2014. Ukrainians are very freedom lovers and I cannot imagine that something like that would happen in our country. But, yeah, if there is a big source of Russian spreading disinformation or propaganda, yeah, it's blockedand everyone is OK with that.

Host: But can you follow what's going on in mediasphere in Russia. Do you have still access?

Guest: Well, yes, there is a big amount of the so-called the inquiry. It's like war bloggers and I don't think that any of them is like a free person or a freelancer. Everyone is, let's say, playing a game on the side of the FSB or some other structure or squad. So and lately like I'm doing that more for myself just to understand what is happening there. What I'm witnessing for the last several months is that they started to talk about the heavy losses that Russia has. So, I think that it's the amount is so big that they cannot not hide it and not to talk about it. Because no one will believe these bloggers, because how can you say that everything is well if I have like 10 friends that were killed in Ukraine. For example. So, and the second thing that they started to talk about very big problems in economy. So, sometimes it's like: oh, we have very big problems, very big problems, this factory is shut down, coal industry is shut down, like everything is bad, bad, bad. That's another thing that is big enough. So, they cannot say that nothing is happening. And this inspires a little bit. So maybe, maybe Mr Putin will decide- ok, that's enough or maybe he will take it to the end of the Russia collapse or whatever.

Host: It's not just a war on the battleground in Ukraine and informational war, it's attritional war - who will survive this heavy fight. Do you know how is the population of occupied territories in Ukraine, how are they treated and what kind of propaganda or disinformation process propaganda is going on in there? Are there any information about that?

Guest: Well, it's complicated for Ukrainians on occupied territory to communicate with the Ukrainians in the country that is not occupied. Because they are afraid, because their phones can be checked and so on. Even because of the small communication with the relatives can be a possibility to go to jail and kind of that. Actually, one of the things that I want to mention the POWs that I talked to, they say that there are many civilians in Russian prisons and they are not because they made some crime, they were just probably in wrong place, wrong time. They're staying in there and they don't know when they go out - because they just don't know. Usually they’re Russian speaking and even there were cases when they loved Russia and they admired Russia and they liked what Putin does, but they are still in prison, because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. And if we talk about disinformation that is spread in that territory, well, it's like common disinformation, which is spread around the Russia and the worst thing in my opinion, is that they are trying to influence children. They arrange meetings with the veterans or soldiers of Russian army in the schools for children, and they're trying to explain that Ukraine is very bad, the West is very bad and Russia is very good. So they are growing society that would tolerate war and that would not like Ukraine and that would not like West and stuff like that. I think that's the worst.

Host: One thing, how much funding does Russia invest to allocate to this information or information warfare. And on the other hand – Ukraine, how much does it allocate?

Guest: Well, I think that both sides probably have a secret budget for it. I don't know.

Host: I Can imagine, yes.

Guest: What I found in public sources about Russia is that that would be about $2 billion. And that's what you can, you know, count somehow, but that invisible part - We don't know how much is in there. If we talk about Ukraine, I think that the main tool is the TV marathon we have. It's like when you're turning on TV, it's different channels are showing the same programmes and so on. It's it works for three years, over three years. I would like not to talk about the efficiency of this, but the budget - also from the open sources - is about $20 million per year. So, it's like uncomparable thing, but there is something that you cannot count. And that's Ukrainian civil society and the NGOs, the volunteers and the people that just, you know, like me, like our organisation. We just found look for fundings in some international funds or Ukrainian funds just to share truth about the situation and so on. And that's what Russia cannot do because they cannot go to Europe and open widely talk about this, They can try, but… And there are also some bloggers and some politicians that would share their opinion. But luckily it's, you know, everyone is looking on this a little bit more suspicious… Than you meet some regular Ukrainian that would tell you.

Host: Yeah. So, I don't know. A year ago I attended a lecture of on fact checking activities in Ukraine. They described the strategy of beehive model: each bee is fragile, small NGO factchecking, but when they find some really troubling stuff, information, they join forces. Is that the model you work on in Ukraine?

Guest: I don't think that is something that is being coordinated, because each organisation has its own floor. It's similar, it's some sometimes It's like the same stage, but a little bit different. Even us. I cannot say that we are fact checking agency as usual factcheckers. No, because I decided that we need to find our own path, which is similar, but a little bit different. So, that's why we monitor, we talk with the POWs and making this combination and that makes us exclusive. So, the other ones also, they have their own projects which are also countering Russian disinformation. Some are monitoring also some Ukrainian medias, some are monitoring Russian medias, some monitoring European medias. Almost everyone is doing debunking. So, when there is a fake news, everyone is writing - yeah, that's a fake news because that, that, that … Generally, if you combine all this, we have diversification of the organisations and volunteers that would move towards one purpose. But as I said, you cannot, you cannot win all the disinformation in the world whatever you do. Because, you know, there is like - who made disinformation that causes no troubles, but there is. The only possibility to lower down is to eliminate the sources. And the sources, not just, you know, web pages or TV channels, but the source is the one who finances this. I think that if one day Russia would vanish our media space would be way cleaner as it is now way more.

Host: On the other side, do you have an understanding how Russia is organised in the field of media or information warfare. Is it centralised? Is it government led or FSB? Do you have that understanding?

Guest: Well, I was at one a conference when there was a panel discussion on also on this issue. It's a very big combination of different stuff. I think year or two years ago, there was information … I don't want to spread disinformation, so I don't remember the name of the organisation that published that. But the message was that there is agency of … So let's call it like the agency in Russia. The main organisation that produces disinformation, propaganda and so on. I don't remember the name of that.

Host: It was stationed in Petrograd, no?

Guest: No, not sure. Not sure. So, so there is this, you can find it on the Internet like the there is a name of that agency of some cognitive or something stuff. So, and they started to look for businessmen and IT workers and other people like civilians that work in different areas and train them. something. So, I think that their idea is to have civilians that would have nothing to … No connections to government or to military or to anything in Russia, but to explain them what to say or have communication with them and just to share information that they want to be shared. I think that it was in Slovenia when there was a family that lived in Argentina and then came back here.

Host: Yeah, they were Russian spies.

Guest: Yeah. So, Russian spies that were like 20 years in Argentina or something like that.

Host: Yeah. Yeah. Long period of time.

Guest: So, they their child even didn't know that his parents are Russian. So, the same conference that I was attending, they said that Russia actually using spies and sometimes you cannot even call them spies. Because in our understanding, a spy is someone who is trying to grab some secret information and to bring it to Moscow. But that's not just what they do. Sometimes they use them for and even there are probably Am people that are used only to spread information. Because you know, for example, you are you are having a restaurant. Yeah? And you have a lot of friends that are coming to your restaurant and you don't need to put a sign ‘I love Russia’ on your restaurant, but you can talk to them and say – yeah, you know, yeah, we have to, you know, destroy this Ukraine, because there's nothing, it’s like it's not a real country and Russia should prevail and become greater and then everything will be alright. And if we're talking like a friend, it's other perception then you see it in the news and so on.

Host: It's maybe more effective.

Guest: Of course it is. Of course it is, because you know, if you know someone you trust this person, usually, and he would not say to you that, yeah, Putin is good and something like, you know, strict things or hard things about this. It would be like, yeah, a little bit of this, little nit of that, there is no truth in this world … And yeah, people are buying this is.

Host: Interesting. Mykhailoa, our time is up. Thank you for your for your lecture, for your interesting introspective in Ukraine reality and information warfare. Thank you as well, dear listeners. This time, Zoran Potič was with you. Kind regards.

Guest: Thank you. Thank you so much for inviting me. And please be skeptical for everything.

Host: Great.