GOVSI podkast: Brez zanesljivih informacij ni demokracije

V novi epizodi GOVSI podkasta je naš gost ameriški strokovnjak za medijsko zakonodajo Michael M. Epstein, ki opozarja na vpliv dezinformacij na demokracijo, zlasti pred volitvami.

Profesor Epstein poudarja, da so zanesljive informacije temelj demokracije, in izpostavlja razliko med dezinformacijami (z namenom zavajanja) in napačnimi informacijami. V času družbenih omrežij in umetne inteligence je po njegovih besedah vse težje preveriti verodostojnost informacij.

Kot rešitev predlaga koncept informacijske suverenosti – pomembno ni le, kaj je vsebina informacije, ampak predvsem od kod prihaja, kdo je vir informacije. Državljanom svetuje, naj postanejo kritični, odgovorni uporabniki informacij in naj vedno preverijo vir, še posebej pred volitvami.

Epizoda ponuja ključne vpoglede v enega največjih izzivov sodobne družbe – kako zaščititi demokracijo v času motenj informacijskega kaosa.

Vabljeni k poslušanju pogovora na vseh priljubljenih platformah za podkaste ter na YouTube kanalu Vlade Republike Slovenije.

[ENGLISH VERSION]

GOVSI Podcast: No Democracy Without Reliable Information

In the latest episode of the GOVSI podcast, the guest is Michael M. Epstein, a U.S. expert in media law, who highlights the impact of disinformation on democracy, especially in the run-up to elections.

He emphasizes that reliable information is the foundation of democracy and points out the difference between disinformation (intentional deception) and misinformation. In the age of social media and artificial intelligence, he notes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to verify the credibility of information.

As a solution, he proposes the concept of information sovereignty – what matters is not only the content of information, but also its origin. He advises citizens to become critical and responsible consumers of information and to always verify sources, particularly before elections.

The episode offers key insights into one of the biggest challenges of modern society – how to protect democracy in an era of information chaos.

You are invited to listen to the conversation on all major podcast platforms and on the YouTube channel of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia.

Transcript

Ne moreš imeti demokracije, če nimaš zanesljivih informacij. Za dobro demokracijo potrebuješ dobre informacije. Tudi če je voda okusna in zdrava. To ni bistveno. Ne gre za tok vode, ampak cevovod. Pomembno je, od kod prihaja. Enako je s podatki. 

Vladni podkast GOVSI

Voditelj: Spoštovani poslušalci in poslušalke, dobrodošli v novi epizodi podkasta GOVSI, kjer danes gostimo pomembnega, uglednega profesorja iz ZDA Michaela Epsteina. Sem prav izgovoril?

Gost: Ja.

Voditelj: V podkastu GOVSI smo dezinformacijam posvetili veliko časa in pozornosti, med drugim smo zagnali tudi akcijo preberi, premisli, preveri. Sodeč po izkušnjah v nekaterih evropskih državah pred parlamentarnimi volitvami je ta tema še bolj aktualna, zato bomo v tokratnem podkastu skušali osvetliti vpliv dezinformacij na volitve v demokratični družbi in pogledati, kako lahko državljani, institucije in tehnološka podjetja pred volitvami delujejo odgovorno. Pogovor bo potekal v angleščini, zato bom nadaljeval v tem jeziku. Michael, dobrodošli. Vesel sem, da ste z nami. Se lahko za začetek predstavite, predstavite svoje delo na področju medijske zakonodaje in dezinformacij? Izvolite.

Gost: Zoran, hvala za povabilo. Vesel sem, da sem tukaj. Sem profesor na pravni fakulteti v Los Angelesu in urednik zbornika Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law, ki ga izdaja fakulteta v sodelovanju z Ameriškim pravnim združenjem. Sem tudi vodja katedre za zakonodajo zabavne industrije in medijsko zakonodajo. Že desetletja se ukvarjam z medijsko zakonodajo in prvim amandmajem ameriške ustave, ki govori o svobodi govora. Zadnja leta se veliko ukvarjam s projekti boja proti dezinformacijam po svetu. V zadnjih petih letih sem vodil dva Fulbrightova projekta, ki sta se ukvarjala z dezinformacijami, enega v Afriki in drugega letos poleti v Sloveniji.

Voditelj: Kakšne so vaše izkušnje tukaj?

Gost: Rad imam to državo, čudovita je. Že preden sem poleti pristal, sem bil očaran, ko sem gledal gore in gozdove. Sem iz Los Angelesa, kjer sta podnebje in pokrajina čisto drugačna kot v Sloveniji. Navdušen sem bil tudi nad prijaznostjo ljudi. Pošteno sem se nasmejal, ko sem videl, da je v Sloveniji beseda love, ljubezen. Privlačen slogan je, ampak sem tukaj dobil veliko ljubezni, tako da hvala za vprašanje. 

Voditelj: Me veseli, zdaj pa se vrniva k temi. Dezinformacije so postale stalnica našega vsakdana. Kako bi definirali dezinformacije in zakaj so tak izziv, zlasti pred volitvami?

Gost: Vam bom povedal. Dezinformacije so tako velik izziv, ker jih je pogosto težko definirati oziroma doseči kompromis, kaj to sploh je. 

Voditelj: Kaj je laž, dezinformacija, napačna informacija. Veliko izrazov je. 

Gost: Ja. Kaj je laž in kaj je resnica? Imam zelo jasno mnenje o tem, kaj je resnica, ampak tudi vem, da bo nekdo drug temu lahko oporekal in bo mislil, da ni res. Dezinformacije zapletejo pogovor o tem, kaj je res, ker pogosto pomenijo ustvarjanje lažnih dokazov, ki podpirajo neresnice. Težko je govoriti o resnici in točnosti informacij, če nimaš več potrjenih dokazov. Strokovnjaki temu pravimo nered informacij. To se zgodi, ko ne samo, da se ne strinjamo o nečem, ampak imamo tudi dokaze, ki podpirajo naše mnenje, ni pa jasno, ali so ti dokazi pristni. V dobi digitalnega tiska in umetne inteligence je vedno teže potrditi, ali so dokazi pristni.

Voditelj: Pristnost je eno, tu pa je še namen. Da nekaj delaš namenoma. Govoriti moramo o tem, s kakšnim razlogom nekdo nekaj počne.

Gost: Ja. To je razlika med dezinformacijami in bolj zahrbtnimi napačnimi informacijami. Pri dezinformacijah je potreben namen. Namen je zavajati in širiti lažne novice, in to tako, da jim bodo ljudje verjeli. Do napačne informacije pa pride pozneje, ko ljudje informacijo sprejmejo. Tvorci dezinformacije hočejo zavajati, prava težava pa so tisti, ki jih zavedejo in informacijo širijo naprej, misleč, da je resnična, ker se zelo hitro širi.

Voditelj: Ni se narobe motiti. Vsak dan se motimo, ne vemo vsega. Napačne informacije lahko širimo, ker ne vemo, da so napačne.

Gost: Ne gre za to, ali imaš prav ali ne, gre za vpliv. Vprašali ste, zakaj ljudje širijo dezinformacije. Razlogov je veliko. V enem od projektov sem ugotovil, da nekateri širijo dezinformacije, ker v tem uživajo. Uživajo, ko ustvarjajo ponarejene videe ali fotografije ali lažne zgodbe, ki jih pošljejo prijateljem. Čeprav gre za dezinformacijo, namen ni zavajanje, ampak tisti, ki je ustvaril fotografijo ali zgodbo, je to naredil namenoma. Ko uporabniki družbenih omrežij to delijo naprej, se izvirni namen šale ali parodije izgubi in nekateri začnejo verjeti, da je to res, in zgodbo predstavijo kot točno. 

Voditelj: Na konferenci o digitalizaciji ste poudarili informacijsko suverenost. Gre za vsebinsko nevtralen pristop za boj proti tujim kampanjam. Lahko razložite, kaj je to?

Gost: Kaj novega sem prinesel, česar še nismo slišali? Boj proti dezinformacijam je zame zelo pomembna bitka. To je ključno ...

Voditelj: Za koga?

Gost: Za družbo. 

Voditelj: Demokracijo. 

Gost: Ja, vzeli ste mi z jezika. Ne moreš imeti demokracije, če nimaš zanesljivih informacij. Za dobro demokracijo potrebuješ dobre informacije. Težava boja proti dezinformacijam je, da pogosto vključuje cenzuro. Kot borcu za svobodo govora se mi to zdi problematično, hkrati pa je tudi izziv, ker se vlade in drugi deležniki nočejo boriti proti dezinformacijam, da jih ne bi označili za cenzorje. Nočejo, da bi izpadlo, kot da zagovarjajo določen pogled. Rekla sva že, da ni dogovora o tem, kaj je res, zlasti v razdeljenih državah. Predlagam, kako se temu izogniti, in sicer ne smemo gledati vsebine sporočila, ampak to, da prihaja iz tujine. V Evropi se odlično spopadate s tujim manipuliranjem z informacijami in vmešavanjem, znanim kot FIMI. Gotovo ste slišali za to.

Gost: Ja. Pri informacijski suverenosti gre za F. Tuj izvor je veliko pomembnejši od informacije same. Na konferenci sem govoril o tem. Sam to raje imenujem FIM. Tuje vmešavanje in manipulacija.

Voditelj: Kje je razlika? Poslušal sem predstavitev in se spraševal, kje je razlika.

Gost: Razlika je v tem, da ne gledaš vsebine. Tisti, ki iščejo dezinformacije, ne bi smeli odločati, ali je nekaj res. To ni del mojega pristopa. Moj pristop je, da se je treba osredotočiti na lažen izvor ne glede na to, ali je novica resnična ali ne. Pri tujem vmešavanju gre za dezinformacije, ker jih širijo pod lažnimi pretvezami. Ponavadi gre za lažen račun na družbenih omrežjih, ki je del tujega vmešavanja in manipuliranja, ki ga je EU odlično raziskala. Novice prihajajo iz tujine, zato sem ustvaril termin informacijska suverenost, ker ni važno, kakšna so naša politična stališča, vsi hočemo suverenost. Če bi ljudi v Sloveniji vprašal, ali vidijo Slovenijo kot državo, bi rekli ja. Mar jim je za suverenost, zato na to gledam kot na vprašanje informacijske suverenosti. Kot država bi morali nadzirati informacije, ki prihajajo v ta suvereni informacijski prostor iz tujine pod lažnimi pretvezami. Res se moramo vprašati, kdo je vir. Govorimo o tem, kdo je vir, avtor novice.

Voditelj: Dezinformacije širijo profesionalci.

Gost: Imajo nobel imena. Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje je opravila odlično delo. Poznamo arhitekturo teh kampanj. Še vedno pa veliko truda vložimo za označevanje pravilno ali napačno, za ocenjevanje sporočila. To veliko ljudi odvrne, še posebej v razdeljeni državi. To poskušam odpraviti tako, da k temu pristopam z najmanjšim skupnim imenovalcem. Neodvisnost. To je nekaj, o čemer bi se morali vsi strinjati. Bodisi, da je podatek dober ali slab. Za primerjavo uporabljam vodo. Če Slovencem rečejo, da pijejo slovensko vodo iz slovenskega vira, izkazalo pa bi se, da to ni res, da so jo prikrito napeljali v Slovenijo iz sosednje države, bi morali Slovenci to vedeti. To je napačna označba porekla. Piše, da je slovenska, vendar ni. Tudi če je voda okusna in zdrava. To ni bistveno. Ne gre za tok vode, ampak cevovod. Pomembno je, od kod prihaja. Enako je s podatki. Lahko rečete nekaj o slovenskem političnem kandidatu. Popolnoma res je. Lahko govorite o kandidatovi bleščeči vojaški preteklosti. Če pa ste tuja oseba, tu pod pretvezo in z lažnim računom, ter vedno znova posredujete te informacije Slovencem, bi morali to vedeti. Zakaj se reklamira določenega kandidata? Morda obstaja širši kontekst, ki bi lahko bil zanimiv za Slovence.

Voditelj: Kje so novinarji, mediji? Glavni mediji. Imajo tu kakšno vlogo?

Gost: Glavni mediji imajo še vedno vlogo, h kakršni so vedno stremeli. Seveda je ... Tega mi vam ni treba razlagati, ampak obstaja cel spekter pristopov in stališč, ki jih morajo predstaviti glavni mediji. Načeloma je njihova vloga enaka. Rad si mislim, da bi radi obveščali državljane, kolikor lahko. Da je njihova dolžnost poročati pravilno, čeprav jim to ne uspe vedno. Lahko in morali bi imeti vlogo, da vlada prevzame odgovornost. Do vlade bi se morali vesti kot t. i. psi čuvaji. Še vedno je tako, ampak glavni mediji l. 2025 ne nadzirajo toka informacij. Na tej stopnji je tok informacij na spletu.

Voditelj: Imamo vplivneže, TikTok …

Gost: Tako je, družbene medije.

Voditelj: Državljansko novinarstvo. Zdaj so vsi novinarji.

Gost: Ja. Ampak to je vprašanje. Ali so res vsi novinarji? Drugo vprašanje je, kaj je prava vloga medijev. V ZDA niti ne poskušamo opredeliti, kaj je novinar. V nekaterih evropskih državah pa. Toda, ali to storiš ali ne, vsak lahko ustvarja in širi vsebino. V 20. stoletju pa ni bilo tako. Zdaj pa je vsak. Zato moramo razumeti, da ne gre za vprašanje, kako nadzorovati širjenje informacij. Duh je že ušel iz steklenice, če lahko tako rečem. Lahko pa poskusite pogledati vire in metode. Lahko uporabite forenzično analizo, da bi bolje identificirali tiste vplivneže, kot ste jih opisali, ki so akterji blizu države, pogosto zlonamerni, ki poskušajo manipulirati z informacijskim prostorom v državi.

Voditelj: Razmišljam o primerjavi. Opisujete zamisel o neodvisnosti podatkov. To vidim tako, kot da grem v trgovino kupit denimo meso. Na označbi preverim. Meso je bilo pridelano v Sloveniji, kupil ga bom. Nočem mesa iz recimo Rusije. Ni mi všeč. Je primerjava taka?

Gost: To je dobra primerjava. Uporabil sem vodo, lahko pa bi vse možne potrošniške primere napačnih označb. To je lahko meso, vino ali katerikoli informativen signal za prebivalstvo. Od kod nekaj izhaja. Naj bo jasno. Lahko vam je rusko meso všeč ali pa se odločite, da ta podatek v resnici ni od slovenskega aktivista, ampak se za tem skriva trol z vzhoda Evrope. V redu. Ljudem ne govorim, kaj naj si mislijo. Ljudem bi rad dal boljše orodje, da bi lahko bolje ocenili, ali je ta podatek del manipulacije. Ali je to res slovenski aktivist, ki poskuša zbrati točke v ekosistemu slovenskega podatkovnega prostora.

Voditelj: Ali imate recept, kako izboljšati ozaveščenost odjemalcev informacij? Kakšna orodja lahko uporabijo? Še posebej pred volitvami.

Gost: Najboljši nasvet, ki ga lahko dam pred volitvami, bi bil, naj bodo poučeni potrošniki. Od kod ste dobili podatke? Kdo to pravi? Ali lahko preverite ta račun? Ste ga videli? Mu zaupate? Ali je podatek z družbenih medijev, za katere prvič slišite? Je videti, kot da je iz enega kraja, v bistvu pa je iz drugega? Naredite lahko taka osnovna preverjanja, če lahko tako rečem. To je del medijske informacijske pismenosti, ki jo lahko takoj uporabimo v uvodu pred volitvami l. 2026. Na splošno pa bi rekel, da je velika priložnost za večjo medijsko informacijsko pismenost v reformi nacionalnega učnega načrta, ki sem ga pregledal v Sloveniji. Zdi se mi vredno vključiti ta pristop informacijske neodvisnosti v učni načrt, ki je narejen tako, da bi bili mladi Slovenci boljši in bolj obveščeni državljani.

Voditelj: Se lahko pogovoriva še o medijskih platformah, ki močno vplivajo na to, kako se informacije širijo. Kako ocenjujete odgovornost velikih tehnoloških podjetij? Mogoče na področju širjenja dezinformacij?

Gost: Odvisno kje, seveda, kje delujejo te ogromne platforme. V ZDA nimamo nobenih varoval, da bi družbenim medijem naložili določeno odgovornost. Nekateri to hočejo, tako na levi kot na desni, kar je zanimivo v ZDA, ampak trenutno to ni vzpostavljeno. V Evropi pa imate Zakon o digitalnih storitvah ...

Voditelj: … imamo pa podjetij s področja družbenih medijev.

Gost: Nobenih podjetij? 

Voditelj: Ni podjetij za družbene medije, ki bi bila evropska. 

Gost: Seveda, to je ...

Voditelj: Samo iz ZDA so.

Gost: No, to je ...

Voditelj: To je politično vprašanje. 

Gost: Mislim, da so samo, kar so. Morda presegajo ... Neodvisnost določenega naroda, ker delujejo v središču razprav. Vsekakor pa je nameščenih vsaj nekaj varoval. Vprašanje pa je, kako učinkovita bi bila v Evropi pri teh velikih podjetjih družbenih medijev. Že samo količina podatkov, ki jih je treba obdelati v zvezi z zahtevki za odstranitve itd., je ogromna. Bomo videli, kako bodo ta vplivna podjetja družbenih medijev sodelovala, glede na trenutne regulatvine okvire in ali se bodo ti okviri razvili tako, da bi imeli kaj vpliva.

Voditelj: Videli smo te ... Lastniki teh velikih podjetij so bili ... Zabavajo se s predsednikom ZDA, hodijo na večerje, sodelujejo in sklepajo pomembne posle. Precej nenavadno. Ali ni?

Gost: Ja ... Ne vem, ali je res nenavadno. Mogoče je svet tak. To so vplivna podjetja z vplivnimi interesi. In ... Vidim, da je v bistvu pomembno sodelovati z vlado. Sploh z vlado, ki rada razkazuje moč. To ni le trenutni predsednik, v ZDA je bilo enako tudi s prejšnjim. V resnici pa je tako, da se ni lahko vrniti nazaj. Ni lahko cenzurirati nečesa, kar je kot cunami. Cunami državljanov, ki svoje mnenje izražajo na internetu. Gre za ljudsko gibanje, a v njem sodelujejo tudi zunanji agitatorji, ki v resnici niso del prebivalstva. Niso del državljanov. Manipulirajo s tem prostorom in mislim, da lahko v zvezi s tem nekaj naredimo. Ne trdim, da imam vse odgovore o prihodnosti novinarstva.

Voditelj: Vem.

Gost: In kako najbolje obravnavati govor na družbenih medijih, kateri pristop bo najbolje deloval. A rad mislim, da imam majhno vlogo s svojim pristopom suverenosti informacij v zvezi s tujimi posegi, tujimi manipulacijami.

Voditelj: Na tej točki imam pripombo, vprašanje. Verjetno veste, Reuters je poročal o 16 milijardah dolarjev dobička, ki jih je Meta ustvarila z manipulacijami. Veste za to? Bi bilo to treba regulirati ali ne?

Gost: To je odlično vprašanje. Veliko takih vprašanj je. Bi morali biti algoritmi regulirani? Algoritmi seveda zgodovinsko prispevajo k polarizaciji političnega diskurza do skrajnosti. To seveda vpliva na demokracijo. O tem sem že pisal. A ponovno, to so vprašanja, na katera skušamo kot družba odgovoriti, ko za sabo puščamo otroško dobo družbenih medijev. Mislim, da bomo tako gledali na zadnjih 20 let. Pred nami je njihova adolescenca, ki jo bo poganjala umetna inteligenca, kar bo spremenilo pravila igre. Cilj je, kaj lahko storimo, da ne pademo v informacijsko zmedo, ki sem vam jo opisal prej. Zamisel, da izgubimo referenčne točke glede tega, kaj je točno, kaj je utemeljeno. To lahko vpliva celo na primer na to, kaj se lahko sprejme kot dokaz v sodnem procesu. Če umetna inteligenca naredi tako dober ponaredek, kako lahko razlikujete, kaj je pristno in kaj je ponarejeno? Te težave ne bodo izginile. To so vprašanja, s katerimi se bomo morali spopasti kot družba. Ne trdim, da bom s svojim pristopom suverenosti informacij našel odgovor na to. Skušam pa obravnavati zelo specifičen problem v dezinformacijskem prostoru, grožnjo tujih informacij in manipulacij. To lahko po mojem mnenju storimo, ne da bi ljudi odtujili s poskusi ocenjevanja vsebine. Ker s pogledom na tujost ne skušate cenzurirati, temveč le identificirati napačno označbo porekla.

Voditelj: Kaj mislite o ruski ali kitajski dezinformacijski agendi, s katero skušajo vplivati na ...

Gost: To je lepota mojega pristopa. Za to uporabljam latinski izrek res ipsa loquitur. Stvar govori sama zase. Ni mi treba izražati mnenja, ali gre za Rusijo ali Kitajsko ali kakšno državno sponzorirano obveščevalno skupino ali farmo trolov. Naj podatki govorijo sami zase. Po mojem pristopu pogledamo vse, kar pride čez mejo pod lažno pretvezo. Lahko je od zaveznika. Lahko je od nasprotnika. Lahko je neškodljivo. Lahko je zlonamerno. Pogledamo vse. Če se izkaže, da 90 % vsega prihaja iz določene države, prav. Če je ta država Rusija ali Kitajska, to govori samo zase. Ni mi treba izjavljati, da je ena ali druga država problem. Podatki bodo pokazali, da je ta država morda problem.

Voditelj: A podatki so odvisni od konteksta. Ne moremo ...

Gost: Kontekst je, da uporabljamo znane pristope. Poznamo arhitekturo teh kampanj. To seveda ne pomeni, da se ne bodo razvijale naprej. Ampak kontekst je pretok informacij preko meje. To je kontekst. Všeč mi je, da ga opisujete kot kontekst s tekstom. Ne gre za tekst. Ne gre za sporočilo. Gre za kontekst. Gre za čas, kraj ali način dostave vsebine, ne za osnovno sporočilo, in to bi moralo govoriti samo zase. Ponovno, če 90 % prihaja iz določene države, potem bi morali na primer Slovenci to vedeti. Po tem pristopu bi to tudi vedeli.

Voditelj: Evropska unija, če govorimo na primer o ruskih medijih, njihovi mediji so prepovedani. Niso dovoljeni.

Gost: In to je kontroverzno. Vem, da vse države članice EU tega ne vidijo kot dobrega. Prav to je eden od razlogov, zakaj se skušam izogniti ideji cenzure.

Voditelj: Zakaj bi nekomu, ki ima zlonamerne namene, dovolili, da nam škoduje?

Gost: Ničesar ne dovolite. Nihče ne pravi: "Farma trolov, dovolili vam bomo, da pridete in se pretvarjate, da ste aktivist iz Maribora." Nihče ne dovoli takih stvari. To je napačen izraz. To ni sredina 20. stoletja z uveljavljenimi medijskimi podjetji, ko so ljudje lahko imeli pogovor, kot bi se to zgodilo v ZDA. "Lahko tega ne obravnavate na tak način?" "Dajte nam nekaj tednov časa, da poskusimo stvari urediti." Takšna pogajanja med vlado ali drugimi voditelji v družbi in novinarji ali mediji, so v veliki meri izginila. Tega ne dovolimo. S tem se moramo nekako spopasti.

Voditelj: Seveda obstaja razlika. V Evropi radi reguliramo. V ZDA pa poskrbite za take stvari.

Gost: Cenzura je po mojem mnenju problematična. Razumem, da obstajajo skrbi glede propagande, da obstajajo skrbi glede dezinformacij. Zgodovina Evrope je drugačna od zgodovine ZDA. To vemo vsi. A se mi to zdi boljši pristop kot popolna cenzura, ker nam daje kontekst. Vidimo, da v konkretnem primeru ... Omenili ste Rusijo. Da se Rusija v naši državi na skrivaj zavzema za določeno agendo. To nekaj pove. Morda bo kdo rekel, kot sva omenila prej: "Ta voda mi je res všeč. Ne moti me, da prihaja iz Rusije." Dobro. Najboljše, kar lahko ponudim, je, da dam ljudem več in boljša orodja, učinkovitejša orodja, da lahko sprejemajo bolj informirane odločitve.

Voditelj: Z zgodovinskega vidika, v digitalni dobi govorimo o dezinformacijah in tako naprej. A pred 50, 60 leti smo se soočali s propagando. Sovjetsko propagando ali hollywoodsko propagando. Vidite kakšno razliko v tej časovnici ali zgodovinski perspektivi?

Gost: Razlika je v tem, da ni več tako linearno, kot je bilo nekoč. Veliko bolj kaotično je.

Voditelj: Ljudje se težko orientirajo v takšnem kaosu. Soočamo se z informacijskim kaosom.

Gost: Ja, z informacijsko zmedo. Sam rad uporabljam ta izraz. A mislim ... Ni lahko vzpostaviti red. A veliko lahko dosežemo, če vsaj identificiramo vir in operacijo pod lažno zastavo, če hočete. Ker to veliko pove. Da smo si na jasnem, ne pravim, da ... Če hoče fundacija, ki je v lasti ruskega oligarha, v Sloveniji zavzeti stališče do neke zadeve in ga širiti, a pri tem jasno pove, kdo je, je to v redu. Ne pravim, da bi morali to označiti. Do težave pride, ko gre pri kampanji za pretvezo. Ko se pretvarjajo, da so nekaj, kar niso. To je dezinformacijski vidik. To je dezinformacija, ne glede na to, ali je resnična ali lažna. Mislim, da bi to Slovenci morali vedeti.

Voditelj: Preden zaključiva, ker nama zmanjkuje časa. Kakšno je vaše končno sporočilo? Preden zaključiva. Kako ravnati odgovorno, ko se soočamo z dezinformacijami v obdobju pred volitvami? Kako ravnati odgovorno kot državljan? Kakšen je vaš nasvet?

Gost: Veliko svobodo spremlja velika odgovornost. Mislim, da morajo Slovenci tako kot ljudje po vsem svetu sprejeti več osebne odgovornosti. Mislim, da to pomeni biti izobražen potrošnik informacij. Morda ste pri nakupu mesa zelo previdni ali pri nakupu zamrznjenih jedi v trgovini, kjer se prepričate, da vsebujejo kakovostne sestavine. Enako bi morali storiti z informacijami, še posebej pred volitvami, ker bo po volitvah morda prepozno. Odgovornost je torej velika. Svobodo za to imamo. V informacijskem prostoru imamo več svobode kot kadarkoli prej. A to svobodo je mogoče zlorabiti. Državljani morajo prevzeti to odgovornost. Moj pristop daje orodja. Ustvarja orodja, zagotavlja orodja, ki lahko ljudem omogočijo, da informacije bolje prepoznajo in bolje ocenijo. Mislim, da je to pomembno. To je pomembno za Slovenijo in za Evropo. Dejansko mislim, da je to pomembno za demokracijo.

Voditelj: Michael, hvala za pogovor. Za vaše misli. Veliko sreče pri vašem raziskovanju in zagovarjanju demokracije.

Gost: Bilo mi je v veselje, Zoran. Hvala lepa. 

Voditelj: Hvala. Poslušalci in gledalci, lep pozdrav do naslednjič. Z vami je bil Zoran Potič. Nasvidenje.

[ENGLISH VERSION]

You can't have democracy, if you don't have reliable information. You need good information to have good democracy. Even if the water tastes good and is healthy for you, because that's not the point. It's not the flow of the water, it's the pipeline. It's where it's coming from that matters. And it's the same thing with information.

The Governement's Podcast GOVSI.

Host: Dear listeners, welcome to the new episode of GOVSI Podcast where we are hosting a prominent professor from the US, Michael Epstein. Did I pronounce it correctly?

Guest: Yes.

Host: We have dedicated a lot of time to disinformation on this podcast, we also started the read, think, check initiative. Judging from the experience of other European countries, this issue is important before an election. We will try to explain the influence of disinformation on elections in a democratic society and see how citizens, institutions and technological companies can be responsible before elections. We will talk in English, so I will continue in it. Welcome to podcast GOVSI. It is great to have you with us. To start off, could you briefly introduce yourself and share a bit about your work in the field of media law and disinformation. Please.

Guest: Sure.

Host: The floor is yours.

Guest: Thank you, Zoran, it is great to be here. Thank you for inviting me. Yes, I am a professor of law at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles. I am the longtime editor of the Journal of International Media and Entertainment Law, which is a faculty led journal that Southwestern Law School produces in cooperation with the American Bar Association. I am also the director of the Entertainment and Media Law Concentration at Southwestern Law School. I have been working for decades in the area of media law and the First Amendment in the United States, speech rights in the United States. And I have done also a good deal of work in recent years writing and working on projects relating to the fight against disinformation and misinformation around the world, including within the last five years, taking on two Fulbright specialist projects having to do with the fight against disinformation, one in Africa and another one just this past summer, in the summer of 2025, here in Slovenia.

Host: And your experience in Slovenia?

Guest: I very much love this country. It is beautiful. I was smitten even before my plane landed this past summer, just by looking at the Alpine mountains and the greenery. I am from Los Angeles, so it is a very different type of climate and a very different type of countryside than Slovenia. And also, I was very much taken with just how lovely people have been here. I did get a big laugh when I did see that you cannot spell Slovenia without L-O-V-E, so without love. You know, it is a catchy slogan, but I did feel a great deal of love here in Slovenia, so thank you for asking.

Host: Good to hear that. Well, back to business.

Guest: Yes.

Host: Disinformation has become a constant part of our digital environment, everyday life. How would you define disinformation and why is it such a major challenge, especially when it comes to elections?

Guest: I will tell you. It is such a major challenge because it is often extremely hard to define disinformation or at least to get a consensus as to what disinformation is.

Host: What is lie? What is disinformation, misinformation? We have a lot of expressions.

Guest: Correct. What is, as you would say, what is a lie or what is even truth? I clearly have strong views as to what is truth and what is true, but I also acknowledge that what I think is true, someone else may debate and may not think is true. And disinformation complicates that whole discussion about what is true because it often means creating and fabricating fake evidence in support of something that is not true. And so it becomes difficult to debate and discuss truth and accuracy in society when you lose the reference points of authenticity, of authenticated evidence. And this is something that scholars refer to as information disorder. It is when you and I, not only we don't agree about something, but we bring our own evidence in support of what our positions are. And it is not clear if that evidence is authentic or not. And in the age of digital reproduction and artificial intelligence, that is becoming increasingly difficult for us to discern the authenticity of evidence.

Host: The authenticity is one thing, and intentions are maybe ...

Guest: The intentionality.

Host: Intentionality. Who is doing what for what reason?

Guest: I think that is correct. I think that is the distinction, Zoran, between disinformation and in some ways, its more insidious cousin, misinformation. Disinformation requires deliberation. It requires intentionality. The idea here is to deceive, to basically put out false information, presumably so that people will think it is true. And misinformation is what happens to disinformation down the food chain, so to speak, as people consume the information. So the initial disseminators may intended to deceive, but it is others who are deceived and then pass on the misinformation, thinking it is true, that becomes a real problem because it can expand exponentially online.

Host: It is not wrong to be wrong. We are wrong every day in our life. We don't know everything and we can spread misinformation because we don't know.

Guest: Right. Well, it is not a question of right or wrong. It is really a question of influence. You asked to what end, why do people do disinformation. And there are many reasons. I found in one of my Fulbright projects that some citizens engage in disinformation, principally because it is entertaining to them and they enjoy creating a deepfake video or a deepfake photo, or creating a false narrative and then sending it to friends. The problem, though, is even though that is misinformative, that it is really not done to deceive, it is done intentionally by the initial disseminator, the person who may have even created the image or the narrative. But as it gets forwarded along to subsequent users of social media, the original context, the joke, the parody, for example, becomes lost and then people, at least some people, may begin to believe that it is true or it is being positioned as accurate.

Host: Yes, but at the Digital Citizenship Conference, you highlighted the concept of information sovereignty, describing it as a content neutral approach to countering foreign disinformation campaigns. Could you briefly explain what is that?

Guest: Yes. So what am I trying to bring to the table that is not already set? I look at the fight against disinformation as a very important battle. I think it is essential.

Host: For whom?

Guest: Society.

Host: For democracy?

Guest: Yes. You took the word out of my mouth. For democracy. Because you can't have democracy if you don't have reliable information. You need good information to have good democracy. The problem with fighting disinformation is that it often can entail censorship. And I find that problematic as a free speech advocate, but I also find it pragmatically challenging because governments and other stakeholders may be reluctant to enter into the let's fight disinformation arena because they don't want to be tarred as censors. They don't want to be seen as apologists for one political worldview. We have already said the issue of truth and the issue of accuracy are contested today, especially in a divided nation. So what I am proposing is a way around that by looking at not the content of a message, but the fact that the message is coming from outside the country. So in Europe, there is a great deal of excellent work that has been done on something referred to as foreign information manipulation interference, known as FIMI. And I am sure you have heard about it.

Host: Yes.

Guest: But information sovereignty is about that F. It is about the foreign aspect and it is much less about the information aspect. So at that digital conference I really talked about how I prefer to call it FIM for foreign interference and manipulation.

Host: Where is the difference? I heard your presentation and I said, where is the difference?

Guest: The difference is I am not looking at the content. I am not suggesting that those who are looking to detect FIMI give a pronouncement about whether something is accurate or whether something is truthful. That is not part of my approach. My approach is, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the underlying message, my focus is on the false designation of origin. What is disinformative about the foreign interference is the fact that it is coming in under false pretences. Typically, it is a fake social media account, but it is part of an architecture of foreign influence and manipulation that the European Union has done a great deal of excellent research on. It is coming from a foreign source and that is why I, to answer your earlier question, that is why I have constructed the term information sovereignty. Because no matter what your political worldview might be, you care about the sovereignty of your nation. I think most people in Slovenia, I think if I asked people assembled at a meeting who here sees Slovenia as a country, they are going to raise their hand. Yes, I see it as a country. They care about sovereignty and so I am trying to basically look at this as a matter of information sovereignty. You should be able to control as a country the information that is coming into that sovereign information space, if you will, under false pretences from a foreign entity.

Host: Yes. And that topic is correct. Who is the source? We are talking about sources and who is the producer. And at that point, we are talking about professionals.

Guest: They have some very fanciful names. The EU External Service has done some great work in this area. We know the architecture of these FIMI campaigns, but still, a lot of the effort is on making a pronouncement of accuracy or false about assessing the message. And that turns off a lot of people, especially in a divided country. I am trying to remedy that by, I guess you could say, approaching this with lower common denominator, essentially sovereignty, because that is something that everyone should be able to agree upon, right? Whether it is good information or bad information. I use the analogy of water. If people in Slovenia are told that this is Slovenian water from a Slovenian source that you are drinking, but it turns out that's not true, that it is actually surreptitiously being piped into Slovenia from a neighbouring country, Slovenians should know about that. It is a false designation of origin. It says it is Slovenian, but it's not, even if the water tastes good and is healthy for you, because that's not the point. It's not the flow of the water, it is the pipeline. It is where it is coming from that matters. And it is the same thing with information. You could say something about a political candidate in Slovenia That is perfectly true. You could talk up a candidate's stellar war record, but if you are a foreign entity, here under false pretences with a fake account, and you are pushing that information over and over again onto the Slovenian people, Slovenians should know about that. Why is there this campaign to push this particular candidate? There may be a larger context that could be relevant and interesting to the Slovenian people.

Host: And where are the journalists, mainstream media in that context of sovereignty? They have a role in that?

Guest: The mainstream media still have the role that they have always aspired to have and of course, I don't need to tell you this, but there is a spectrum of approaches and viewpoints that may be brought to bear by the mainstream media. But fundamentally, their role would be the same. I would like to think they are here to try to inform their citizens as best they can, that they see that they have a duty to try to get things right, even if they don't always get things right. I think that they clearly could and should have a role to keep government accountable. The so-called watchdog approach to government, that is all still there. But mainstream media doesn't control the flow of information in 2025 or beyond. You know, at this point, the flow of information is on the internet.

Host: We have influencers, we have TikTok.

Guest: Correct. You have social media.

Host: Citizen journalism. Everybody is a journalist.

Guest: That is right, but that is the question. Is everybody really a journalist? And that is a different question, what the proper role of media is. In the United States, we don't even attempt to define what a journalist is and in some countries in Europe, they do. But the reality is, whether you do or you don't, everybody is potentially a creator and distributor of content. And that is not how it was in the 20th century, but everybody is now and because of that, we need to understand that it's not a question of controlling the dissemination of information. You can't put the genie back in the bottle, if you will. But what you can do is try to, basically look at sources and methods. You can try to use forensic analysis, so that you can better identify those influences, those influencers, as you describe them, who are essentially state adjacent actors, often malign actors who are trying to manipulate the information space in a country.

Host: I am thinking about the analogy. You are describing the idea of information sovereignty. For me, it is like, you know, I am going to the shop and I am buying, I don't know, some meat. I am checking the label. This meat was produced in Slovenia. I will buy it. I don't want meat from, I don't know, Russia. I don't like it. It is an analogy. Is it like that?

Guest: It is a very good analogy. I use the water one, but you could use all sorts of consumer false designation cases. It could be meat, it could be wine, it could be any number of informative signals to the population as to where something is coming from. And just to be clear. It could also be that you really like Russian meat. All right. Or you may decide that, oh, this information, it's not actually a homegrown Slovenian activist. It's really a troll farm from the far east of Europe that is behind this. Okay, well that's fine, you can do that. I'm not telling people what to think here. I'm trying to give people better tools so they can make a better evaluation. As to is this information part of a manipulation campaign? Or is it something that it's truly a Slovenian activist who's trying to raise points within the ecosystem, if you will, of the Slovenian information space?

Host: Do you have a recipe of how to increase the awareness of consumers, information consumers? What kind of tools they can use? Especially before the elections.

Guest: Well, before the elections... Of course, I think the best advice I could give before the election would be, just be an educated consumer. Where's your information coming from? Who's saying it? Is it an account that you can verify? Is it an account that you've seen and trust? Is it an account... Is it coming from a social media account you've never heard of before? That looks like it's coming from one place, but really is coming from another? You can do those types of basic interrogations, if you will. But I think that's part of the media information literacy that could be applied just now at this point in the immediate run up to the 2026 election. I would say more generally, I think there's a great opportunity for more media information literacy in the national curriculum reform that I've had a chance to review here in Slovenia. And I would very much think it would be of value to incorporate this information sovereignty approach into, into the type of curriculum that is designed to make young people here in Slovenia better and more informed citizens.

Host: Yes. Can we talk a little bit about media platforms as a massive influence on how information spreads? How do you assess the responsibility of big tech companies? Maybe in the field of spreading disinformation.

Guest: I mean, that can depend on where, of course, those giant platforms are operating. Of course, in the United States, we really virtually have no guardrails in place, to impose degrees of responsibility on social media companies. There have been some who've asked for that, on the right and the left. Interestingly enough, in the United States. But, it's not something that's in place currently. Here, of course, in Europe, you've got the Digital Services Act. You do have...

Host: But no companies from that social media field.

Guest: No. No companies.

Host: No, there are no companies from social media.

Guest: That are European Union?

Host: European.

Guest: Ah, of course. Yes. These are...

Host: They're just, I mean, United States.

Guest: Well, they are. And, you know, I...

Host: That's a political question.

Guest: It's... I think they are just what they are. You know, they may be transcending the sovereignty of a particular nation at this point, because they operate so fundamentally at the heart of debate and discourse now. But certainly they're, you know, there are some guardrails in place. It's a question of how effective they would be here, in Europe for these for these large social media companies. But, you know, just the amount of data that has to be processed, with respect to requests for takedowns etc. it's immense. And it really remains to be seen, how cooperative these very large and very powerful social media companies will be to the current regulatory scheme and whether it even that regulatory scheme will develop in a way where we'll really have an impact.

Host: Because we saw those... Owners of those companies, big companies, they were, you know, with president of the United States having a good time, dinners, they are cooperating, they are dealing, they're doing big businesses. It's quite odd, isn't it?

Guest: Yeah, it is. I'm not sure if it's odd. I think it may be just the way of the world. These are powerful companies that have powerful interests. And I can certainly see that it's important to, to basically do work with the government, especially if it flexes its muscles. I mean, it's not only the current president, they did that with the previous president as well in the United States. So, you know, but the reality is that, there's no easy way to go back. There's no easy way to censor what essentially has been a tidal wave, a tsunami of citizens who have taken to the internet to express themselves. It's a popular movement, but it's a popular movement that also has outside agitators that are really not part of the population. They're not really part of the citizens. They are manipulating that space and here we can do some things about. So I'm not here to tell you that I've got all the answers to...

Host: I know.

Guest: To journalism.

Host: I know.

Guest: The future of journalism and how best to address speech on social media as we move forward and which approach is going to work best. But I, I like to think that I have a small role here with my information sovereignty approach with respect to those foreign interventions, those foreign manipulations.

Host: But at that point, I have a little remark, a little question. You're probably aware of... Reuters reported about $16 Billions earnings of Meta from... Earning from, you know, from manipulations, from... Do you know that?

Guest: Well, I mean...

Host: Should it be regulated or not?

Guest: Well, that's a great question. I mean, there are lots of questions. Should the algorithms be, you know, regulated? The algorithms historically contribute to the polarization of political discourse to extremes. And of course, that has an impact on democracy. And I've written about that elsewhere. But again, these are questions that we as a society are trying to answer as we move from essentially the infancy of the social media age. I think that's how we'll look back at the last 20 years and, and into its adolescence and it's going to be fueled by artificial intelligence, which I think will be a game changer. So, the goal here is what can we do to prevent us from descending into information disorder which I described to you earlier, the idea that we lose our reference points as to what is accurate, what is defensible. That has an impact even on, that can have an impact, for example, on, what can be admitted to evidence in a trial, you know, in a legal trial, if artificial intelligence makes fakery so good, how can you discern what is authentic from what is fabricated? Those issues are, they're not going away. These are issues we're going to have to contend with as a society. And I'm not purporting with my information sovereignty approach to come up with an answer for that. But I am trying to address a very specific problem within that disinformation space and that is the foreign information and manipulation threat. And that is something I think we can do without alienating people by trying to evaluate content. Because by looking at the foreignness, you're not trying to censor, you're just trying to identify false designation of origin.

Host: Yes. What do you think about Russia or China disinformation agenda they're trying to influence? I don't know.

Guest: So that's the beauty of my approach, because, I use the Latin phrase res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. I don't need to opine as to whether it's Russia or whether it's China or it's some state adjacent or state sponsored intelligence group or troll farm. I'll let the data speak for itself. If, in my approach, we look at everything that comes across the border under false pretenses. It could be from an ally. It could be from an adversary. It could be benign. It could be malign. We look at everything. Now, if it turns out that 90% of everything is coming from one particular country, so be it. And, if that country is Russia or if that country is China, it speaks for itself. I don't have to make a declaration about this country is a problem or this country is a problem. The data will show. That country may be a problem.

Host: Yes, but all data has a context, you know. You just can't leave the context.

Guest: Again, the context here is that we're using known approaches. We know about the architecture of these campaigns. Of course, it doesn't mean that it's not going to continue to evolve. But the context is that flow of information across the border. That's the context. And I like the way you describe it as context with text. It's not about the text. It's not about the message. It's about the context. It's about the time, place or manner of that delivery of the content that matters, not the underlying message, and that should speak for itself. If 90% comes from a particular country, then the people, for example, in Slovenia should know that, and they would know that under this approach.

Host: But the European Union, for example, if you are talking about Russian media, their media are banned. You know, they're not allowed.

Guest: And that's controversial, right? I mean, that's controversial and not all... I know that not all EU member states view that as favourable. That's one of the reasons precisely I try to not go through with the idea of censorship.

Host: Why allow someone who has malignant intentions, malign intentions. Why do you allow them to do that? You know?

Guest: To do...

Host: To harm.

Guest: First of all, you're not allowing anything. No one is sitting here saying, hey, troll farm, we're going to allow you to come in and pretend to be an activist in Maribor. No one's allowing these things. That's the misnomer. This is not the mid-20th century with established media companies where people could've a conversation, as would happen in the United States. Hey, could you not cover this in this particular way, or give us a few weeks to try to sort things out. That type of give and take and negotiation between government or between other leaders in a society and journalists and media that's largely gone. Right. We don't allow this. We just have to somehow deal with this.

Host: There's a difference, because in Europe we like to regulate. In the United States you deal with the stuff.

Guest: Right. And, you know, censorship, I think, is problematic. I understand that there's concerns about propaganda, there's concerns about disinformation. And also Europeans history is different than the USA history. We certainly all know that. But I do think that this to me seems to be a better approach than flat out censorship because it gives you that context. You can see, for some reason, this particular case, you mentioned Russia, Russia has been pushing this surreptitiously into our country, has been pushing this particular agenda. That says something. Now, maybe someone will say, just like we said before. Oh, I really love this water or it doesn't bother me that it comes from Russia. Okay. The best I can offer is to give people more and better tools, more effective tools, so that they can make a more informed decision.

Host: From a historical perspective, you know, digital era we are talking about, disinformation and so on. But I don't know, 50, 60 years ago, we faced propaganda. I don't know, Russian, Soviet propaganda or Hollywood propaganda. Do you see any difference in this timeline or historical perspective, from that perspective?

Guest: Well, the difference again is that it's not as linear as it used to be. It's much more chaotic. And I think that.

Host: It's troubling for people, for citizenship to orientate in that. Chaos, we can say. Information chaos we are facing.

Guest: Yeah. Or information disorder in that sense. That's the term that I like to use. But I think, it's not easy to establish order. But I think you can go a long way by at least identifying the source and the false flag operation. If you will, because it says a lot. Just to be clear, I'm not suggesting that if, a foundation that's owned by a Russian oligarch wants to make a statement in Slovenia and assume, take a position on an issue, and disseminate it with clear identification as to who they are. That's fine. I'm not suggesting we should try to flag that. It's when it comes in under false pretenses, right? As part of this influence campaign when they're pretending to be something or not. That's the disinformative aspect. That's what makes this disinformation, irrespective of whether it's true or false. That is something I think Slovenians should know about.

Host: Before we wrap up, because we are running out of time. In that message should be or what? What's your final message? Before we end. How to act responsibly? How to be responsible when facing disinformation in the period of election, before the election. How to act responsibly as a citizen? What's your advice?

Guest: With great freedom comes great responsibility. And I think citizens in Slovenia, like citizens around the world, need to exercise more personal responsibility. I think that means being an educated consumer of information. So maybe you're going to be very careful shopping for that meat or shopping for that particular frozen dish, frozen food at a grocery store to make sure it has quality ingredients. You should do the same thing with the information you consume, especially before an election, because it may be too late after the election. So the responsibility is great. The freedom is there. We have more freedom than we ever have had before in the information space. But that freedom can be abused and it's really up to citizens to exercise that responsibility. What my approach does, it gives tools. It makes tools, provides tools that may allow people to better identify and to better assess the information they're consuming. And I think that's important. I think it's important for Slovenia. I think it's important for Europe. And I actually think it's important for democracy.

Host: Michael, thank you for your conversation. For your thoughts. And good luck in your research and advocating democracy.

Guest: It's a pleasure to be here, Zoran. Thank you very much.

Host: Thank you. Hello, all viewers and listeners. See you next time. I am Zoran Potič. Goodbye.